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ABSTRACT 
The current high exchange rate volatility in the face of globalization, underpinned by 
growing trade and financial and commodity markets liberalization has attracted the 
resurgence of considerable interest from both financial economists and policy makers, 
into the validity of international parity relationships. Using multivariate cointegration 
framework and long run structural modeling, this paper investigates the evidence in 
support of two of the parity relationships that underpin either implicitly or explicitly 
much of international macroeconomics. The first is the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
hypothesis or the theorem that there exists an invariable long-run equilibrium real 
exchange rate. The second is the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) theorem, a 
hypothesis, which implies that yields of domestic and foreign financial assets (real 
interest rates) can differ only by the expected change in the price of foreign exchange. 
These tests are conducted on 8 of the 14 SADC economies using South Africa and 
United States as numeraires for the post- Bretton era; for the intra-continental and the 
intercontinental approaches respectively. All tests generally suggest that regardless of 
the approach used, there is significant evidence supporting cointegration, when the 
PPP is tested in its simple form and when the joint PPP and UIP hypothesis is tested. 
Except for a few countries, results are less favorable when the simple UIP is tested. 
We are therefore able to conclude that the simple PPP and joint PPP and UIP 
variables are cointegrated or that they do move together in the long-run for most 
countries indicating that the propositions are valid. However, most of the estimated 
cointegrating vectors rejected the restrictions of symmetry and proportionality implied 
by the PPP and UIP theories. With the simple UIP our conclusion is that support is 
sample dependent as the UIP generally holds only for those countries with very strong 
economic ties and whose currencies are pegged one to one. 
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I SUMI\.IARY 
The PPP theorem used on its own or in conjunction with the UIP hypothesis is one of the 
basic ingredients of policyMmakers' 'conventional wisdom' in the detennination of their 
exchange rate policies. The relationship between the PPP used together with the UIP 
suggests that in the long nm a country's real exchange rate will be given by the 
combination of a constant and real interest rate differential. Whereas, the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) hypothesis posits that there is an underlying tendency for movements in the 
nominal exchange rate to offset inflation differentials with a country's trading partners, 
such that, there exists a constant long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. The uncovered 
interest parity (UIP) hypothesis postulates that the expected change in the spot exchange 
rate is always equal to the interest rate differential between two countries. The practical 
implications of the PPP doctrine are diverse, ranging from the significance level of the 
exchange rate used in policy inference to inter-country comparisons of living standards. 
Empirically, the UIP alone or in conjunction with the PPP is usually used as an exchange 
rate forecasting and macroeconomic modeling tool. Combining these two theorems, the 
paper investigates the validity of the PPP and UIP in Southern Africa. Sadly despite the 
theoretical and intuitive appeal of both the PPP and UIP propositions empirical evidence 
for the two (either.separately or collectively) has been a divisive issue, a factor, which 
often raises skepticism about their merits. 
The analysis is conducted within the context of cointegration and it employs the Full 
Inf..::mation Maximum Likelihood Multivariate Cointegration methodology developed by 
Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1991), to investigate the empirical 
validity of the propositions under study. Also, since in a multivariate framework such as 
the one given by the combined PPP and UIP model, a vector error correction model may 
contain multiple cointegrating vectors, the long run structural modeling approach 
suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1997) is used. The technique imposes independent theory 
restrictions on the coefficients of the accepted cointegrating vectors based on long-run 
economic theory, in order to reach conclusions apropos the validity of the propositions 
under study. 
The results are obtained using the individual country approach (not panel) for 8 SADC1 
bilateral exchange rates against the South African rand (intra-continental approach) and, 
the US dollar (intercontinental approach) with monthly information of varying samples 
from the post Bretton Woods ercl The analysis uses multivariate cointegration theory and 
long run structural modeling to examine the existence of cointegration between the 
nominal exchange rate and either the price or interest rate differentials. Although recently 
panel approaches have proven to be superior in raising the power of econometric tests, the 
country specific approach, which highlights the cross country heterogeneity was preferred 
because the hypothesis under examination was the validity of the PPP and UlP, not in 
SADC but, in each SADC economy under investigation. 
The findings vary from country to country but generally there is little evidence to support 
the UIP in its simple form in SADC. Support for the PPP is more favorable as indicated by 
the finding of cointegration between the PPP variables. Interestingly enough is the fact that 
this is true regardless of whether we use the intra-continental or intercontinental approach 
except, for a few countries with strong economic ties. This finding contradicts the evidence 
from other recent tests that the PPP holds better for countries within the same continent. 
However it does support previous empirical findings that there are greater chances for 
finding PPP cointegration for high inflation countries. One is therefore bound to conclude 
that finding empirical evidence of the PPP relationships may still be heavily sample 
dependant, in terms of length of sample period or choice .;,f countries as well as, 
methodology dependent. 
The results of the combined PPP and UIP relationship also provides evidence that there 
exists a cointegration relationship or a stationary long run relationship between the price 
and interest rate differentials. However we find several incidences of significant 
I SADC - Southern Africa Development Community and is made up of the 14 Southern African 
countries (please see map on page xv). Therefore the term SADC and Southern Africa will be used 
synonymously, 
2 The term intra-continental approach In this research means H:.11t both the foreign and domestic 
countries are within the same continent (Africa) and is synonymous with cross-national and so the 
words will be used interchangeably, Whereas the term intercontinental approach refers to the 
situation where the foreign country is outside the continent (in this case the U S). 
cointegrating vectors that reject the theory symmetry and proportionality condition 
restrictions 
The conclusions are that except for a few exceptions where there are very strong trade 
links between the countries, generally the evidence of cointegration between exchange 
rates and interest and price differentials is invariant to the choice of numeraire currency. 
That is, the choice of foreign country does not seem to matter, whether it is intra~ 
continental or intercontinental. Also except for a few countries where there are very strong 
links between the domestic country and the foreign country, the propositions' symmetry 
and proportionality conditions are rejected. 
CHAPTER I 
PROLOGUE 
One of the most remarkable developments in recent years has been the increasing 
integration of the global village via the proliferation of global trade, investment flows and 
communication linkages in a world of rapid technological advancement. This phenomenon 
is normally tenned globalization. In tandem with this rapid change has been the growing 
volatility of currency flows and exchange rate fluctuations. Needless to say as the IMF 
(1984) pointed out foreign exchange rate fluctuations tend to induce macroeconomic 
phenomena that are undesirable by affecting other macroeconomic variables. These other 
macroeconomic variables are the stability of domestic interest rates, the level of inflation 
and the level of unemployment as well as, wealth, constraints on government policy and 
protectionism. To this end exchange rate forecasting and management has become 
invaluable for long term strategic planning by governments and multinational corporations. 
Hence the question of what exactly, in terms of economic fundamentals determines the 
value of a country's exchange rate remains an important issue not only in open economy 
macroeconomics, but also in international finance and economics, 
However the matter remains unsettled despite the fact that considerable ink has been and 
continues to be spilled over the issue. Whilst there are many possible answers, this paper 
will concentrate on two major international parity models that, are most commonly 
employed as building blocks in virtually all contemporary macroeconomic exchange rate 
models and, they are the purchasing power parity (PPP) and the real or uncovered interest 
parity theorem (UIP). In its simplest sense the theory of PPP suggests the presence of a 
long- run equilibrium relationship between national price levels, such that internationally 
traded identical goods should sell for the same effective price when converted into the 
same currency. Defined this way, the PPP provides a specific concept for the nominal 
exchange rate, namely, the PPP exchange rate. This is defined as the rate that equalizes the 
prices of a similar basket of goods in two different countries. The UIP on the other hand 
asserts that nominal interest rates (in a riskless environment) are detennined by world 
interest rates plus the expected change in spot exchange rates, thus implying the 
equalization of real interest rates between countries- the real interest parity (RIP) theorem. 
These two international economics theorems have been subjected to extensive empirical 
testing and there still is burgeoning empirical literature documenting the two concepts and 
yet the debate regarding their empirical validity, although now heading well into extra 
time, remains controversial. With the PPP debate, the sense of a conundrum is only 
furthered by the realization that for the most part, studies have been run on essentially the 
same econometric models and data, deriving different conclusions from slight changes in 
sample periods and length of samples, countries included in the sample, :frequency of data, 
pooling and panel techniques, stationarity tests and the like (Taylor, 2000). 
A flavor of the PPP tests can be obtained from Krugman (1978), Frankel (1981), 
Dornbusch (1988), Hakkio (1984), Lothian and Taylor (1996), Rogoff (1996), MacDonald 
(1997), Geppert (1997), Engel et al (1996), Ramirez (1999) and Taylor (2000), Chortareas 
and Driver (2001). Though there seems to be no broad agreement at hand, as to the PPP 
empirical validity (i.e. the symmetry and proportionality conditions do not hold exactly for 
any pair of countries over time), there is some degree of consensus on a couple of basic 
facts. First, because the adjustment of bilateral exchange rates to domestic and relevant 
foreign price levels is not instantaneous as required by the theory, it is not out of the 
ordinary to observe short-run deviations from the PPP, For this reason, the PPP theory 
does not explain the behavior of exchange rates in the short run (see Frankel 1981 for a 
classic example, Adler and Lehmann (1983) and Krugman (1978)). This conclusion is in 
line with Froot and Rogoff's (1994, p. 2) observation that, 
"The advent of floating exchange rates made it obvious-that PPP is not a short run 
relationship; price levels movements do not begin to offset exchange rate swings on a 
monthly or even annual basis". 
Secondly, using both regression and cointegration, generally studies using long range 
annual time series data sets, found persuasive evidence of mean reversion or a 
cointegration relationship between nominal exchange rates and relative price ratios. Real 
exchange rates tend towards the purchasing power parity in the very long run, with 
consensus estimates, suggesting a very slow rate of conversion of a 3-5 year half-life. One 
caveat though to the long horizon time series approach, is that apart from the potentially 
serious strucmral changes between each exchange regime, the long time series encompass 
periods in wbi ch nominal exchange rate regimes shifted from floating to fixed and back 
again (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Lothian 1997). As shown in Mussa (1986), real exchange 
Is 
rates tend to be much less volatile under fixed exchange rates than they do under floating 
exchange rates. Also, the basket used to construct the price indices is likely to be very 
different at the beginning and end of the sample. The empirical implication of 
amalgamating data from different periods on test results therefore remains unclear and for 
this reason some authors including the author of this paper, preferred not to use data from 
different regimes. In addition, this long-horizon approach is also susceptible to specific 
sample selection bias, referred to as the survivorship bias (Froot and Rogoff, 1995) in that 
due to data availability, long horizon studies of the PPP primarily investigate industrial 
countries. 
Thirdly, in post 1973 - the period of floating exchange rates - using high frequency 
monthly data-3 most tests generally found poor perfonnance of the PPP, the existence of 
unit root in real exchange rates, or no cointegration between exchange rates and the price 
ratios and therefore failed to reject the random walk hypothesis. However, for the same 
period studies using panel data found evidence against the random walk real exchange rate 
hypothesis. Such tests involve testing the hypothesis that each individual series is I (1), 
against the alternative that all the series taken as a panel are stationary. This evidence 
supports the conclusion by Bethelomy and Sorderling (1999) that using a panel data set 
combining cross sectional and time series infonnation leads to substantially better 
econometric results. It also confirms the argwnent by Li (1997) and Frankel and Rose 
(1996) and many others that the ability to find evidence of the PPP depends crucially on 
the total variation, which might come either from time series dimension or the cross-
sectional dimension in the data used. 
Fourth, some studies like Krugman (1978) found evidence suggesting that there is more to 
exchange rates than the PPP. This conclusion leads to the missing variable problem in the 
theory's specification. Finally in many PPP tests reported in empirical literature, there is a 
clear pattern of greater support for the PPP under episodes of high inflation. A classical 
example is the Gennan hyperinflationary experience documented in Frankel 1978 and 
Madbavi and Zhou (1996). 
With the real interest parity theorem, commonly known as the uncovered interest rate 
parity (UIP), results also remain mixed. Bollerslev (2000) noted that the UIP is one of the 
3 High frequency data here refers to monthly and quarterly data as opposed to annual data. 
most unresolved paradoxes in international finance. So unconvincing has been the 
empirical verification of the U1P hypothesis that the general view of the economics 
profession weighs more in favor of the empirical failure of the UJP in predicting exchange 
rate movements. In fact, most research in the area point to the conclusion that the VIP is at 
best a poor or even a perverse predictor of exchange rate movements. For this reason, Guy 
Meredith (2000) concluded that this resounding unanimity on the failure of the predictive 
power of the interest rate differential is virtually unique in the empirical literature in 
economics. Also, using the Engle and Granger cointegration method, Meese and Rogoff 
(1988) and Edison and Pauls (1993) among others failed to establish a clear long nm 
relationship in their analyses, However, Edison and Melick (1997) and MacDonald (1997) 
using the Johansen method have reported somewhat stronger UIP evidence. More support 
for the UlP was also reported by Meredith (2000), who using interest rates of longer 
maturity horizons found all coefficients on interest rate differentials not only having the 
correct sign, but almost very close to the predicted value of unity. Probably the strongest 
evidence in favor of establishing a clear long run relationship between exchange rates and 
interest rate differential was established by MacDonald and Nagayasu (2000) using panel 
cointegration methods. 
Simply put one can surmise that the high regard that the PPP and UIP theorems are held in 
seem incongruous with the poor empirical support that they enjoy. 
MotivatioP. and Significance of Study 
It is clear from the above discussion that although testing the PPP and UIP theorems has 
been prolific, the empirical validity of the PPP and UIP concepts as models of exchange 
rate movements remains very controversial and unclear. Despite evidence on these 
concepts not being conclusive, what is clear from the sheer extensiveness of published and 
unpublished work devoted to these theorems, is the indication in part that there is a 
reluctance to accept that the PPP and UIP do not hold, at least in the long run. In addition, 
the very fact that either one or both the two theorems continue to be employed by 
practitioners in their exchange rate models only attests to this apparent reluctance to accept 
that these theorems do not hold. 
In light of this, the major motivation of this study is not only topicality, as evidenced by 
the continued vast research and interest in the area The motivation to study the Southern 
African economies also arises from the fact that while these theorems have been 
extensively studied, admittedly most research in this area has focused on industrialized 
countries, Latin America, Asia and/or other developing countries mostly outside Africa. In 
contrast empirical evidence for developing countries in Africa, least of all in Southern 
Africa is notably limited. At least three factors may account for this. First, limitations on 
quality and frequency of data may be a constraining factor. Second, developing countries 
tend to be prone to sudden crisis and marked gyrations in macroeconomic variables, often 
making it difficult to discern any type of cycle or economic regularity. Related to this are 
the frequent large policy shocks. which lead to time series noise evidenced by severe 
measurement problems (official and market exchange rates often differ by large margins). 
Thirdly, the economic insignificance of African states in the global economy could also 
help to explain the apparent lack of interest in carrying out much research into these 
economies. 
Clearly economists like to use PPP as a frame of reference not just for industrial countries 
but for the rest of the world as well. Even more important is the fact that, in small open 
economies like those of SADC, the detennination of exchange rates is of crucial 
importance to understanding the links between domestic and foreign economies. 
Therefore, given that very little attention by way of research on the PPP and UIP has been 
given to Sub-Saharan Africa and least of all Southern Africa, this paper builds on the 
existing literature by systematically documenting the stylized facts on the validity of the~ 
exchange rate theorems in the developing economies of SADC. This could prove useful for 
a number of reasons. To begin with, such an investigation could be valuable for analyzing 
whether similar empirical regularities are observed across countries with different macro-
economic policies and at different economic development levels. Most important of all as 
argued for instance by Agenor and Montiel (1996), these findings may have important 
policy implications. 
In the case of SADC in particular where one of the major causes of its dire economic 
consequences has been overvalued national currencies and unstable monetary events, the 
existence of an empirically verifiable long-run exchange rate theory, may prove crucial in 
providing firm foundations on, which to develop exchange rate models that capture 
exchange rate movements over the economic life cycle and, for exchange rate management 
purposes. The results may also provide an important theoretical basis in the designing of 
financial stabilization policies, in as far as these concepts play a major role in the choice 
between interest rates, inflation or exchange rate targeting in their monetary policies (Boyd 
and Smith, 1999). In addition the findings might prove invaluable in providing a basis for 
the designing of structural adjustment policy programs recommended by the, IMF and 
World Bank as they play their increasing role as supervisors of stabilization and 
adjustment in transitional economies.4 Last but not least, since the use of these exchange 
rate theories is of immense importance (due to their implications for setting prices and 
hedging) to multinational firms, it is very important to establish whether these theories of 
exchange rate determination are accurate or even applicable to SADC countries. 
Another motivation for the study is based on Thomas (1973) who warns against an 
unqualified projection of results based on historical periods to the current situation. He 
suggests that the recent experience of foreign exchange markets is necessary to gauge the 
relevance of the PPP theory to improve its applicability to existing conditions. fu particular 
the new era of, floating albeit managed exchange rates affords useful data for such 
empirical work. For the SADC countries, even though the current floating exchange rate 
system dates back to 1973, currency liberalization started in the 1980s and only gained 
momentum during the 1990s when most foreign exchange restrictions were relaxed. It 
therefore goes without saying that with the current thrust to economic reforms, 
underpinned by among other things the need to properly value Southern African states' 
cu1Tencies, there is an inevitable need to investigate the ·:alidity of the PPP and UIP in 
SADC countries in the ! 980s-90s. It is hoped that, the empirical findings will be of interest 
to the respective countries' policy makers and their economic-advisers as these 
investigations will indicate macroeconomic policy implications the policy makers can 
work on to achieve :financial stabilization and stable and properly valued exchange rates. 
Purpose of Study and Research Questions 
To this end, a key contribution of this study is to build on the existing literature by 
extending the scope of investigations into the empirical evidence of the joint PPP and UIP 
hypotheses in Southern Africa in several dimensions. Using the :framework of multivariate 
4 One of the reasons the IMF was created, was to assist In the elimination offoreign es.change 
restrictions, which hamper the growth of world trade (Article 1 of the IMF's Articles of Agreement-
IMF 1993). 
cointegrating equations suggested by Jobausen and Juselius (1990, 1992) and Pesaran and 
Shin (1997)'s long run structural modeling methodology, the paper investigates the 
existence of a long run relationship between nominal bilateral exchange rates of the 
currencies of the SADC against, a set of factors consisting of measures of interest rates and 
price differentials, as assumed by the PPP and UIP relation, as well as the real price of oil. 
The investigations were conducted using two approaches, (i) the intra-continental or cross-
national approach where South African is the foreign country and the intercontinental 
approach. where the US is the foreign country. 
The questions to be answered are: 
I) Does the simple PPP and UJP hold in SADC countries'. 
2) Does the PPP model of exchange rates, used in conjunction with the UIP and 
allowing for the effect of oil prices hold for the SADC countries? In other words, 
how important is the price ratio variable as a theory of the detennination of 
exchange rates, when compared to the interest rate differentials variable? This will 
be examined in two contexts: (i) the intra-continental approach and (ii) the 
intercontinental approach with the aim of answering question (3), 
3) Is evidence of finding support for the PPP dependent upon the choice ofnurneraire 
currency? In other words does the PPP and UIP hold better for countries within the 
same continent or not 
4) Are the speeds of gravitation towards PPP and UIP different or the same for the 
different SADC countries? 6 The measwing of speed of convergence is critical 
especially where the strong form PPP 7 is rejected 
Methodology 
First an analysis of the order of integration of the variables is established using unit root 
tests as has become the standard procedure in most empirical studies applying time-series 
techniques. Secondly the order of the vector auto regression (VAR) is also established and 
finally the simultaneous model, which analyses data in a full system of equations as used 
by Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992) is adopted for this analysis. The novelty of the 
5 The term simple PPP or UIP in the context of this study refers to the hypotheses:, in their originally 
postulated forms i.e., not the joint study of the two. 
The formulator of the modern PPP, Cassel (1922), believed that the disturbances to PPP would be 
extioguished after one year and the currencies revert to PPP. 
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model is that it allows for possible interactions in the determination of prices, interest rates 
and exchange rates, thus avoiding the single-equation bias (for full discussion see Johansen 
and Juselius, 1992). For the intra- continental analysis variance decompositions, 
persistence profiles and impulse response functions were also used to gauge the exogeneity 
of each variable and to measure the time profile of the effect of shocking one or all 
variables in the system respectively. 
Although the use of the panel data approach has shown more power in predicting the 
validity of the PPP anci UIP in most recent empirical literature, it was deemed necessary 
for the purposes of this study to preclude this approach for the following reasons. Firstly, 
because cross- country differences between the sample countries are substantial, this cross-
sectional heterogeneity was taken into account and the countries considered individually 
for the empirical modeling of exchange rate dynamics. Secondly, as the hypothesis under 
investigation is not testing the validity of the Casselian theorem and the uncovered interest 
parity in general, but to test whether their empirical validity applies to each individual 
SADC country, the country by country approach was considered ideal. This is in line with 
the conclusion by Frankel and Rose (1996) and Madd«la and Wu (1999), !hot assuming all 
sample countries have an identical PPP regression coefficient is too restrictive due to the 
considerable diversities of the macro-economic policies (particularly foreign exchange 
policies), which exist in each country and different traded and non-traded goods. 
Also, since the empirical literature is of the opinion that the selection of a standard foreign 
country is useful in testing the PPP a lot of consideration was put into the issue. As stated 
by Officer (1976), ifa unique standard country is to be used in the computation of PPPs for 
a broad group of countries then the usual choice of the US seems appropriate. However for 
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individual country analysis, the optima] standard country wouJd be the one with which the 
former country's trade and payments links are strongest. Davutyan and Pippenger (1990) 
produce evidence that PPP holds better for countries within the continent than for countries 
on separate continents. Using the same argwnent some studies have found that the PPP 
holds better for European countries than for the US (see, for example, Edison, et al (1997), 
Jorion and Sweeney (1996) and Papell (1997)). This seems to be caused by the fact that the 
geographical proximity of European countries facilitate greater goods arbitrage, making it 
more likely for the PPP to occur. South Africa was therefore chosen as the foreign country 
7 Strong form PPP in this study refers to the PPP hypothesis In Its symmetry and proportionality 
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for the cross-national approach not only because of its geographical proximity but also due 
to the fact that, a11 SADC member states have some trade links with it albeit to different 
extents. The US was deemed the favorite foreign country for the intercontinental or cross-
continental approach. 
Summary 
The findings are that, cointegration tests for both the simple PPP aod the joint PPP aod UIP 
indicate some evidence of co integration thus confirming the validity of weak fonn PPP and 
joint PPP aod UIP hypotheses in the SADC. 8 This positive result could be attributed to 
high inflation, which is a common characteristic of the sample countries during the sample 
period. However using long-run structural modeling, generally the estimated cointegrating 
vectors violate the symmetry aod proportionality conditions implied by the PPP aod UIP 
theories. The choice of foreign country does not seem to matter, as the results are similar 
both for the intra-continental and the intercontinental approaches with very few exceptions. 
We also observed that a conunon conclusion to this research is that the SADC exchange 
rates contain sizable mean reverting components but the mean reversion rate vary between 
countries and also between the PPP and UIP. Gravitation back to long-run equilibrium 
definitely does not occur overnight and deviation from parity is by and large persistent. 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows; Chapter 2 gives a detailed analysis to Sub-
Saharan Africa's economic trends over the past three decades. The Chapter also gives an 
introduction of SADC and outlines the specifics of each member country's, economic 
standing. 9 The Chapter concludes by isolating the unique economic characteristics of the 
sample countries relevant for the analysis. Chapter 3 outlines the literature review and 
gives the theoretical background of the PPP and UIP doctrines, marking out their empirical 
origins and the subsequent criticisms as well as problems underlying their testing and 
implementation. Following this, the model and methodology is presented in Chapter 4. 
Data and results are analyzed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 outlines the limitations of the study 
restrictions (Le.,p-e-p • = J.J.J) 
I Where there is colntegration at the 95% critical level we conclude that the weak form version of the 
theory holds even though the theory restrictions of symmetry and proportionality are !lubsequently 
rejected. The strong form theory validity ill where the theory n:striclions or symmetry and 
proportionality are accepted, 
9 Southern Africa falls under Sub-Saharan Africa and thb background chapter is Intended to give the 
reader a better understanding oftbe structural characteristics oftbe region under study. 
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and recommendations for further research. The last Chapter concludes with an epilogue. 
An Appendix, containing data sources, data figures and detailed data analysis tables is also 
provided. The Appendix a1so contains a detailed description of the organizational structure 
of SADC. A reference list and notes are at the end. 
CHAPTER2 
BACKGROUND 
Any study of the SADC countries would not be complete without a brief overview of the 
overall African economic trends. The overview is also intended to provide the reader with 
a better understanding of the structural characteristics of the African economies. 
2.1 A General Overview of the African Economic Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Southern African countries fall under Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and like all economies of 
SSA, the region is not only being left behind in the tide of globalization10 but has been 
arguably overturned by it much to the detriment of its economies. Stein (1999) even goes 
further and argues that globalization has failed to transform the structure of African 
economies and might have actually exacerbated some of its structural weaknesses and 
economic dislocation. It must be however noted at the onset that although they share 
common characteristics sub-Saharan African countries have great diversities, and as such it 
is accordingly difficult to draw general conclusions about the region's economic 
perfonnance as a whole. Broad generalizations will however be attempted. 
By virtually any economic or social indicator SSA countries perform less well thsn any 
other developing region outside Africa. Its economic performance over the last three 
decades can be best described as disappointing as most of the region's states failed to break 
away from the path of low or negative per capita income growth. With the lowest average 
GDP per capita output growth rate in the world ofUS$308, SSA has in many ways found 
itself retreating economically while other developing areas of the world, vis a vis East 
Asia, South Asia and Latin America, are developing strongly. Although performance 
slightly improved from 1995 primarily due to new commitment by many countries to 
sound macro-economic policies and more open and better managed economies, growth 
remain fragile. Factors underlying Africa's parlous economic conditions and macro-
instability can be broadly categorized as external and or internal, all of which have 
militated against sub-Saharan Afiica's fuller engagement in the international economy. 
10 Globaliszation in the context of this study means, the Increasing integration of world economiH 
through a combination of capital, Information and technology and trade nows. 
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Major external factors contributing to most of Africa's economic pathologies include the 
vicissitudes of international commodity prices coupled with adverse movements in terms 
of trade, historical structures, massive shifts and huge declines in foreign aid and/or 
investment (financial flows). Internal factors are mostly sui generis to developing 
countries. They include poor soils, widely fluctuating and harsh climates, poor human and 
physical infrastructure, rapid urbanization and population growth, poor health delivery 
systems worsened by the upsurge of the HIV I AIDS pandemic, environmental degradation, 
ineffective and inefficient governments and, inappropriate public policies all topped up 
with persistent political tunnoil and frequent transformation of political regimes. 
Unfortunately African governments have very limited control over many of these factors 
particularly the external ones. 
2.1.1 External Factors of Economic Decline 
Trade and Regional Co-operation: 
The pillars of Africa's relationship with the western industrialized countries are, trade, aid 
and investment. Decline in all three has inevitably added to the continent's poor economic 
performance over the last two decades, with the most serious of the external factors being 
the worsening terms of trade characterized by waning traditional exports both in terms of 
price and quantities, alongside ever increasing imports also both in price and value. 
Processing which would provide employment opportunities to African economies is 
discouraged by import policies (i.e. tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade) of western 
industrialized countries. These forms of protectionism, for example strict inspection 
requirements on food imports also play a major and often negative role in Africa's export 
performance. Additionally the relative decline in terms of trade in Africa is also directly 
related to the shifting nature of global production. Due to advances in biotechnology and 
material sciences, industry in western countries is increasingly turning to synthetic 
substitutes for primazy products such as beet sugar for cane sugar. On the demand side 
fiber optics or microwaves are replacing copper wires in telecommunications, putting 
downward pressure on prices and curtailing imports from Africa 
Moreover, trade among African countries is low as most states produce similar products 
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for export, generally primary agricultural products and mineral commodities. As most 
value added is carried out in western industrialized countries (WIC) there is little African 
demand for these products. In fact, African countries themselves often discourage trade by 
their strongly inward oriented import substitution development strategies, including, over-
valued exchange rates and protectionist trade policies. Their transport infrastructure is 
geared for export to Western Europe, Japan and North America making a mockery of the 
saying that charity begins at home. In Southern Africa for example, only 4% of the export 
trade of the 14 member countries of SADC were transacted between SADC markets in 
1998. 11 The result is that Africa has been missing the large expansion of international 
trade. Figures from the ARD of March- April 1998 show tha~ Africa's share of global 
trade has fallen from around 3% in the 1950s to 1% in 1995. 
In an attempt to improve their trade perfonnance and to develop overall regional economic 
cooperation, there have been several attempts to fonn free trade areas or customs unions. 
Several of these have failed and have since been abandoned, such as the colonial imposed 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Zimbabwe Zambia and Malawi) or the East 
African Community incorporating Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda Only the South African 
Customs Union (SACU) founded in 1969 and comprising of Botswana, South Africa, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland has stood the test of time and as such is the longest 
standing and successful regional organization. 
Two other groupings conunanding good prospects for success and respect are the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS has as its eventual goal the removal of barriers to trade, 
employment and movement between its 16 member states as well as the rationalization of 
currencies and financial payments among its members. However, owing to the political 
and economic disparities between its members, it is likely to be decades before any of the 
above objectives are fully met. 
SADC was established initially as Southern African Development Co·ordination 
Conference (SADCC) to provide a counter, during the (lra of apartheid, to South Africa's 
economic hegemony over the region. SADC did not initially seek an economic association 
or customs union, but rather to :function as a sub regional planning center to rationalize 
11 See Africa South of the Sahara 1999; Economic Trends In Africa South of the Sahara, 1999. 
development planning. Its reconstitution in 1982 to SADC placed binding obligations on 
member countries with the aim of promoting economic integration towards a fully 
developed economic market. This regional integration, it is hoped, will help the member 
countries to overcome the disadvantage of their relatively small economic size and 
enhance their ability to trade globally. 
Foreign debt, aid and investment: 
Three of the most obvious manifestations of external difficulties are the high level of 
foreign debt, moribund levels of international aid and the difficulty of attracting foreign 
investment. Africa's debt has long passed sustainable debt ratios and its structure remains a 
major impediment to the continent's recovery. In the whole region of SSA, total external 
debt as a percentage of exports rose from 91% in 1980 to 270% in 1995, whilst debt 
relative to GDP also increased from 30.6% of GDP in 1980 to 74.1% in 1995.12 Of the 36 
most severely indebted low-income countries listed by the World Bank in 1996, 28 were 
from SSA. To date, without foreign debt relief and with the continued capital flight, some 
countries are paying much more than their exports bring in resulting in too frequent budget 
deficits. 
Africa's ability to service its debts has been impaired by rising world interest rates 
(commercial debt often uses floating interest rates) and severe falls in foreign exchange 
earnings coupled with ever declining annual levels in net foreign financial flows (including 
concessionary economic assistance) from the mid 1980s. For example in 1993, SSA 
attracted only $8.00 per capita in foreign capital flows against almost $200.00 per capita in 
Latin America Also, much of the assistance particularly from IMF is short term and must 
be paid back even before structural adjustment is complete, such that in 1996 alone, Africa 
paid US$2,5 billion more in debt servicing than it received in long tenn loans and credits. 
The major reasons for the dearth of foreign invesbnent have been that the sub-Saharan 
Africa region has yet to broaden its investment base beyond energy and mining, which 
remain the prime attractions to foreign investors. While investors are, attracted by the 
region's vast raw materials and low wage economies, they are fearful of high risk due to 
internal political volatility and the uncertainty surrounding obtaining enforcement of 
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contracts and low returns on capital. These considerations combined with the deteriorating 
human and physica1 infrastructure have virtually extinguished overall investor confidence 
leaving just a minute participation of Africa in flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
According to UNCTAD, Africa's share of developing countries' FD! has fallen from 11% 
in 1986-90 period to 5% during the 1991-96 and falling to a mere 3.8% in 1997. In the 
period 1991-95 the total going to Africa was only 2% of the world's total FD! (44% ofit 
went to Nigeria alone)13, In comparison in 1996 Malaysia and Poland received more than 
the total of the entire continent. For sub-Saharan Africa this understates the paucity of 
participation. 
Overall the poor export performances coupled with the problems of decline in foreign debt, 
aid and investments discussed above, have resulted in large deficits in most countries' 
current balance of payment accounts. 
2.1.2 Internal Factors of Economic Decline 
Having discussed the external problems, the internal economic problems in the view of 
many analysts far outweigh the external factors. Indeed the World Banlc (WB). 1989 study 
on Sub-Saharan Africa's quest for sustainable growth suggested Iha~ "underlying the 
Jitany of Africa's problems is a crisis of governance." 
Government, Social factors and Environment: 
Internationally, social and political stability is generally associated with higher economic 
growth rates. Unfortunately more than half of the African states have been caught up in 
civil wars, uprisings, mass migrations and famine. Ethnic conflicts and civil wars have 
continued in 2000 in Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, the democratic Republic of Congo and 
Angola to name a few. In addition to damaging economic prospects in the region, armed 
conflicts and instability has resulted in very low average GDP per capita. According to the 
World Banlc between 1965 and 1985 the more unstable countries averaged armual GDP per 
12 Statistics were eitracted from Africa South of the Sahara 1999; Economic trends in Africa South of 
the Sahara, 1999. 
13 For comparison with previous periodSt according to the ECA Economic Report, FDI and bilateral 
credits to Su~aharan Africa fell from 5% In the t97os to 3.5% in the 1990s. I ts 
capita output growth rate of 0.5% while the region's most stable countries achieved an 
average growth rate of 1.4% over the same period. 
In addition some governments even stable ones have been suspicious and hostile towards 
the business community be it foreign or domestic and have also become bloated, greedy 
and corrupt. This animosity has in some instances proved to be counter productive and a 
major impediment to foreign investment and economic growth. The quest for better 
governance remains critical especially in the are of economic management. 
The region's population growth has doubled since the 1960s and at the current growth rate 
it is again expected to double by 2020. Unfortunately most African governments until 
relatively recently did not view rapid population growth and environmental degradation 
( characterized by over cultivation and overgrazing) as matters of concem Only in the last 
decade of the 20th century has a succession of countries realized that, their resources cannot 
service the ever-increasing population growth and so have begun programs on family 
planning and environmental protection. 
Rapid urbanization also caused stress in many African economies and with it came 
rampant unemployment and underemployment as job opportunities failed to keep pace 
with the growth of labor force. To compound the problem, African states face significant 
problems in the provision of health services and education. This is made worse by the fact 
that several countries continue to spend more on military requirements than on health and 
education. The dramatic upsurge in HIV infections coupled with the rise in the incidence 
of tuberculosis also continue to exacerbate budgetary pressures on individual governments' 
ability to provide adequate health care and education. The United Nations has estimated 
HIV to have, infected 24.5 million or 8.6 percent of the adult population of sub-Saharan 
Africa by the end of 1999. Given the size of the pandemic and its adverse impact on life 
expectancy, savings, growth, labor productivity and human welfare and the social fabric in 
several Central, Southern and East African states, it is reasonable to expect that AIDS will 
curtail GDP growth in several countries well into the 21st century. 
Related to problems of inadequate education facilities and opportunities is the fact that 
participation in the era of infonnation technology (IT) is contingent upon basic 
technological literacy. Without education vital elements of participation in the IT 
revolution continue to lack seriously. Primary school enrollment rates continue to plummet 
from 69% for female children and 91% for male children in 1980 to 64% and 77% 
respectively by 1993 (Word Bank; 1996). The decline in education is due to a variety of 
factors including pulling out children to support family income strategies in the infonnal 
sector after layoffs in the fonnal sector; the introduction of school fees in education and, 
the cutback in the 1980s on spending in education by many African governments partly in 
response to IMF credit and deficit targets. Also, the lack of hope in the formal economy for 
educated graduates has created demonstration effect due to paucity of jobs (Stein, 1999). 
To cap it all, Africa's institutions of research and development and higher learning have 
seriously eroded in recent years with irregular payments of staff salaries and, poor and 
inadequate staffing and funding, which remain very tiny by world standards. One can 
therefore argue that if Africa is to foster growth, then more investment and additional focus 
on hwnan capit· J is needed, especially through shifting the structure of public spending in 
favor of primary education, health care and other social services. 
Physical Infrastructure and the Structure of the Economies 
For most countries in the region except South Africa, physical infrastructure has generally 
deteriorated since the countries achieved their independence due to neglect and funding 
crises. Serious infrastructure deficiencies in essential services such as transportation 
(roads, railways and ports), communications and power generation, remain a major feature 
in most economies in the region. The situation is particularly worse in the rural areas. 
Millions of US dollars worth of investment in transportation will be required if Africa is to 
take advantage of any improvement in agricultural output perfonnances. Better allocation 
of public funds as well as opening these sectors to private investment, with appropriate 
supporting policies to foster competition, would improve infrastructure and at the same 
time reduce the public budgetary burden. 
Although African industry marginally expanded during the past generation from about 
25% of the continent's GDP in 1965 to 30% in 1987, contribution to GDP is still lower 
than the least developed countries' average. 
The structure of sub-Saharan Africa's economies has not changed drastically since the time 
of independence, as African goals of rapid industrialization have not materialized. We 
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argue that globalization has failed to transform the structure of African economies and 
might even have actually exacerbated some of its structural weaknesses. Manufacturing, 
which advanced rapidly in the 1960s has slowed to about the same average as the gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth and by the early 1990s manufacturing represented only 
11% of the region's economic productivity (against 9% in 1965). In 1995 its contribution 
to global manufacturing was a mere 0,3%. 
The Sub~Saharan Africa region experienced overall rates of inflation of 37.2% in 1993, 
60.7% in 1994 and 43.4% in 1995, Many African countries' currencies appreciated in 
exchange rate terms during the, mid 1970s because while inflation raised domestic prices, 
local currencies were not devalued to compensate. As a result most currencies became 
overvalued, such that their purchasing power was stronger for goods from abroad than at 
home leading to increased demand for imports. At the same time, their exports have 
become increasingly uncompetitive in price as their currencies became overvalued and the 
foreign 'hard' currencies were in short supply. This drove African governments to limit or 
ration foreign exchange. This move triggered "parallel" or "black markets" for foreign 
currencies. Foreign exchange over- valuation was thus a result of inflation which, in tum 
was generated at least in part by escalations of government deficits itself a product of poor 
monetary and fiscal policies. To raise more revenue, African governments increased export 
and import tariffs and this led to declines in trade. As trade declines, so does government 
revenue thus exacerbating year on year budget deficits. If not corrected, overall production 
and exports are hurt by an overvalued currency, which inhibits economic diversification 
and resilience to future economic shocks. 
Agriculture and Famine 
Indisputably the leading factor behind the drastic declines in African economies has been 
the general neglect of agriculture. Agriculture alone accounts for about a third of the GDP 
for the continent as a whole, two thirds of employment and 40% of export value. As 
suggested by the WB, " if agriculture is in trouble, Africa is in trouble", and agriculture has 
been in trouble for the past three decades. On average agricultural growth was slower 
during the period 1970-1990 (then it rose by 1.4% anuually, about half the rate of the 
population growth) than in the 1960s when it advanced at the rate of 2.7%. The impact is 
that several African states in the region are suffering from food deficits and the under 
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nutrition which goes with it. 
Many African countries continue to suffer from either chronic food insecurity because 
there is not enough food locally or because they cannot afford enough food, or from 
transitory food insecurity due to fluctuations in prices and production levels caused by 
natural climatic difficulties including droughts and floods and civil wars. Sadly, several 
millions suffer from hunger or are at the immediate risk of famine especially in rural areas. 
Grain, meat and overall calorie consumption are well below the required minimums and 
Africa remains the only continent in the world that has not reached a life expectancy of 60 
years. To make matters worse producers are often bound by prices fixed by their 
governments and at times these 'l)roducer" prices fail to cover input costs, forcing fanners 
to reduce production for sale and reverting to subsistence agriculture. Low levels of 
technology and bottlenecks like poor roads for transporting produce also have a negative 
impact on agricultural production. 
Parastatal Organizations 
Central to the understanding of direct state involvement in many African economies is the 
role of parastatal organizations. The establishment of these state·owned organizations rose 
out of the governments' justifiable concerns that the private sector could not or would not 
help in improving the living conditions for the poorest citizens. Generally most analysts 
consider these public enterprises to have failed at least in terms of the economic efficiency 
criteria. Consistent and at times uncalled for government intervention in their day to day 
running. mismanagement and corruption are some of the often cited causes for the failure 
of the predominantly monopolistic parastatal bodies. Appropriately designed and regulated 
divestiture should improve efficiency, reduce strains on the public budget, eliminate 
political interference in decision making and provide incentives for foreign investment, 
more innovation and dynamism. 
2.1.3 Pressures for Economic Policy Reform and Adjustment 
Pressures from international organisations 
Due to their poor economic performance md their growing economic malaise, the African 
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countries have been coming under increasing pressure from a variety of sources to 
liberalize their public economic policies. Owing the 1970s to the 1990s most direct 
pressure came from the IMF, which stressed the importance of macroeconomic stability as 
a precondition for growth and poverty reduction crippling most countries in the region. It 
insisted on a condition for its support sometimes termed "structural adjustment", usually in 
the areas of exchange rates (i.e. devaluation) agriculture, infrastructure and institutional 
reform in the public sector as well as reduction in government spending, before a new loan 
agreement could be signed. By 1997, 35 African countries had launched Structural 
Adjustment Programs. Additional pressures came from the WB and USAJD all, which 
joined the IMF in playing an increasing role as the supervisors of stabilization and 
adjustment in transitional economies. To date, in essence, African governments have little 
choice but to agree to the tenns and conditions of the IMF and Word Bank if they are to 
receive any concessional assistance and debt relief. 
From the perspective of the World Bank and IMF, the cause of Africa's economic 
melancholy was directly the result of policies pursued by the governments of Africa since 
independence and particularly from the 1970s. The important policies as cited in H.Stein 
1999 are: 
1) Overvalued exchange rates which encouraged imports at the expense of_ exports 
which in tum caused imbalances in the current account 
2) The neglect of agriculture through low production prices and government controlled 
marketing boards, reflecting broader policy of an urban bias. 
3) Over investment in import substitution relative to domestic demand and to the 
export industries that are needed to generate rising foreign exchange. 
4) Over extension of public ownership relative to their economic justification and 
existing management capacity, leading to inefficiently run public enterprises while 
displacing the private sector. 
5) Overspending on government, usually to support bloated bureaUcracies leading to 
exorbitant budget deficits. 
6) Financing of government deficits and public companies through money supply 
creation or seigniorage leading to inflationary pressure. 
7) Artificially low interest rates leading to the discouraging of savings while 
encouraging investment in capital intensive production at the expense of more 
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suitable labor intensive operations. Shortage of savings ultimately lowered 
investment levels. 
8) Price controls on products leading to disincentives to produce, shortages and 
rampant corruption. 
9) Foreign exchange controls with central allocation of foreign exchange also leading 
to corruption, bmeaucratic obstacles and usage, which was of little benefit to the 
country. 
10) Excessive and often misguided use of trade tariffs and other fonns of protection 
leading to a paucity of competition and inefficient production. 
The prescribed treatment or model of adjustment follows from the above diagnosed causes 
and, specifically the 1981 WB study proposed four major and basic policy changes it felt 
were critical and they are: 
(i) Exchange Rate Policies; Correction of the overvalued foreign exchange rates 
through currency devaluation and shifting the currency allocation procedures away 
from centralized control. At the sectoral level, lower exchange rates will make 
local funds available for export oriented agriculture and industry thereby providing 
incentives to produce in this area, which in turn increases the supply of foreign 
exchange. Devaluation also penalizes companies heavily dependent on imported 
inputs, thus encouraging a greater conservation of foreign exchange. Liberalizing 
foreign exchange will reduce corruption, punish inefficient industries and benefit 
viable ones, which are export oriented and, encourage the inflow of foreign 
investment by removing bureaucratic obstacles and the security of an exit option. 
(ii) Price Policies; This is also tenned the "getting prices right" doctrine of adjustment. 
It allows for pricing policies conducive to the free operation of supply and demand 
by, removing of all forms of price controls, elimination of subsidies and 
disbanding all methods of state sponsored inter-firm allocation as well as 
improvement of price incentives for exports and agriculture. hnproving agriculture 
is in Africa at the heart of adjustment. It provides raw materials to industry, vital 
foreign exchange when exported and important demand linkages to the rest of the 
economy. Also raising the terms of trade in agriculture is the best way to improve 
income distribution and reduce poverty since the majority of the poor.est 
population is engaged in agricultural production. 
(iii) Commercial Policies; The protection of industry in a more uniform and less direct 
way to avoid distortions in the economy by allowing competition from imports to 
act as an incentive to lower costs and raise quality and quantity of production. 
Quotas and other protectionism should be replaced by tariffs so that the market can 
be used as a basis of adjustment. 
(iv) Financial and Institutional policies through reduction of direct government 
controls; This falls into two parts, 
(a) Financial policies entail a tight control of monetary aggregates and 
government deficit spending through the operation of an independent 
central bank. Public debt will no longer be covered by high-powered credits 
from central banks but through the auctioning of treasury bills to the public. 
As part of financial policies, the exchange rate levels should be a reflection 
of the relative price levels between countries (purchasing power parity). In a 
world of floating exchanges, little or no inflatio~ will generate exchange 
rate stability, which will provide a climate more propitious for encouraging 
foreign investment in industry. Similarly price liberaliz.ation will reduce 
informal sector activities and in tum generate, a potentially larger tax base 
and tax revenues making it easier to contain budget deficits (supply side 
argument). 
(b) Institutional policies focus on reform of the public sector. Inefficient state 
enterprises should be closed down, sold to the private sector or 
systematically restructured. Operating decisions should be developed away 
from political influences and managers should be subject to clear financial 
and economic performance criteria. Profits should be a reliable indicator of 
efficiency in the public sector. Public policy towards private sector and 
investment activity should be made transparent and should transcend price 
and foreign exchange aligrunents. Private property rights need to be 
established and enforced through the expansion of an autonomous judiciary 
system. Finally the informal sector should be encouraged to shift into 
formal production. 
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Though these grandiose remedies sound very attractive both in theory and maybe in 
practice in industrialized macro-stable economies, to Sub-Saharan Africa, they have 
proven to be more of a 'shock therapy" approach to financial liberalization. They are also 
problematic and have ineluctably contributed to financial chaos in some countries (Nigeria 
is a good example). McKinnon cited in Stein (1999) argues that much of the financial 
disarray has arisen, because the proponents of liberalization have not followed an optimal 
sequence of liberalization, including macro-stability before financial deregulation. In 
particular, he suggests the sequence should be inflation control, followed by interest rate 
liberalization, privatization and commercialization, unification of foreign exchange rates, 
trade liberalization and lastly opening up economies to capital flows. 
It is also crucial to ensure institutional homology, such that the rate of transfonnation or 
adjustment in the different components of the system are internally consistent and well 
suited to servicing the needs of the real sector of the economy. 
Pressure from within 
In addition to IMF and World Bank other pressures also originated and grew internally, as 
more people became increasingly dissatisfied with their declining living standards and the 
poor economic perfonnances of their countries. As a result, during the early 1990s several 
countries, most notably the folJowing SADC member countries, Mauritius, MRlawi, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe removed restrictions on external capital 
transactions. This effectively closed the gap between official rates and "parallel" or "black 
market" rates. South Africa removed its two-tier exchange rate system in 1995 and 
Angola, Zambia, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia have also unified their foreign exchange 
systems making foreign trade and investment less cumbersome. 
Recognizing their poor past performances and also as part of their structural adjustment 
programs, African governments are currently scaling down their involvement in parastatal 
organizations by commercializing their operations, providing them with greater operating 
autonomy or privatizing them completely. In addition to privatizing state-owned 
organizations, many African governments are actively seeking and encouraging 
participation of the private sector both domestic and foreign. However, by the mid 1990s 
less than one fifth of sub-Saharan Africa's state-owned enterprises had been sold, very few 
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of which were operating in such key sectors as electricity, telecommunications µ"ansport 
and mining. 
'foe region has also, as a result of adopting progressive economic policies, experienced a 
dramatic growth in stock exchanges and in 1996 new houses had opened in Zambia, 
Malawi, Uganda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland and Tanzania (mostly SADC countries) 
2.1.~ Current Economic Outlook 
Economic reforms for those very few countries that followed reform prescriptions well 
have in general led to some improved economic performance especially since the second 
half of the 1980s. However growth remains fragile, standards of living are still very low 
and poverty is wide spread as some sectors have experienced sharp declines. Accordingly, 
the 1994 WB report on 29 sub-Saharan countries, which took reform adjustment strategies 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, concluded that in the broadest sense no African country has 
yet firmly established a sound macro-economic policy. In fact only six countries out of the 
29 namely Ghana, Tanzania, The Gambia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, which 
also made the most improvement in macro economic policies between 1981-1991, 
performed comparatively well in economic terms. From this result it is clear that the extent 
and depth of the impoverishment of African peoples are such that, as most would agree, 
market forces alone and the grandiose IMF/World Bank structural adjustment 
prescriptions, have so far failed to improve the quality of life of millions of Africans. 
It is also clear that for African governments to implement their plans for economic 
liberalization encompassing generally higher agricultural producer prices, revised and 
realistic foreign exchange rates and publicly unpopular policy reform measures, they 
require increased outside support. Sadly unlike other countries like Thailand, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Brazil and Russia, where the IMF continue to intervene with multi-million 
dollar bailouts, in Africa such economic assistance to the region from IMF, OECD and 
other major multilateral donors was and continues to be dependent upon the pursuance of 
sound economic reform. Although the UN and United Nations Center for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
continue to launch programs mainly financed by the WB to assist Africa's economic 
development their efforts are not adequate. 
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2.1.5 Summary 
One can conclude that overall the performance by sub-Saharan economies over the past 
three decades has been depressing. However despite the dismal economic perfonnances by 
most of its states, Africa is still a resilient continent in other areas. It has notably withstood 
drastic changes during the past three centuries especially within the last three decades of 
the 20th century. It has moved from colonial domination to independence in less than two 
generations. Recent history elsewhere, particularly in Asia suggests that the unacceptable 
economic deterioration of the past thirty years can be reversed. As sub-Saharan Africa 
moves into the 21st century its governments must, realize that, while most economic 
problems were inherited, responsibility must be taken for problems that are soluble. So 
rather than being hostile to foreign entrepreneurs and investors in the form of harsh 
regulatory controls, most African governments are actively seeking foreign based 
involvement. By 2000 most governments were presenting the appearance of reform and 
acknowledging the parallel between political pluralism and economic development. This 
combination of liberalized economic policies together with more political openness could 
signal the beginning of sub-Saharan Africa's transformation tOwards economic recovery 
and sustained long term development. 
Undoubtedly, continued productivity gains and sustainable economic growth perfonnance 
can only come through the implementation of a successful macroeconomic adjustment 
policy underpinned by structural changes, which includes allocation of state factors to 
more productive activities, diversification and opening up of the economy. As an example, 
Lucas (1993) cited in Berthelemy aud Soderling (1999), argued that the creation of"Asian 
Miracles" relied on structural changes leading to the production of increasingly 
sophisticated product mixes. Structural changes are however not likely to occur in the 
absence of significant investment and capital accumulation. It is in this area that Africa 
needs foreign assistance in the form of sustained aid flows, inasmuch as local savings 
capacity will be insufficient to support the necessary human and physical capital 
accumulation in the short term. 
A joint report issued by the World Resources Institute and the lntemational Institute for 
Environment and Development succinctly states that, "Sub-Saharan Africa poses the 
greatest challenge to world development efforts to the end of the 20th century and beyond." 
Africa's path ahead remains difficult and uncertain but not without hope. Vital questions 
are posed by the extent to which, the region is truly committed to genuine reform and 
whether it can finally break the cycle of poverty, macro-instability and political instability 
in which it has been trapped for the past 3 decades. In addition, will subMSaharan Africa 
continue to be marginalized in the globalization process or can it find ways to better 
integrate into the global economic village. Can the very recent and positive signs of 
economic growth be sustained?14 
2,2 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
2.2.1 lntroduct5on 
The Declaration and Treaty establishing the SADC, which replaced the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 15 was signed by the then existing ten 
member countries at the Summit of Heads of State Government on 17 July 1992 in 
Windhoek, Namibia. By September 1993 all the member sates had ratified the treaty and it 
came into effect on 5 October of the same year. SADC's stated aims are economic 
harmonization and to achieve this end, the economic community is dedicated to the ideals 
of free trade, free movement of people, a single currency, democracy and respect for 
human rights. An understanding of the PPP and UIP in the region will therefore, 
undoubtedly provide some input into that process. 
The current fourteen member states are Angola, Botswana, and Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
2.2.2 Review of the SADC 
Given the organization, its aims and sound macro economic fundamentals (please refer to 
SADC Appendix page,), the SADC has indeed great potential to become one of the most 
prosperous and dynamic economically viable and vibrant political blocs in Africa as well 
14 Sustainable development in this context is as defined by Robertson (1999), as the economic 
enhancement that meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
nenerations lo meet their need. 
SAD DC the predecessor lo SADC was eslabUshed in 1979 t,) .ilarmonize development plans and 
reduce the region's economic dependence on South Africa. 
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as a key player in the world's economic arena. With a population of about 190 million and 
a combined dross domestic product (GDP) of $176 billion, the region has the prerequisites 
for economic growth and remains one of the largest unexploited markets in the world. It is 
richly endowed with abundant energy resources, huge diversified mineral deposits and an 
agricultural sector that in most of its member states could expand considerably. It has 
sufficient human resources that can be trained, a reasonably good infrastructure, a 
significant tourism business mid, an embryonic industrial sector that given the right 
conditions could be a driving force in the development process. However, this potential is 
in sharp contrast to the actual situation of escalating violence, hostile legal regimes, 
corruption, economic crisis, hunger and poverty16, declining life expectancy caused in 
main by the AIDS pandemic17, distorted economic structures and adverse regulations, 
declining resource inflows and a huge debt burden and credit risk. 
It is estimated that the SADC region's huge external debt at the end of2000 amounted to 
US$79 billion. Because of this, six of the SADC member states now belong to the category 
of highly indebted low-income cmmtries. The reasons for the colossal debt burden of 
Southern Africa are many, varying from corruption of military and civilian leaders to 
drought, failed projects (many directed by western technology) and the fact that Southern 
Africa is not getting a "fair share" of the world's investment. The major historical reason 
for debt is however destabilization by apartheid, which drove most of the SADC countries 
to resort to borrowing as a means of finance their own security. This coupled with hard 
currency constraints, are major stumbling blocks for national and regional development, as 
SADC has had to rely heavily on foreign donors. 
Related to the above, another factor contributing to the sluggish performance of the SADC 
economies remain the marked reduction in resource flows as evidenced by a decline in 
both FDI and developmental assistance to Southern Africa's low credit worthiness. Apart 
from the high levels of indebtedness other factors believed to have contributed to the low 
levels of credit worthiness are high political risk, weak economic growth and export 
16 Poverty in this context is described as a multidimensional phenomena reflected in poor social 
indicators such as illiteracy, unemployment, underemployment, declining life eupectancy and 
unsatisfactory access to basic services and infrastructure needed to sustain basic human capacities. 
Poverty can also be categorized into, (i) income poverty (I.e. lack of income to buy basic food 
requirements and non~food needs; often called extreme poverty and overall poverty respectively) and 
(ii) human poverty ( lack of human capabilities such as education, clean water sanitation and energy). 
17 Available statistics show that 1'.!S high as 1 in every Sis Infected with aids. In 4 countries the rate is 
over400 people in every 1000. 
performance, large structural fiscal deficits, erratic monetary and exchange rate policies 
and weaknesses in financial systems. The enhancement of the volume and productivity of 
investment is vital in bringing about accelerated economic growth, but both foreign direct 
investment and official development assistance have been falling while domestic savings 
are at a level, which cannot support the investment expenditure needed to give fresh 
impetus to growth. 
Another previously mentioned drawback is the protectionist tendencies of developed 
countries. These unfair trade practices of developed countries deprive Southern Africa and 
other developing countries of potential export revenues. The World Bank President in his 
statement at the annual meeting of the Bank in Prague 2000 hinted that, 'the protectionist 
measures and subsidies in industrialized countries cost developing countries US$40 billion 
a year in lost export earnings, more than they receive in official developmental aid'. 
Linked to the above is the issue of member countries' inward oriented import substitution 
development strategies and burdensome regulations all, which discourage regional trade 
thus thwarting trade its rightful role as the engine of economic growth. Evidence from 
other regional integrations have shown that other things being equal, regions in which the 
nations have much trade with each other and relatively little trade with the rest of the world 
and have structures of production that complement each other, are much more likely to 
gain from regional economic integration. Unfortunately in SADC, as in most third world 
countries the opposite situation exists where the lion's share of external trade is with the 
rest of the western industrialized countries and only a very small portion goes to the 
region. 
Furthermore, the strength of the SADC as a region is weakened by the fact that production 
structures in individual economies do not complement each other and as such investment 
opportunities have yet to be created. This lack of a cohesive economic agenda by the 
SADC for regional economic integration has meant that individual economies of most 
member states are not internationally viable and competitive. As a result they are not in a 
position to enjoy the required economies of scale and to effectively deal with constraints to 
international economic competitiveness. These constraints include uncompetitive 
industries, small markets, inadequate infrastructure, underdeveloped financial and capital 
markets and, lack of modem technology and skilled manpower. As such, significant 
benefit to its individual member countries is yet to be realized. 
j 31 
All the weaknesses discussed above tend to undermine the fundamentals upon which the 
organization was originally established. One is therefore bound to question whether the 
organization's continued existence is warranted considering the fact that its original raison 
d'etre, which was to isolate South Africa is now gone. Is the organization now not just a 
neo-colonial hinterland of South Afiica? However this debate although interesting is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, on a more positive note the recent implementation effected in Windhoek on 
September 1, 2000, of the fourteen-member SADC trade agreement, although it falls short 
of establishing completely a free trade area (FTA) througbout the region, is a giaut step 
towards trade liberalization and the achievement of SADC's ultimate goal of regional 
economic development. The trade agreement, is a follow up to the SADC Trade Protocol 
of August 1996 which seeks to establish an FTA and it entails the immediate elimination 
of tariffs for what is termed, Category A goods. Members, especially South Africa, offered 
to reduce their tariffs under this agreement and they were all expected to enforce the 
reciprocal tariff reductions by March 1, 2001. This is well in line with the agreement that 
SADC members categorized as developed, specifically South Africa and other participants 
in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) will front-load the bulk of the tariff 
reductions. While the schedule will be slower for developing countries, which include 
Zimbabwe, Seychelles and Mauritius, and even more slow-paced for the least developed 
countries, namely Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, DRC, Angola and Zambia. 
Also worth noting is the fact that, against all the odds discussed above, the SADC region 
has scored a few pluses in terms of overall economic growth since 1991 with an average 
annual growth rate of 3% at the regional level. Some member states such as Botswana, 
Mauritius and Mozambique have recorded average annual growth rates above 5 percent, 
while the majority recorded average annual growth rates below 4% as reflected in the 
Table 1 overleaf. 
Last but not least is the fact that gradually the SADC is beginning to coordinate its 
activities and acting together as one region in many international forums as demonstrated 
by the SADC Pavilion at the Expo 2000 in Hanover Germany. Such efforts are intended to 
strengthen the region's international economic competitive advantage. 
Table 1: 
Economic Growth Rates in SADC 
Econom1c Growth Rates in the SADC Re 1ort avf!ra c annual rowth rates 
Country 1991-IU 1995-98 1991-98 
Angola -7.0 7.9 0.5 
Botswana 3.7 6.4 5.0 
DRC -9.0 -3.0 -6.0 
Lesotho 5.1 4.2 4.7 
Malawi 0.2 8.5 4.3 
Mauritius 5.4 5.7 5.5 
Mozambique 7.0 8.3 7.6 
Namibia 5.1 2.7 3.9 
Seychelles 3.7 2.8 3.3 
South Africa 0.2 2.1 2.3 
Swazlland 2.7 3.3 3.0 
Tanzania 3.2 3.7 3.4 
Zambia 0.2 1.4 1.6 
Zimbabwe 0.9 2.4 3.3 
SADC •• 40 3.1 
Source: SADC Finance and Investment Sector Re"ort 
2.3 Individual Member Country's Economic Characteristics 
Although all could potentially benefit significantly from regional integration and 
cooperation, there are vast disparities in the levels of development between the 14 SADC 
member countries. There are also some systematic differences in the structural 
characteristics across the countries as revealed in the following discussion. 
2.3.1 Angola: Prior to its independence in 1975, Angola enjoyed a high output 
economy with a rapidly expanding manufacturing sector, near self sufficiency in 
agriculture with crop surpluses for export and, abundant natural resources such as 
petroleum and iron ore. With the petroleum sector continuing to prosper, Angola is the 
second largest oil exporter in sub-Saharan Africa and oil receipts account for the great bulk 
of merchandise exports and of government revenue and slightly more than half of the 
GDP. However, the country has had to endure many decades of internal conflicts before 
and after independence, to the extent that the economic activity in almost all the non-oil 
sectors are operating at a fraction of pre-independence levels. 
To address this a program of radical economic reform was announced in 1991 as part of 
the government's commitment to move away from economic policies based on Marxist-
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Leninist ideology adopted at independence to a market economy. Although, the program 
liberalized most aspects of the economy and saw the massive devaluation of the kwanza 
national currency, it failed mainly because of the ballooning budgetary deficit triggered by 
unplanned military spending. A second attempt at refonn saw the introduction of a new 
reformed program named, 'Nova Vida" (New Life) in conjunction with lhe IMF and it 
resulted in the reduction of inflation. 
Despite all this effort at reform social conditions continue to be adversely affected by the 
armed hostilities, which exerts strong pressures on public finances leading to worsening 
current account deficits. In particular, the resumption and intensification of the civil war 
since 1998 led to a slow down in GDP from 3.2% in 1998 to 2.7% in 1999. Inflation has 
accelerated to triple digits and was 438% for the twelve months ending May 2000. 
In addition, the financial market is still not well developed and the monetary policy was 
accommodating until trade and foreign exchange rate policy and financial systems were 
liberalized in May 1999 and the kwanza was allowed to freely float. Although there are 
still some exchange rate restrictions, action is being taken to strengthen public finances, 
reform public administration and improve transparency in a bid to control government 
operations and continue with tax reforms. 
2.3.2 Botswana: The country has been among the world's best performing 
developing economies with an average annual growth rate of 7%. This per capita output 
growth of more than 7% a year has allowed Botswana to develop from one of the world's 
poorest countries at its independence in 1966 to an ''upper middle income" country today 
(under the World Bank's definitions)18, with per capita income well above the sub-Saharan 
Africa average. The back-bone of Botswana's economy are diamonds, which remain the 
country's strongest foreign currency earner (88% of earnings) and accounts for more than 
45% of the total government revenue. Factors contributing to this long-run success include 
prudent monetary and fiscal policies, the efficient exploitation of mineral resources and the 
use of those resources to boost investment in infrastructure and social services, such as 
18 The World Bank defines (World Bank 1989), (a) Low Income countries as those with per capita 
GNP of US $480 or less in 1987. (b) Middle Income countries as those with a per capita GNP of US480 
< $6 000 in 1987 and (c) High Income Countries as those with a GNP per capita In excess of 56000. 
Usually low income and medium income countries are rererred conveniently to as developing 
countries. Since the per capita GNP naturally occur over time, the Income classification criteria have 
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health and education, and a stable political environment attributable to a democratically 
elected govenunent. 
2.3.3 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Since 1990 the DRC has experienced 
an extraordinary period of high inflation wnong the longest on record, from 56% in 1989 
to 10 000% in 1994 before falling to 370% in 1995 and rising again to 657% in 1996. 
Roots of hyperinflation were essentially political and the collapse of the traditional fonn of 
govenunent, under the administration of Mobutu, which was accompanied by an explosion 
in government spending and dwindling revenue collections. 
During 1991 and 1992, opposition forces derailed the gradual liberalization process led by 
the president, and by 1993 DRC (then Zaire)'s political system had all but disintegrated. A 
measure of control over monetary policy was restored in 1995 but in late 1996 political 
conditions further deteriorated and inflationary pressures reemerged. Hope was somewhat 
restored by the coming into power of L Kabila in 1998, but it was short lived as war 
resumed in the same year plunging the nation into a deeper economic and political 
quagmire. 
The urgent challenges the country is facing in order to recover economically are an 
immediate solution to the prolonged political stalemate, an abrupt and complete halt to 
currency issuing and an immediate address to the fiscal policy in fonn of structural 
reforms. The coming to power of J. Kabila in 2000 is expected to bring some peace io the 
war torn nation and hopefully some economic recovery. However positive recovery signs 
are likely to take a while to emerge. 
2.3.4 Lesotho: Although economically Lesotho is one of the least developed 
countries with its resources having been listed as ''people, wat\!r and scenery", until the late 
1990s economic performance in Lesotho was favorable due to prudent fiscal management. 
In 1995, the World Bank measured Lesotho's GNP at an average of$720 per head. The 
country's GDP increased in real tenns and averaged 6% in the decade ending 1997. 
Perfonnance began to deteriorate in 1998, leading to a 4% decline in GDP for the fiscal 
year 1998/99. This tum-around in economic performance was caused by political 
disturbances after the 1998 elections, fiscal pressures, decline in foreign direct invesbnent 
been adjusted upwards periodically by the WB. As such, with the adjustments In criteria, the country 
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and a slow down in the manufacturing industry. GDP however, picked up and grew by 
2.5% during the 1999/2000 fiscal year. 
Although the country does not have an independent monetary policy, inflation has 
remained low because the nation's currency, loti (plural maloti) is fixed one to one with 
the South African rand. Given the limitations of the monetary policy, fiscal prudence is 
crucial to sustain economic growth. With growth in mind, as from 2000 into the early 21 51 
century, the country is focusing on growth oriented policies as well as fiscal restraint, tax 
policy and administration reforms, privatization, financial sector reform, bank restructuring 
and institution strengthening. 
2.3.S Malawi: Malawi's growth perfonnance in the 1990s was modest, thanks to 
some structural reforms in the form of liberalizing agricultural production and external 
trade. Real per capita GDP grew an average of less than 0.5% per annum from 1989-1999. 
lbis was an improvement on Malawi's performance in the 1980s when per capita GDP 
declined after having grown at an average of 2.2% per year between 1969 and 1979. 
However, the high and variable rates of domestic inflation experienced in Malawi during 
the past two decades caused by a monetary policy which accommodated fiscal pressures, 
coupled with incomplete programs in structural reforms, have been the major obstacles to 
the achievement of satisfactory growth rates. 
The exchange rate throughout the 1990s was that of formal and/or infonnal management 
and therefore the currency experienced episodes of sizeable depreciation episodes in 1994, 
1998 and 2000. However as from May 2000 the Central Bank established a fully flexible 
and market- determined exchange rate system. The financial sector, nonetheless continue 
to provide very limited support for the private sector development. In addition, 
infrastructure remains in a precarious condition. The task ahead therefore, is to build more 
on the achievements made so far by ensuring steadfast application of policies for 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform. 
2.3.6 Mauritius: Unlike most countries in SADC, Mauritius has enjoyed good rates 
of economic growth over the past two decades and, it is classified by the World Bank as an 
''upper middle income economy". Tourism, light industry (including textiles) aod sugar, 
composition of each Income group under WB classification bas generally stayed stable over time. . I 36 
dominates the backbone of Mauritius' economy. Despite its relatively favorable economic 
perfonnance in recent years, Mauritius faces a number of uncertainties. Among them is 
rapid population growth, which could lead to overcrowding and environmental damage, 
and an infrastructure showing need for heavy investment in projects such as roads, 
telecommunications and public utilities. However, prospects for growth remain high well 
into the 21st century, mainly because of the textile and tourism industry. 
2.3. 7 Mozambique: Mo1.aI11bique's post independence economy suffered the 
damaging effects of guerilla war, drought, floods, famine, the displacement of population 
and severe scarcity of skilled workers and foreign exchange, compounded by a large 
visible trade deficit. As a result, the country is heavily reliant on foreign credits. Signs of 
economic recovery began to emerge at the end of the 1980s, only to decline due to the 
1992-93 drought and to rise again after 1993. In 1995 according to estimates by the World 
Bank, GNP per head measured by 1993-95 prices was $80.00. 
The country has made considerable progress since 1995 in dismantling the state-owned 
economy and adopting outward-looking and market-oriented economic policies. Structural 
reforms focused on the shift toward market determination of prices, with the liberaliz.ation 
of the exchange rate and interest rates and elimination of virtually all price controls and 
trade. Exchange liberalization also saw the removal of non-tariff barriers and exchange 
controls, a lowering of average import tariffs and elimination of most export taxes. Fiscal 
reforms included civil service reform, simplification and restructuring of the tax system 
and improved public expenditure management, while raising the actual delivery of health 
and education in real terms. Private sector development has been fostered by reducing 
administrative barriers to trade and investment, legal and judicial reform to increase 
economic security and, financial sector reform to develop money markets and indirect 
instruments of monetary policy. 
2.3.8 Namibia: With a GDP per capita of more than US$2 000, Namibia is 
relative!y prosperous in the Southern African context and is classified as a 'lower middle 
income economy' (World Bank definitions). However the figure disguises an extreme 
inequality in income distribution, with the average income of the white minority 
significantly higher than that of the mass of the black population. Having experienced deep 
economic recession in the early 1980s, due to war, drought and low world prices, the 
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economy has been recovering since the mid 1980s. The economy however remains highly 
extractive and poorly integrated with about 90% of the goods it produces being exported 
and 90% of goods used in the coontry, including Y, of the food being imported. Overall, 
Namibia's economic growth rate continues to advance with future economic prospects 
primarily due to its abundant mineral reserves and rich fisheries. 
2.3.9 Seychelles: Over the ten years ended 1997, the Seychelles grew by an average 
annual rate of 6% and inflation averaged less than 2% a year. However, real GDP growth 
slowed in 1998 and 1999 while inflation rose sharply ending at above 10% at the end of 
1999 for the first time since the early 1980s. Despite growth in the manufacturing and 
construction sectors, declining tourist arrivals and tourism earnings, the heightened 
shortage of foreign exchange and the devastating effects of the global weather phenomena 
El nino and La nina, were the main factors accountable for the slowdown in overall output 
during the 1998-99 period. 
The slump in economic activity led to large fiscal deficits evidenced by substantial external 
arrears due to foreign exchange shortages and deteriorating external competitiveness. In 
response and mindful of the acute foreign exchange shortages emanating mainly frorr~ the 
rigid exchange rate policy, the COWltry introduced (in 1998), a series of elaborate trade and 
exchange restrictions aimed at limiting imports of goods and services. These restrictions 
have so far proved ineffective in stemming the foreign exchange crisis. To brace itself for 
economic recovery and to improve its external competitiveness, the Seychelles needs to 
work on liberalizing its trade and exchange policies, reduce its balance of payment deficit 
and implement structural refonns. 
2.3.10 South Africa: The country has the largest economy in the region and is 
classified as an, 'upper middle income economy' using World Bank definitions. The 
vagaries of climate mean, South Africa remains a relatively poor crop raising country in 
most branches of farming. However, its greatest wealth lies in substantial and diverse 
mineral deposits including diamonds and gold. Fisheries also contribute to the economy's 
wealth. Exports remain the major source of growth causing the country to record an overall 
surplus in the current account. Unlike most of its SADC and African counterparts, South 
Africa's manufacturing industry is the largest sector of the national economy, measured in 
terms of contribution to GDP. 
The country undoubtedly achieved remarkable economic development in the 1960s with 
one of the highest economic growth rates in the world during that decade. The fruits of that 
development were however unevenly distributed because of apartheid. Growth during the 
1970s was lower but picked up again in 1980 due to the boom in world economic prices 
especially gold. The weakening price of gold and generally unfavorable commodity prices 
on the international markets, plus the damaging effects of political instability and 
sanctions, and severe drought and low overall investment caused an economic recession in 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Following the election of the new government in 1994 the country bas been following a 
market oriented approach to economic development that has been characterized by the 
extensive pursuit of prudent fiscal and monetary policies, substantial progress in trade 
liberalization and the maintenance of a healthy and robust financial system. This approach 
helped South Africa to withstand contagion from the Asian financial markets turbulence of 
1997-98, with relatively little economic dislocation. Since then the country has regained its 
momentum and experienced a modest export-led economic recovery, fueled by the 
expansion in world output and improvements in external competitiveness. 
Progress in strengthening public finances has been impressive and as a result the overall 
deficit of national government bas been reduced as a percent of GDP since 1992/93. At the 
same time, fiscal expenditures have been reprioritized toward the social sectors (education 
health and welfare) and strong improvements have been made in the efficiency of tax 
administration. Due to sound monetary policy inflation has fallen considerably during the 
1990s from 18% in 1991 to 8% in 1999. However the AIDS pandemic and the escalation 
of criminal activity remain major challenges to the government. Looking ahead, South 
Africa needs to build on the progress made so far towards macroeconomic stability by 
implementing faster structural refonns, particularly in the labor market and privatization 
areas. The fight against AIDS and crime also poses a major challenge 
2.3.11 Swaziland: Swaziland, the smallest state in mainland Africa after Gambia, is a 
"lower middle income country" according to World Bank definitions, with a per capita· 
GDP of US$ 1 340. Despite its relative diversification and wealth Swaziland has not 
escaped the extremes of income distribution familiar elsewhere in Africa 19 
Over the past three decades, from 1972 to 1997 the country experienced growth and the 
GDP grew at an annual rate of just under 6% with manufacturing contributing the largest 
share of GDP. In 1998 growth declined and inflation rose because of the depreciation of 
the South African rand against which the Swazi currency, the lilangeni (plural emalangeni) 
is pegged. Unemployment increased as private sector employment declined. Although 
unemployment remained high and the country's government moved into defici~ by 1999 
economic activity had picked up. 
In 2001 the receipts from the South African Customs Union (SACU), the major source of 
government revenue, are expected to taper off at the same time when the country is facing 
high incidence of HIV/AIDS infection. The countcy's immediate challenge is therefore to 
offset the effect of the tapering SACU receipts by safeguarding fiscal sustainability, 
without unduly adversely affecting the level of existing public services and at the same 
time, permit much needed expansion in outlays of health and education. This calls for 
reforms to expand the tax base in order to boost government revenue coffers. 
In addition, there is the need to accelerate the pace of reforms, in particular reform relating 
to land tenure arrangements, restructuring and privatization of additional public 
enterprises, maintain adequate investment levels and improve the skills briSe in order to, 
help sustain broad based economic expansion. 
2.3.12 Tanzania: Tanzania remains one of the poorest countries in the world and 
economically the country performed dismally from independence in 1961 until the mid-
1980s. The almost two decades of severe economic decline brought the country to a 
condition of economic collapse with a near static average annual growth of 0.8%. 
However in the 1980s the government driven in main by the desire to obtain continued aid 
from international donors, abandoned the Marxist-Leninist economic ideologies and 
19 It is interesting to note that the general trend in Africa is that even for those countries doing well, the 
distribution of wealth is very uneven. This was well noted by the former Managing Director of IMF In 
his last statement at the UNCTAD conference In Bangkok in 2000 where he said," It is not enough to 
increase the size of the cake; the way it is shared is deeply relevant to the dynamism of development 
and to reducing poverty." 
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adopted a more pragmatic approac-h to economic planning and began a decisive shift away 
from government control and ownership of the economy. By 1995, the exchange and trade 
system and the financial system had been liberalized, price controls had been eliminated, 
and a major privatization program had begun. Macroeconomic perfonnance during 1996-
1999 was generally good and, based on the strong fiscal policies the efficient cash 
budgetary management helped to contain public expenditure. Substantial progress was 
made with structural reforms, including major tax refonns, a comprehensive framework for 
monetary management and fiscal sector development. Civil service reform led to 
rationalization, retrenclunent and the initiation of pay reform. The petroleum sector was 
fully liberalized and subsidies eliminated. The government has focused and continues to 
increase its efforts to improve its governance record and to develop sectoral anticorruption 
plans. 
2.3.13 Zambia: Its economy expanded rapidly during the 1960s and early 1970s 
owing to high levels of the international price of copper. The failure by the Kaunda20 
government to develop other sectors of the economy, coupled with the reduction in the 
international price of copper since the 1970s, resulted in severe economic decline 
characterized by critical foreign exchange shortages, lack of skilled manpower; poor 
infrastructure and high debt service obligations. After the coming of the Chiluba21 
administration, Zambia adopted a three-year structural adjustment program in 1992 in 
agreement with IMF and World Bank. It liberalized its foreign exchange rate policy in the 
same year and since then the economy has been recovering though at a sluggish rate. The 
govemment is also reducing the public sector workforce partly by retrenchment and 
containing public sector wage rates in a bid to ensure a sound and efficient civil service so 
as to increase public investment and social programs. 
Despite the efforts to liberalize like Zimbabwe and Tanzania, the country continue to 
experience double- digit inflation due to increases in the money supply, currency 
depreciation and food shortages among others. The cowitry therefore still remains a long 
way from economic independence. 
2.3.14 Zimbabwe: Since independence in 1980, economic growth has been wieven due 
to climatic reasons as well as changes in economic policy. In 1991 Zimbabwe launched an 
zo Kenneth Kaunda was the first president oflndependent Zambia. 
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economic reform program which was instrumental in liberalizing the economy and 
addressing structural impediments to growth. In 1994 exchange control regulations were 
substantially relaxed and a market determined exchange rate was formally adopted 
although the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) continued to intervene whenever the 
exchange rate fell out of the specified band. As a result during the early 1990s the country 
experienced growth and performed well economically due to the benefits of structural 
adjustments coupled with sound economic policies and political stability. 
However the economy has been deteriorating since 1997 as its recent experience has 
shown how quickly governance problems, monetary policies and fiscal profligacy can get 
out of control with macroeconomic stability and investor confidence being undermined as 
a result. Over the tluee years from 1997-1999 the country suffered economic recession and 
there was a decline in per capita income, deterioration in social conditions as a result of 
Zimbabwe's loose macroeconomic policies especially in the fiscal area, the rapid spread of 
the HIV I AIDS pandemic and poor governance. Economic activity and unemployment 
faltered especially in the manufacturing, mining, tourism and agricultural sectors as they 
were, buffeted by erratic law enforcement and acute foreign exchange shortages. As a 
result GDP contracted by more than 5% resulting in a cumulative decline in per capita 
income of 12% over the tluee-year period. This and the weakened balance of payments 
from 1997 coupled with the crisis in the emerging markets sparked sharp depreciation of 
the currency. Dissatisfaction with the sharp devaluation and its effects on domestic prices 
led the authorities to fix the exchange rate from January1999 to July 2000. 
Economic crisis deepened in 2000 fueled by continued deterioration in the fiscal position 
kindled by severe fiscal imbalances, erosion of competitiveness, fuel shortages, high 
interest rates and an overvalued currency. Political tensions related to the February 2000 
constitutional referendum and the June parliamentary election and, escalating tension and 
uncertainty related to the significant change in the government's stance on the land reform 
program deepened this. The lack of transparency in its fast track" land reform program", is 
having spill over effects on international investor confidence in other countries of Southern 
Africa, leading to adverse economic contagion in the fonn of capital flight and curtailed 
access to foreign financing; much to the exasperation of some SADC members. Zimbabwe 
needs to be mindful of these increasing negative externalities on neighboring countries. 
21 Fredrick Chlluba Is the reigning Zambian President. 
With mayhem reigning in Zimbabwe, the country's economy is currently under siege, 
characterized by constrained growth in all sectors, a burgeoning budget deficit evidenced 
by depletion of usable foreign reserves and the emergence of external payment arrears, 
escalating inflation, a weak monetary policy and a slow pace of selling off loss making 
state finns. 
Probably, the 2001, Zimbabwean situation was best described by professor A. Hawkins, 
who in his line of thinking noted that, although the manifestations of Zimbabwe's crisis are 
economic, the nation's problem was rooted in skewed social and political policies. He 
stated that, " The country's deepening economic difficulties are explained by a 
combination of weak institutional capacity and administration on one hand and the 
subordination of sustained economic progress to short tenn political goals".22 
Urgent corrective measures in the fonn of improved governance, a credible adjustment 
program anchored by a return to a sustainable fiscal path supported by prudent monetary 
and wage policies, and a restoration of external competitiveness need to be taken. One can 
conclude that Zimbabwe faces a difficult and complex set of economic, political, social 
and other challenges. They include, the stabilizing of the macroeconomic environment, 
restoring investor confidence, fighting against HIV I AIDS, which continues to assume 
dramatic proportions23 and reducing unemployment. Success in restoring economic 
stability also hinges on rebuilding of confidence through speedy return to rule of law and 
the implementation of an orderly land reform program that could garner domestic and 
international support. The major downside risk in the outlook stems from the possibility of 
continued political tension and uncertainties ahead of the March 2002 presidential election, 
which would prolong the economic drift and create enonnous social hardship (IMF Staff 
Report for 2000 Consultation with Zimbabwe, November 2000). 
2.3.15 Summary Comment 
Although the above analyses do show how diverse the 14 member SADC states' economic 
statuses are there are some common characteristics. In general, like all other typical 
African economies all SADC countries (with the exception of probably South Africa and 
22 Source: The Financial Gazette, March 8-14 2001, 
"The International Labor action against HIV/AIDS on Southern Africa (Geneva 2000), projected that 
in Zimbabwe alone, the labor force will bel7.5°/, lower by 2015 than in a non-AIDS scenario. I 43 
Botswana) get the bulk of their export revenues from a narrow group of primary 
commodities, import mainly capital goods and intennediate outputs and faces persistent 
trade deficits. They also allocate a significant fraction of their export revenues to meet their 
short-tenn debt obligations. To recover economically and sustain economic growth most 
SADC member states need to undertake a speedy and steadfast application of policies for 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural refonn. This will call for market discipline that 
entails strict and sustained adherence to macroeconomic targets including properly valued 
currencies and favorable trading policies, detennined application of systems for monitoring 
and controlling public spending, effective use of foreign aid and debt relief in productive 
investments, improved governance and resistance to vested interests. 
2.4 Key characteristics of Sample Countries 
The 14 countries, which fall under SADC, also constitute Southern Africa and these two 
terms will be used synonymously. The dire economic circumstances of Southern African 
countries in the midst of globalizing forces and its economic structures have already been 
extensively covered in sections 2.1 and 2.2.7. This section seeks to isolate a number of 
economic features specific to the countries in the sample during the sample period that are 
relevant to the analysis in this study. Although these countries belong to one economic 
integration the countries in the sample were also chosen on the basis of several other 
considerations. 
Due to data availability and data quality problems six of the SADC member states were 
deliberately excluded from the sample. Thereby addressing the criticism that the whole 
study has limited validity because of data inaccuracies and contamination. These 
historically crisis prone, countries are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, 
Mozambique, Malawi, Seychelles and Lesotho.24 The eight remaining countries used in the 
sample can be reasonably argued to be a good representation of the SADC region. Their 
economies range from the 'poor' countries namely Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe to 
'lower middle income' economies represented by Namibia and Swaziland and lastly 'upper 
middle income' economies represented by Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa. 
2' As can be ascertained from the lndlYidual country analysis given In Section 2.6, these countries 
because of Internal conDlcts do not have sufficient and or consistent data even though some or the 
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The eight remaining countries though different in tenns of economic governance and 
development share a number of common characteristics. Firstly all the countries generally 
suffer from substantial economic turmoil albeit to different extents and they also share a 
common feature of tolerating sustained episodes of moderate to high inflation during the 
period under study. High inflation in Southern Africa, as in most emerging market 
countries, is mainly caused by: (a) the need for governments to finance persistent fiscal 
deficits through seigniorage and (b) the time inconsistency of economic policies.25 Caution 
must be given that using data from such countries could lead to difficulties associated \\'ith 
data interpretation as the PPP is likely to hold because high inflation tends to bias the 
synnnetry and proportionality test towards acceptance (Rogoff, 1996). Frankel (1978) also 
found evidence supporting PPP using high inflation data, which according to Rogoff 
25 According to the World Economic Outlook (May 2001) governments (more so of developing 
countries) have financed persistent fiscal deficits by Issuing money since time immemorial. At the root 
of seigniorage, is the government's unwillingness or incapacity to avoid persistent deficits or to resort 
to other sources of financing to make up for the shortfall. Governments also favor seigniorage beeause 
compared to other forms of revenue it tends to be easier to collect and enforce and does not require the 
approval of the legislative body, which can be lengthy and politically difficult As such, incentives to 
use seigniorage is lower In countries where collection of other forms of other revenue mainly in form of 
formal taxes is more efficient and borrowing is cheaper due to more developed capital markets. 
Seigniorage also tends to he lower in countries where, public tolerance for inflation is lower (itself a 
function of institutional and historical factors) and where the governments capacity to enhance the use 
of high-powered money (the tax base of seigniorage) is limited. 
While the seigniorage theory emphasizes the behavior of the fiscal authority, the time inconsistency 
theory focuses on the behavior of the monetary authority. The theory highlights the inflationary bias to 
monetary policy as stemming from not being able to credibly commit to low Inflation. Usually the 
perception that output can be raised in the short run by expansionary monetary policies may induce 
the central bank to run a looser monetary policy than Is, consistent with low Inflation. This is 
particularly likely if the Central Bank is not independent from the rest of government and where 
political considerations, such as, electoral cycl~ may influence policy. By the same token, the time 
inconsistency theory also helps explain why, Reserve Banks may adopt an accommodative policy 
stance once inflation is triggered by other factors such as adverse supply or oil price shocks. 
It is evident from this brier discussion that, the complexities or unsustainable and persistent high 
inflation can be addressed by among other things, institutional reforms like, central Bank 
independence, and structural reforms such as greater openness to trade. 
(1996) is not surprising given the overwhelming predominance of price movements 
denominated by monetary shocks in such environments. 
In addition, Froot and Rogoff (1995) observed that real exchange rates are prone to 
instability for developing countries because rapid income growth or inflation often induces 
drastic changes in the relative price structure between tradables and non-tradables. 
Similarly, Madhavi and Zhou (1996) reported results favoring the PPP in some high-
inflation developing countries. Finally, Liu (1992) using data for nine Latin American 
countries tested the weaker version of the PPP theory and found support for the hypothesis 
that because of the high inflation rates the exchange rates for these countries versus the US 
dollar are influenced by, the relative price level.26 
Secondly, all countries in the sample have relatively small economies by global standards 
and thus exercise very limited influence on world prices of oil and traded goods, 
international interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, all the countries in the sample 
are heavily dependent on oil imports and hence an increase in oil prices is expected to 
result in the depreciation of the countries' currencies. For this reason, the model used in 
this study considered foreign variables vis a vis interest rates, oil prices and foreign prices 
as being weakly exogenous for the cross continental approach. It is also important to 
mention that Zimbabwe was subject to oil sanctions during the very early part of the 
sarnple,27 as was South Africa for the first decade of the sample. Botswana and Swaziland 
may have felt spill over effects. Namibia did not join the sample until 1991 but until then 
was a de facto South African province. In short apart from the economies being too small 
to affect world oil prices, the world oil prices did not rule much over the sample period 
Rather there was what could be termed a sanctions-busting premium which may have been 
high or low or variable depending on the volumes of each country's strategic reserves, oil 
from coal production etc. For this the methodology used employed long-run structural 
modeling to test for the importance of includingthe oil price variable in the sample. 
Thirdly, although trade restrictions and exchange and capital controls, which in the long 
run discourage foreign direct investment and undennine overall sustainable economic 
16Liu tests the weaker version of the PPP theory, Le., e, = a0 + a1p1 + a2p1• with a1 negative and 
a 2 positive (but not necessarily unit in magnitude). 
17 The sample varies for each country but the full sample is from January 1979 to May 2001, I 46 
growth and competitiveness were lowered in the 1990s; they are still prevalent in Southern 
Africa and generally higher than i'l other regions. In addition, even though most of the 
sample countries floated their currencies in the 1990s (some have since returned to a 
managed float again) the operations of the central banks and capital markets are still 
subject to frequent goveniment intervention as the monetary policies are set to 
accommodate fiscal policies. Because of this either, (i) their financial markets are not 
complete and are not integrated to the international financial system. For example there are 
no organized markets for stocks or bonds or there are no mutual funds or the banks are few 
and only offer limited number of products. Or, (ii) financial markets and financial 
intermediation are not fully developed and do not function as efficiently as in large 
industrial countries and hence their monetary transmission mechanism is surrounded by 
uncertainty (Worrell, 2000). Additionally, capital flows and information asymmetries limit 
the interest responses of the financial markets and make it di:fficu1t to interpret market 
signals. Financial systems in most of the sample countries are also characterized by wide 
spreads between deposit and loan interest rates because interest rates are sticky or fixed by 
the Central Banks. 
These factors impinge on Southern Africa's ability to trade freely with the rest of the world 
and hence tend to reduce its share of world trade and capital flows and investment, whilst 
at the same time raising the domestic price of imports. Better financial systems28 and terms 
of trade in the form of lower duties and simplification of tariff structures will benefit 
SADC more especially in terms of external competitiveness. This characteristic, which 
hinders international arbitrage on both the goods and financial markets, could have a 
significant impact on the results. 
Fourthly all the countries excluding Botswana, South Africa and Mauritius have relatively 
large trade deficits. Their volume of international trade on average accounts for more than 
half of their aggregate output and their export revenues are highly unstable due to recurrent 
and sharp fluctuations in prices of primary commodities. Most of the sample countries are 
also heavily indebted due to large imports of capital goods and intermediate inputs and as 
such, a significant fraction of their export revenues are used to meet their debt service 
28 However, Mussa et al (2000) argue that for small economies, the costs of the fully developed financial 
institutions and the technical expertise required for a well developed Independent monetary policy (i.e., 
under a flexible exchange rate regime), can be too high relative to the potential benefits of exchange 
rate flexibility. I 47 
obligations. This makes the SADC countries extremely vulnerable to changes in world 
interest rates. Related to this the characteristics of the economies' industrial structures 
make them highly wlnerable to trade shocks: they have relatively smaller industry and 
service sectors compared to the agricultural sector. 
Last but not least, the sample countries excluding Botswana and South Africa are to a large 
extent characterized by limited domestic savings. While foreign investment can play a 
valuable role in stimu1ating economies' capital markets, the growth and stability of these 
markets will require the development of a health base of domestic investors. Pension 
reform and the promotion of mutual funds could encourage domestic investment in 
fledging stock markets. 
2.5 The sample Countries Exchange rate regimes during the sample period 
For the purposes of understanding the results of the statistical tests, it is necessary to give a 
summary of the exchange rate regimes that were ruling during the sample period in each of 
the SADC countries. This is considered important as the cointegration tests results are 
likely to be affected by the exchange rate arrangements. Tables 2 and three summarises the 
exchange rate regimes prevalent prior to 1991 and those as of December 1999, 
respectively. 
Table 2: 
SADC Countries Grouped by Exchange Rate Arrangement 
(as of December 31, 1991 and prior) 
Excbam!'e Rate Rem'me Countries 
NS/CBA Democratic Rel'lublic ofCon{!o, Namibia 
FP Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Sevchelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe 
HB NIL 
CP NIL 
MF Mozambiaue, South Africa, Zambia 
IF NIL 
Source: IMF 
KEY: 
NS = Arrangements with no separate legal tender 
CBA = Currency board 
FP = Other conventional fixed pegs 
HB = Pegged rate in horizontal band 
CP = Crawling peg 
MF = Managed float with no pre-announced exchange rate path 
IF = Independentlv floatint! 
While the all other countries had a unified exchange rate throughout the sample period 
irrespective of the exchange rate regime they adopted, South Africa moved to and from a 
unified exchange rate to a dual exchange rate system from 1979 to 1995. Theoretically the 
dual exchange rate system must have imposed a shock to any existing interest rate 
relativities on the date of the policy changes. For this reason the data for South Africa was 
tested, once for the whole sample and secondly from 1995 when the rate was finally 
unified and allowed to float freely. 
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Table 3: 
SADC Countries Grouped by Exchange Rate Arrangement 
(as of December 31, 1999) 
Exchange Rate Regime Countries 
NS/CB A NIL 
FP Botswana, Lesotho Namibia, Sevchelles, Swaziland Zimbabwe 
HB NIL 
CP NIL 
MF Malawi, 
IF Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritius, Mozmnbique, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia 
Source: IMF, Annual report 2000 
KEY: 
NS= Arrangements with no separate legal tender 
CBA = Currency board 
FP = Other conventional fixed pegs 
HB = Pegged rate in horizontal band 
CP = Crawling peg 
MF= Managed float with no pre-announced exchange rate path 
IF= lndenendentlv floatim! 
South Africa and the Dual exchange rate system 
The dual exchange rate system played a vital role in protecting the current account from 
large capital outflows due to episodes of political risk. On January 24, 1979, the 
commercial rand 's link with the US dollar was freed and allowed to float ushering in the 
dual exchange rate regime.29 On February 7 1983 the financial rand was abolished only to 
be re-introduced in, September 1985 due to increased political turmoil. 
The dual exchange rate system consisted of a 'commercial rate' and a 'financial rate'. The 
financial rand traded at market-determined prices often at a substantial discount to the 
commercial rand. In general the financial rand applied to portfolio investments or approved 
direct investment by non-residents, while the commercial rand applied to current account 
foreign trade dealings as well as foreign loans and credits. 
29 He Institutional features of the dual exchange rate system were largely the result of political 
inffuences. These Included links with the British financial system,polilical and economic events 
resulting in shocks to the South African economy and the recommendations of the De Kock 
Commision. 
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The financial rand therefore served as the principal exchange control on non-resident 
equity capital flows with the purpose of insulating the South African market for current 
account transactions from the volatility in the flow of non resident equity (capital account 
transactions). For this reason, Dornbusch and Kuenzier (1993, p.120) concluded that, 
"In a dual rate system the commercial rate remains stable, whereas the free rate reflects 
the instability of portfolio holders' expectations, and hence capital flows". 
After the first democratic elections in the country, the removal of sanctions and the 
stabilization of South Africa's economy, the dual exchange rate was unified on March 15, 
1995 and has been freely floating against foreign currencies since. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
International macroeconomics makes use of a set of parity conditions. Whilst empirical 
evidence supporting these conditions has often been ambiguous, they are convenient 
because they combine analytical tractability with theoretical desirability (Chortareas and 
Driver, 2001). In view of the mixed nature of the empirical evidence this paper investigates 
the validity of the PPP and UIP in Southern Africa. Although empirical literature on these 
two proposals is vast, it still is necessary to set out the theoretical background before the 
empirical analysis is done. 
3.1 The PPP Theory 
The first of these parity conditions is the purchasing power parity (PPP). The origins of 
the PPP theory dates back to Spanish scholars of the 16ili century although, intellectual 
origins of the doctrine are credited to Wheatley and Ricardo's work in the 19th century.30 
However the tenn PPP originated from Gustav Cassel (1918, page 413) who rekindled 
interest in the theory in the 1920s, although as quoted by Officer (1976) the PPP theory 
had been presented earlier using the term "theoretical rate of exchange" in 1916. The 
debate over, the PPP was resumed by Samuelson in 1964 but it only intensified after the 
collapse of the Breton Woods system and the introduction of the flexible exchange rates in 
the early 70s. 31 
The PPP theory of exchange rates looks at the relationship between a country's foreign 
exchange rate and its price level as well as the relationship between the changes in those 
variables, It suggests that the exchange rate between two countries must be proportional to 
the ratio of the price levels between the two countries. The PPP hypothesis is closely 
associated with an international version of the law of one price (LOOP), which states that 
abstracting from transport costs, in equilibrium, the price of identical commodities should 
be the.same everywhere in the world when expressed in common currency units, as free 
trade causes prices in the various countries to converge. The LOOP holding for any good i 
we get: 
lll The origins of the PPP are analyzed in detail by Officer 1976 
31 A comprehensive review of previous research In this area can be found in Donbuscb (1987) and 
Officer (1976). 
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(1) 
where p: stands for the domestic price of good /, E, denotes the home currency price of a 
unity of foreign currency or the exchange rate and P:' denotes foreign price with an 
asterisk denoting a foreign magnitude. The key to why PPP is an attractive theory and a 
condition for (1) to hold is what is known as arbitrage in the international commodities 
market. Thus, if for some reason the left-hand side of (1) falls out of equilibrium and is 
larger than the right-hand side, it would be profitable to ship the good from the foreign 
country to the domestic country thereby pushing the domestic currency of the foreign good 
up and the domestic price of the good down, until equilibrium between the two prices is 
restored. The underlying PPP assumption of course, being that internationally produced 
goods are perfect substitutes for domestic goods. 
Needless to say the LOOP as concluded by Rogoff (1996) holds only in the breach because 
not only are commodities with the same name not the same everywhere, but there are 
several factors which drive a wedge between their prices. He gives the interesting example 
of the McDonald's "Big Mac", which is priced differently in different countries. The "Big 
Mac's" pricing disparities are due to the fact that, not only is it not possible to 
trade/arbitrage (i.e., transport and sell the final fonn product to other countries) the final 
product or some of its inputs and components, but the way the Big Mac is bundled is 
different between countries and so are profit margins charged and taxes included in the 
basic prices. More reasons that cause the PPP to deviate such as differences in taste and 
technology and others will be discussed later under the theory criticism section. 
By adding the prices of a basket of common goods in each country and giving each price 
the same weight in the sum, we obtain a condition of what is termed absolute purchasing 
power parity. 
E, =P,/P,", (2) 
" " h P. "'''P.' .....,,,· w ere, , = ~a p, , , = ~a p1 and a. represent a weight. A rise in the domestic price 
1-1 1-1 
level triggered by, say, an increase in interest rates or by a monetary expansion, should 
result in an equi-proportionate depreciation of the exchange rate. The PPP hypothesis like 
all economic theories is expected to hold only in the long run, and for it to hold the real 
exchange rate should be stationary and not governed by pennanent shocks. Obviously the 
restrictions of the PPP theory are clear. For example even if for simplicity sake it was 
possible to construct prices in the manner suggested by condition (2), the existence of 
transportation costs and other multifarious impediments to trade will affect the arbitrage 
process and prevent condition (1) or (2) from holding exactly. However, as stated by 
McDonald (1995), if such factors are assumed constant over time and depending on the 
efficient functioning of the goods marke~ then either condition (1) or (2) would be 
expected to hold up to a constant factor A giving us; 
E, = A(P,/ P,') (2.1) 
where, if the arbitrary constant tenn, A = 1 we have the absolute version of the PPP, and if 
A "F- I but is a constant, we obtain a weaker version of the PPP hypothesis, which is usually 
labeled the relative purchasing power parity. With relative PPP the PPP theory is 
weakened to symmetry rather than proportionality. Expressed in logs we get: 
e, =a+ p, -p; (3) 
for the absolute PPP where, the lowercase letters now indicate that the variable has been 
transfonned using the natural logarithm operator. Upon expressing the tenns in equation 
(3) in changes we obtain the relative PPP hypothesis: 
(4) 
which states that an a% change in relative price level will have an a% change on the 
nominal exchange rate, i.e. the percentage exchange rate depreciation is equal to the 
difference between domestic and foreign inflation. 
Allowing for the possibility of short run deviations from the fundamental PPP, the long run 
relationship between the PPP vari~bles is given by: 
(5) 
where £ 11 is a stationary zero/constant mean random variable, otherwise the mean value of 
the exchange rate will depend in some way on t. In other words, E1r should not exhibit 
random walk behavior. If it does, then there will be no tendency of for p1 and p; and e1to 
move together in the long run. If the absolute PPP holds then e1, = 0 and symmetry between 
the domestic and foreign countries implies that the coefficients of p1 and p; in equation 
(5) are of the same magnitude, while proportionality between the exchange rate and prices 
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implies that the values of these coefficients are (1, -1 }, respectively. 
In testing the PPP, recent work has concentrated on the application of cointegration 
methods to an equation such as (6): 
(6) 
If e,, p, and p,' are integrated of order one -I (1)- then weak fonn PPP (MacDonald, 
1999) exists if the residual tenn from an estimated version of (6) is stationary - I (0). 
Strong fonn PPP exists if in addition to the weak form holding, symmetry and 
proportionality is also satisfied: exo = 1 and a, = - !. According to Patel (1990) the 
distinction between weak and strong form ( or relative and absolute) PPP is seen important 
because the existence of transportation costs and different price weights across countries 
means that there are no hypotheses regarding the specific values of ao and cx.1, except that 
they are positive and negative. 
3.1.1 Empirical Applications 
The PPP is important in that because of its simplicity and intuitive appeal, it has many 
empirical applications and they are as follows: 
(i) It can be used to convert data from denomination in one currency to another and as 
such the PPP plays a central role in the theory of trade. 
(ii) It can be used by governments, especially of newly independent states as a guide in 
setting up appropriate exchange rate policies (Kim 1990). 
(iii) As a theory of exchange rate, the PPP equation is used widely in almost all models 
of theoretical exchange rate detennination and exchange rate behavior. It can be 
used to forecast floating exchange rates as well as measuring the amount of 
disequilibrium of a floating exchange rate from its long-term equilibrium (assumed 
to be the PPP) caused by speculation. The PPP can eqnally be used to measme the 
disequilibrium of a pegged exchange rate. The PPP in this case becomes a relevant 
prediction model of exchange rates and a criterion for assessing the over or under 
valuation of a currency, especially in smaller open economies and those 
experiencing large differences between domestic and foreign inflation (Fraser et al 
1991 ). A currency can be undervalued if speculators exaggerate their mistrust of it. 
So the deviation of a floating exchange rate from the PPP can be taken as a 
measure of the amount of speculative activity in the foreign exchange market. 
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(iv) As cited by Officer (1976), it can be used as a computational device, for example 
De Vries (1968) used relative price parity to calculate the depreciation and or 
appreciation of currencies of 64 countries compared to the US dollar. 
(v) Finally as noted by Vachris and Thomas (1999), the PPP can also be used to 
examine the structure of expenditures across countries. 
3.1.2 Possible Causes of Departure from PPP 
Although proponents of the PPP theory are understood to be those who believe that 
expressions (2) and (4) hold; it is clear from the writings of the father of the PPP theory 
Cassel that his concept has limitations. As the disturbances in prices do not instantly 
transmit to the exchange rate, cognizance must be taken when working with or interpreting 
results from testing the PPP. Cassel acknowledged the following limitations as an integral 
part of his theory and for these reasons, the floating exchange rate may, in the short run 
diverge from the PPP~defined value.32 
1) While the theory assumes no trade barriers, it has since been recognized that if 
trade restrictions in the form of quotas and tariffs are more severe in one direction 
than the other, for example, if the country's imports are more restricted than its 
exports, then the exchange rate value of the country's currency may be 
overvalued, that is, it may exceed the PPP value. 
2) Over speculation in the foreign exchange market may be against a country's 
currency and therefore reduce its exchange rate value below the PPP. 
3) Anticipation of greater inflation in the domestic country than, abroad, may 
reduce the foreign exchange value of its currency below the PPP. 
4) Changes in relative prices in a country are an indicator of real cyclical economic 
changes compared to a base period and so involve a divergence between relative 
PPP and the exchange rate. 
5) Long term capital flows volatility resulting from changing perceptions of interest 
rates can move the exchange rate away from the PPP, for instance, a net long~ 
term capital outflow may depress a country's currency below the PPP. 
6) Institutional intervention in foreign exchange markets, for example, the 
government through its monetary policies can intervene in the foreign exchange 
market, bidding up the price of foreign exchange above the PPP by demanding a 
u For details see Officer 1976. 
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certain amount of foreign currency irrespective of price. This can result in a 
managed float where exchange rates can be artificially held away from their 
fundamental economic or PPP values. 
Given these limitations it is clear from the writings of Cassel and other prominent 
proponents of the PPP hypothesis, that the interesting question is not whether the PPP 
holds exactly in the long-run both in its symmetry and proportionality conditions, but 
rather how far do exchange rates, deviate from the price ratio and how much time does it 
take for arbitrage to correct these deviations from PPP? In other words, using a time- series 
expression, in the Casselian view, the PPP should be mean reverting. However, it has been 
empirically observed that deviations from the PPP are remarkably persistent, much more 
than can be explained by the cited limitations alone. 
3.1.3 Criticisms of the PPP Theory 
Although simple in theory and intuitively appealing, the criticisms of the PPP follow 
directly from its limitations and they have created considerable challenges and even 
problems for testing the PPP theory empirically. They are detailed below. 
1) Index Number Problems 
As MacDonald (1995) points out, if one could construct price series consisting of prices of 
homogenous internationally traded goods, then testing the PPP would be relatively clean 
and straightforward. However, it would be vanity even to pretend that this happens 
because, in practice govenunents do not construct intertemporal price indices for 
internationally standardized baskets of goods. Actual price indices used to test the PPP are 
calculated from only a sample of commodities rather than all commodities in the economy. 
Obviously, the very diverse expenditure patterns in each country due to differences in 
climate, tastes, packaging, regulations and the like, detennines the items selected for 
inclusion into this representative basket. This raises the issue of how practical the PPP 
theory is in a more complex realistic case as it follows that any computed price parity is an 
imperfect representation of the true theoretical parity. Closely related to the above is the 
difficulty that even if the entire population of commodities is used to calculate the index in 
each country, the value of parity will vary with the base period of the index as well as, the 
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weighting pattern of the price measures. So even if price measures refer to traded goods 
alone and there is costless international arbitrage of these goods (no trade restrictions, 
foreign exchange market intervention, transport costs and other imperfections in the 
arbitrage process); different weighting schemes for the countries' price levels (indices) win 
in general lead to different parities, none of which can be expected to be the true parity-
namely the current nominal exchange rate in this case-which equalizes all commodity 
prices internationally. 
The only solution according to Stein (1973, pagel43) cited by Officer (1976) is tha4 "in 
principle; the calculation of PPP on the basis of absolute interpretation requires talcing a 
common basket of goods with a standard system of weighting for the individual countries." 
Yeager (1958, page 517), takes the same position in stronger tenns by stating that, " the 
"absolute" or "positive" approach to index calculation, ideally envisages that, the pricing 
in local currency in each of the two countries of a standard assorbnent of goods and 
services be the same and yet be duly representative oi the economic life in each." As this 
dual requirement is impossible due to different consumption and production patterns 
between countries, Yeager rejects the absolute PPP as non-operational, a view not shared 
by many. 
In addition, even in the same country and more so with time series data, the index 
problems are exacerbated as the basket used to construct the price indices is likely to be 
very different at the beginning and end of the sample, raising the question of how to handle 
introduction of new goods and, shifting consumption weights. Also, when using long 
horizon, time series data for one country, one faces the problem of amalgamating data 
from very different exchange rate regimes, a factor, which may affect the statistical 
properties of the real exchange rates. This maybe viewed as the temporal analogue to the 
spatial problem that arise in comparing price indices at a particular point in time 
(MacDonald, 1999). 
In recognition of the problems with using government price indices when making 
purchasing power parity comparisons, since the early 1950s, there have been attempts to 
construct indices or acceptable measures of absolute PPP (Rogoff, 1996). Milton Gilbert 
and Irving Kravis(l954), for example developed price level measures for common baskets 
of goods across the U.S., U.K., France Gennany and Italy. In more recent years as cited by 
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Rogoff (1996), the endeavor to develop absolute PPP measures has culminated in the 
influential research of Robert Summers aud Alau Heston (1991), who together with 
colleagues have constructed estimates covering a much broader range of years and 
countries termed, International Comparison Program data, But again this data is gathered 
infrequently, couutry coverage is limited aud much of the data is often filled in by a 
melange of extrapolation, period averages and other approximations. So the solution to 
index problems as a hindrance to testing PPP empirically remains to be found. 
2) Absolute Parity 
Officer (1976) states that under this category criticism falls into 2 categories, (a) those that 
suggest a reduced accuracy with, which the short run equilibrium exchange rate 
approaches the PPP and (b), those that deny the basic premise of the PPP hypothesis, 
namely that freely floating exchange rates tend to PPP. 
2.1 Although in what is rather characteristic of economics, the theory of PPP is 
timeless in the sense that the passage of time is not accorded an essential role in the 
theory. The existence of infonnation disparities, tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and 
transport costs33 as expected, allow for considerable deviations from (absolute) PPP 
in the short-run. The amount of this deviation varies directly with the severity of 
the imperfections because these forces frustrate the commodity arbitrage 
mechanism by making it unprofitable to arbitrage away potentially profitable 
trading opportunities. According to Taylor (2000), these fixed and variable trading 
costs or risk aversion can under certain scenarios lead to what he terms a, "band of 
inaction" in which no arbitrage occurs despite a nonzero price gap. This neutral 
band can also arise simply because it takes time for information on arbitrage 
opportunities to become available and for economic agents to react to price 
differences. Only when prices move apart sufficiently will arbitrage occur and 
reversion, begin. With the exception of information disparities, these factors are 
likely to persist even indefinitely. While some like Scammel (1961), argue that the 
very existence of these imperfections involves a breakdown in the PPP theory, 
" A number or studies ba,·e Indicated that transportation costs represent a statlstlcally significant 
explanation for PPP deviations (MacDonald, 1999) Also. The exlstence or other factors such as 
uncertainty or the permanence or shock and so-called sunk costs or the activity or arbitrage may widen 
the bands over and above the width associated with simple trade restrictions ((Krugman, 1989). 
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others (e.g. Ellsworth, 1950;cited in Taylor, 1976) see moderate levels of tariffs as 
only reducing the acci ·acy of the theory especially in the short-run, but not 
destroying it outright. 
In particular, when trade restrictions take the form of sufficiently high and 
comprehensive tariff walls, quotas or exchange controls, a freely floating or any 
maintained exchange rate may bear virtually no relationship to the PPP because the 
price responsiveness of imports and ·exports is greatly reduced. PPP becomes all the 
more inapplicable if controls are extended to the domestic sector in the form of 
price and wage controls, rationing of consumer goods and industry allocation of 
raw materials and primary factors of production. Under these conditions, the 
buying power of a country's currency is but poorly reflected in the market prices. 
2.2 Depending on their magnitude and persistence in one direction, the existence of 
non-current account items like long-term and short-tenn capital movements are a 
well-known limitation of the PPP theory. 
2.3 Before cointegration theory the issue of causation was a major criticism of the PPP 
theory in that it views the exchange rate changes as determined variables and the 
price levels as causal variables. However in circumstances where we have short-
tenn real exchange rate changes, it is possible for chains of causation to run from 
exchange rates to prices. As R. MacDonald (1995) concluded, this reverse 
causation and joint endogeneity of exchange rates and prices is especially likely to 
be a feature of actual data from the recent floating period. Related to this is the fact 
that the operation of fixed exchange rates also suggest that the causation implied in 
the PPP theory is reversed with the domestic price level adjusting to the fixed 
exchange rate and largely to exogeneous foreign price levels. 
2.4 The concept of arbitrage though it seems to be OK for goods that can be traded 
internationally, is complicated by the presence of non-traded commodities. On a 
practical level, the price indices used in testing the PPP must be constructed from 
prices of traded goods. However, the truth of the matter is that both the Consumer 
price index (CPI) and the wholesale price index (WPI) incorporate prices of non-
traded goods, and therefore it is unlikely that their use in an empirical test would 
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produce the symmetry and proportionality implied by conditions (2) and (4). The 
wholesale price index seems the most appropriate (although it also consists of some 
non-traded goods), because it contains a relatively large traded goods element and 
is therefore often chosen. Moreover the wholesale price index is more likely to 
produce the symmetry and proportionality implied by conditions (2) and (4). An 
alternative view however, is that if one talces the exchange rate as a relative price of 
national monies where currency is held as an asset, which when necessary like all 
other fonns 6f wealth can be converted into purchasing power over tradable and 
non-tradable goods, then the consumer price index, which consists of both traded 
and non-traded goods may be deemed more appropriate. 
It is interesting to note at this stage that even if there are substantial non-traded 
elements in the price series employed in an empirical test, relative PPP may still 
hold if the overall prices are homogeneous of degree one in monetary impulses 
(MacDonald, 1995). This so-called homogeneity postulate suggests that an increase 
in the money supply shOuld leave equilibrium relative prices unchanged and should 
increase all prices by the same amount. 
2.5 The issue of pricing to market also frustrates the international arbitrage process in 
that for some tradable goods (especially by international producers with monopoly 
power) arbitrage across national frontiers is difficult. Examples are automobiles 
and many types of electronic goods. To the extent that their goods cannot be 
arbitraged, these producers often exploit the price leverage available from 
monopoly power to price discriminate across different export destinations such that 
their prices are market specific and therefore sticky. The difficulty in international 
arbitrage can also arise due to differing national standards ( e.g., left-hand drive cars 
are not popular in Southern Africa). 
3) Relative Parity 
The calculation of relative PPP requires a base year in which ideally the exchange rate 
should be in long-run equilibrium, However, unless the base year exchange rate was freely 
floating there is no guarantee that it was even in short tenn equilibrium, hence its use will 
result in a relative price parity which perpetuates this disequilibrium. The difficulty of 
finding a "normal" or equilibrium base period exchange rate often caused by policy 
shortcomings and external constrains, is viewed so ovenvhelming that the relative PPP 
theory becomes virtually unusable; an extreme position taken by Bunting (1939) and 
Bacha and Taylor (1971) as cited in Officer (1976). 
Moreover, structural economic conditions may have changed in some manner since the 
base year period. Conditions include circumstances determining international capital flows, 
unilateral tra'l.sfers and investment income. Also changes in tastes, technology, factor 
supplies and market forms may occur. The implication of this to relative PPP is that for the 
theory to work, the base period should be as close as possible to the current period in order 
to minimize the scope of structural changes. A prescription which might be flawed if the 
chosen base period conflicts with the requirement of selecting a base year in which the 
exchange rate is at or close to long term equilibrium. However when the base period is 
properly chosen, Officer (1976), concludes that the relative PPP has greater advantages 
over the absolute PPP. 
3.1.4 Residual Validity of the PPP 
When all the limitations and criticisms of the PPP are taken into consideration, Rogoff 
(1996) evaluating the LOOP concluded that, 
"Overall, it is hard to read the empirical evidence without concluding that outside a fairly 
small range of various homogenous goods, short-run international arbitrage, has only a 
limited effect on equating international goods market prices". 
He added that with the PPP wann and fuzzy feelings about the theory should never be a 
substitute for hard evidence. 
However, in spite of all criticisms directed against it, its mixed support and the fact that 
like any theory the PPP theory is flawed, (that is, it cannot make exact predictions and 
results are subject to a random error), the PPP has been and continues to be extensively 
used as a basis for estimating equilibrium exchange rates. No wonder, some authors 
contend that the PPP does provide a strong basis for exchange rate determination with 
useful policy implications. In fact the words of, Ellsworth (1950 page 600) that, "the 
purchasing power parity has almost irresistible attractions in spite of its many_ pitfalls" 
(italics added and cited in Officer, 1976), remain valid to this day. This popularity of the 
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PPP is mainly attributed to its relatively simple and intuitive appeals. Its basic variables are 
minimal, thai is, domestic and foreign prices and the exchange rate between two countries. 
Furthennore, the ability of the theory to allow for adjustments and extensions, that is, 
including other variables further contributes to its versatility. 
3.2 The Uncovered Interest Parity Theorem 
The second parity condition is the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) doctrine, which has 
been invoked to explain the determination of interest rates usually in association with the 
unbiased market efficiency hypothesis34• It entails the uncovered arbitrage of nominal 
interest rates and links real interest rates differentials to exchange rates. 
In the capital market, the UIP hypothesis is a monetary model, which states that in the long 
run the equality between the nominal interest rates differential and the expected inflation 
differential between two countries follows from the interest rate parity. In other words, the 
interest rate differential between two currencies is the conditional expected value of the 
rate of depreciation of the high interest rate currency relative to the low interest rate 
currency. That is, assuming efficient markets in which the bonds of different countries are 
perfect substitutes, long-run intemationa1 investment flows ( or wtlimited arbitrage on the 
capital market) ensures that, real interest rates are equal across countries35, Defined this 
way, the UIP asserts that nominal interest rates are, detennined by world interest rates plus 
the expected change in the spot exchange rates. The exchange rate in this case is viewed as 
moving to equilibrate the international demand for stocks of assets rather than the 
international demand for flows of goods as under the PPP view. Thus we get a positive 
relationship between the exchange rate and nominal interest differential. The UIP is 
represented by: 
(7) 
where, E,'1e11+1 = e2,, e1, is the log of nominal exchange rate (home currency price of 
foreign currency) for country i at period I for k periods ahead (i = I. ..... , N and I = 
l4 The UIP is equivalent to the expectations hypothesis in the foreign exchange market, as discussed by 
Fisher (1930) and Keynes (1930). 
u This Investment argument is not necessary however, nor if used does it preclude the possibility of 
different real interest rates in the short run, since even the most perfectly classical of economies have 
lixed capital stocks that cam non-zero pro lits in the short run. 
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I ........ , T), k r1 is the nominal long nm, short tenn interest rate at period t for k periods 
ahead and an asterisk denotes a foreign variable, .6. is the first difference operator and 
E, (· 11+k) implies the expected value of(.) for time t + k fonned at time t using all relevant 
infonnation or the expected rate of depreciation or appreciation of country i's currency. 
For condition (7) to hold it implicitly assumes no uncertainty as in a perfect foresight 
economy, i.e., the tenn structures of the interest rate differential and the forward discount 
rate contain no risk premium36• 
Equation (7) can be rearranged into an equilibrium condition for, real exchange rates as: 
(8) 
where 'e; is the systematic or long-run component of the real exchange rate and is driven 
by real fundamental factors such as government spending, productivity differences across 
countries, net foreign assets accumulation and terms of trade effects (MacDonald, 1999). 
3.2.1 UIP Limitations 
Although, the UIP model is typically justified, most of its limitations emanate from the 
very asswnptions upon which it is built. To begin with, the assumption of perfect markets, 
which entails investors' rational expectations, risk neutrality, free capital mobility and the 
absence of transaction costs like, taxes on capital transfers, is always cited as a potential 
limitation of the UIP hypothesis. Linked to this is the fact that invariably, the ability to 
arbitrage is restricted due to risk aversion by rational investors and speculative effects. 
Also as noted by Piggot (1993, p, 29), 
"-The belief that real interest rates should converge internationally is based on the 
presumption that returns to capital will ultimately be equalized and that the PPP detennines 
nominal exchange rates-conditions that are likely to hold, if at all only in the very long· 
run." 
For this reason the UIP is expected to hold only in the long run if it holds. Another reason 
for explaining the empirical failure of the UIP might be due to the very omission of the 
variable capturing the risk premium in the empirical model specification used because in 
reality there is always the time varying risk premiwn. Therefore if these variables, which 
36 Although it ls straightforward to Include a no-risk premium assumption In (7) It turns out from 
empirical tests, that including a risk premium typically has no slgnlRcant Impact on the results 
(MacDonald, 1999), 
capture the risk premium are correlated with interest rates the estimated coefficients would 
be pulled away from those implied in the UIP. 
3.2.2 Problems with Testing the UIP 
Because the question arises as to what determines the expectations about future exchange 
rates, testing for UIP directly either in real or nominal form is complicated by the fact that 
it is difficult to obtain information on expected exchange rates ( either nominal or real). 
This point might also explain the doctrine's alanning empirical failure. For example, 
Meese and Rogoff (1988) examine the relationship between real exchange rates and real 
interest rates of major industrialized economies under the flexible regime and their 
findings demonstrate that interest rate differentials are not significantly better than the 
random walk hypothesis. They fail to find cointegration between exchange rates and real 
interest rate differentials suggesting a lack of a real long -run relationship between the two. 
Indeed, some researchers have concluded that the empirical failure of the UIP helps sustain 
the notion that, central banks (relying on the behavior of dealers and participants in the 
exchange markets) are able to set, real interest rates that are lower (or higher) than those 
ruling on average in the rest of the world. One strategy therefore has been to combine the 
PPP and UIP (as in this study) with the hope of finding some empirical support for the 
UlP. 
3.2.3 Significance of UIP 
I. As McCallum (1996, p. 191) cited by Lavoie (2000) recognizes, the UIP is, " a 
constituent of virtually all contemporary exchange rate models, from sm!'lll scale 
theoretical systems ... to large scale econometric systems constructed and tended by 
teams of researchers employed by organizations such as the IMF'. This is true despite 
the general empirical failure of the UIP. Moreover, neoclassical authors still rely on it 
because they say a more attractive relationship is yet to be found. In this context 
therefore, exchange rate movements/fluctuations can be explained by shifts in interest 
rates differentials if the UIP holds. 
2. The UIP exchange rate theory is of immense importance to multinational firms due to 
its implications for, hedging against international financial risk. 
3.3 Country Specific versus Panel Approach to Testing PPP and U1P 
To search for more support for parity reversion in real exchange rates, a growing body of 
literature has turned to panel data methods aod away from country by couotry analysis. 
These panel approach studies adopt a cross-section approach and combine it with time 
series information, which contrasts with the individual country approach highlighting the 
cross- country heterogeneity. As a result many have indeed found support for the PPP 
(Engel et al; 1977, Frankel aod Ross; 1996, Wei and Parsely; 1995 and Wu 1996) and for 
UIP (MacDonald aod Nagayasu 2000) and for PPP and UIP (Chortareas and Driver, 2001). 
Unlike long run horizon studies, which extend the sample period, panel studies advocate 
for increasing the sample size by, pooling data across many currencies in order to amplify 
statistical power and therefore lead to substantially better econometric results. The, use of 
panel data therefore avoid the long-horizon data problems, which arise from structural 
breaks. However as noted by Maddala, it is not clear whether the structural changes 
dilemrr.a is more of a setback than cross sectional heterogeneity, a common problem with 
the use of panel data. Also as Papell 1997 observes, the panel results can be sensitive to the 
panel size and country grouping. In the case of Southern Africa, even though the countries 
belong to one economic block, they are not yet integrated economically and as such results 
could be very sensitive if the panel approach was used. 
O'Connel (1998) further points at the possible bias in panel tests due to cross sectional 
dependence. Moreover, because panel unit root tests examine the null hypothesis of a unit 
root for all pooled currencies, rejection of the null does not therefore necessarily imply that 
the currencies being pooled all contain no writ root. The rejections may reflect the parity 
reverting behavior of a possibly small sub-grouping of currencies only. Indeed for all 
intents and purposes as Taylor and Sona (1998) illustrate, the joint non-stationarity of a 
group of real exchange rates may be rejected when only one of the series is mean reverting. 
Using a similar line of argument, Maddala (2001) notes that the decision whether or not to 
use panel data unit roots tests in PPP depends on the hypothesis of interest. For example, 
one maybe interested (as in this study) in testing whether the hypothesis of PPP holds for 
the Zimbabwe dollar against the U.S dollar. In this case what is ofrelevanee are only data 
on the Zimbabwe dollar exchange rate. As such it is irrelevant to be told that we reject the 
long ruo validity of the PPP for the Zimbabwe dollar/the US dollar, but if we throw in a 
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number of other Southern African countries and use panel data unit root tests, we do not 
reject the PPP validity for the ZD/US exchange rate. On the other hand, one maybe 
interested not in the validity for any particular exchange rate but as a general PPP 
hypothesis for a set of exchange rates. In this case as argued by Li (1997), estimating the 
PPP regression country by country would invariably lead to noisy and often nonsensical 
estimates because of excessive data variability. Therefore, the use of panel data to get 
improved estimates for the autoregression parameter in the equation of each of the grouped 
exchange rates would be deemed important and appropriate. 
So although under some plausible assumptions the panel approach may be very helpful and 
powerful as well as theoretically appealing, the use of panel data is of limited empirical 
value especially if the hypothesis of interest is on country by country approach (O'Connel, 
1998; Kim and Maddala, 1996). In addition, presupposing that all countries have the same 
PPP or UIP regression coefficient can be too restrictive especially where each country in 
the group of countries have diverse macroooeconomic policies as well as different traded 
and non-traded goods. Assuming that the speed of adjnstment is the same for a number of 
exchange rates as recent literature has typically done, may also not only be questionable 
and misleading but untenable and so may the assumption of homoskedasticity across real 
exchange rates. For this reason this study considered the country by cowitry analysis as 
superior, as the results are intended to benefit national monetary authorities and economic 
leaders. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK/ MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter sets out the data description, the methodology and a review of the 
cointegrating vector autoregressions (VARS) including a discussion of how the intercepts 
and trends are specified in the models used. The chapter also expatiates, the statistical 
structures, bringing out the relationship between the various representations of the 
vectorial processes. The various representations are useful for different purposes like, 
identifying the Granger causal chain and its strength in addition to, indicating the time 
profile of shocks to either the individual variables or the whole system. 
4.1 Data Source and Description 
Based on the six variables defined below, the study appl!es a multivariate empirical 
equation to examine the relationship between price and interest rate differentials for 8 
SADC countries over varying sample periods from Jw1Uary 1979 to May 2001: 
The countries considered are Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In each case the nominal exchange rates are monthly 
closing bilateral and measured against the South African rand and the US dollar. 
The model relates nominal exchange rates to price differential variables while allowing for 
the effect of other relevant factors like the interest rate differential and changes in world oi1 
prices. The model thus enables the testing for both UIP as well as the absolute PPP 
relations based on the significance of the relevant coefficients in the cointegrating 
relations. The real price of oi1 was included in the model because it has been identified as a 
major source of shock to the flexible-price equilibrium values of real exchange rates 
(Throop 1993, cited by Zhou and Madhavi, 1996). An increase in the real price of oil 
causes deterioration in the trade balance or, a reduction in aggregate demand of an oil 
importing country. As a result, the value of the country's currency is expected to 
depreciate to restore equilibrium in the goods market ceteris peribus. However to the 
extent that the country is less dependent on oil imports relative to its trading partners its 
currency vis-A-vis the currency of its trading partners, is expected actually to appreciate. 
Long run structural modeling is used to test the validity of including the oil price vatriable. 
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All data is monthly. The majority of the time series available for most of the data used in 
the study cover the sample period from January 1979 to May 2001, though a number of 
them are limited by data availability and have somewhat shorter sample periods. The 
shortest time series available (Mauritius) ranges from January 1997 to May 2001 (see 
appendix for detailed information of the data samples). All data was obtained from Global 
Financial Data Company, California, USA and the data set include: 
• The logaritlun of the effective nominal exchange rate (defined as units of domestic 
currency per US dollar or South African rand ( e,) such that an increase represents a 
depreciation of the home currency). As the original data was all expressed in US 
dollar/ local currency, the exchange rate against the South African rand was 
calculated by dividing the US dollar/South Africa rand exchange rate against each 
individual country's currency exchange rate. 
• The logaritlun of the domestic price levels i.e., consumer price index (CPI) denoted 
by P, .31 
• The logarithm of foreign ( i.e., US or South Africa) price levels, (CPI) denoted by 
p,'). 
• The logarithm of the oil price index (po,) 
• The logarithm of, domestic interest rate ( r1 = In( 1 + R}(o0) where R, is the three 
months treasury-bill (TB) rate. For Botswana, Taozania and Swaziland the deposit 
rate was used instead. 
• Logaritlun of foreign interest rate r; = In( 1 + Rioo) where R,• is the US of South 
Africa's three months treasury~bill rate. 
Data was assumed to be consistent for analysis purposes. This assumption was made based 
on the reliability of the data source. However, because of the South African dual exchange 
rate system during part of the sample period, South Africa's exchange rate data from 
Financial Data Company was checked against data from the Reserve Bank of South Africa. 
37 Although on theoretical grounds, price series for tradable goods might be preferable, the observed 
price variables used are given by the consumer price index series. Th empirical motivation for the use 
of CPI series Is that, they are similarly defined at least In most of the countries, they are easily well 
understood and official rneasurements or price Inflation are usually calculated from this index. I 69 
The differences in values were very negligible and so were disregarded as negligible for 
analysis purposes. 
As the seasonal effects were considered to be only marginally significant and also given 
the limited sample size available it was thought best to leave out seasonal effects. The data 
therefore did not include any seasonal dummies. Related to this is the question of structural 
breaks. Whereas other studies have included dummies to capture structural breaks, in this 
paper we focused only on the exchange rate, prices and interest rates and did not consider 
the possibility of structural breaks mainly because the sample is fairly short. Extensions to 
include, structural breaks dummies in the vectorial processes used in this study are 
therefore beyond the scope of the current study. Cognizance though was taken of the fact 
that when there are structural breaks, the various unit root test .statistics are biased towards 
non-rejecting the null of a unit root. 
Based on these six variables, cointegration analysis was carried out using the following 
empirical models for the vectorial process: 
Intra-continental/Cross-national Approach 
All variables are treated as endogenous I ( l) and conditioned on the changes in world oil 
prices, which is I (0) 
Intercontinental Approach 
Yt= (e,,p,,r,] 
x, = l,,;.r,-,po,J 
Where,z, = (y1, x,) and z," =(t,p,,e,,r,,r,",p;,po,) 
The variables x, are treated as weakly endogenous I ( 1) and t stands for the time trend. 
The above vector(s), contain two long-run relationships-one relating to exchange rate and 
relative prices, PPP, and the other an interrelationship among interest rates and exchange 
rates, UIP. A detailed discussion of the statistical models for the two approaches will be 
given later. 
4.2 Econometric Methodology 
4.2.1 Cointegration technique 
The analysis applies VAR techniques to the Southern African exchange rates, interest rates 
and price differentials. Cointegration was used because it has been empirically proven that 
it can provide an important framework within which a closer link between theory and 
econometric applications could be fostered and therefore can capture the economic notion 
of a long run economic relation. Cointegration teclmiques are also imminent when 
modeling the behavior of data series that display stochastic trends as it counters the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method's problem of spurious regressions. According to 
Engle and Granger (1987, 1988), if two variables are found to be cointegrated, then the 
possibility of no causation in the Granger sense (not structural sense) is ruled out and 
causality must exist at least in one direction, either unidirectional or bi·directional. 
This study employs cointegration analysis based on the technique pioneered by Engle and 
Granger (1987) and extended by Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990, 
1992) and many others. It is a full infonnation Maximum Likelihood Estimation method 
and it allows the estimation of both long and short·run relationships without having to 
difference the data. In testing for the presence of these relationships among the variables 
included in the data set, the Johansen and Juselius procedure is employed. Although the 
Johansen modus operandi is well known a brief outline of the methodology is given here to 
shed some light on how the procedure was applied in this paper. 
The Johansen and Juselius (JJ) tests of cointegration are conducted through say, a ,ih order 
n-dimensional vector of I (d) time series variables X, with an autoregressive representation, 
which in its error correction fonn can be mathematically expressed in the following fonn: 
p-1 
M, = 8 + :E r,M1_1 + nx,-p + q., D, + s, ,_, (9) 
where, X, is an n x l vector of I (1) or stochastic variables integrated of same order, r 1 'I' 
and n represent n x n coefficient matrices of short and long run effects/ adjustments to 
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the changes of the process, respectively, A is the difference operator, p denotes the longest 
lag length so the VAR is the / 1 order, 6 is a constant or drift and e, tvNiid (0, I) , is a 
vector of white noise errors. D,, is a vector of non-stochastic variables designed to capture 
the time trend t and centered seasonal dummy variables should they be needed, as well as 
other intervention dummies, which will depend upon the particular circumstances of an 
empirical application. Centered seasonal dummies, sum to zero over twelve consecutive 
months by construction and are necessary to account for short run effects, which would 
otherwise violate the Gaussian assumption. In our cointegration tests the Jag length pin the 
above model has been chosen on the basis of the Akaike lnfomtation Criterion (AIC). 
Model (9) will be used as a benchmark model within which all the subsequent hypotheses 
are tested, since in the unrestricted fonn it corresponds to the I (0) model. All higher 
models used in this research are nested in this model. 
Important to this study, the variable n embodies infonnation on the long-run relationships 
between variables comprising the data set. As such it is the rank (r) of n which indicate 
the number ofcointegrating vectors. Johansen (1991) shows that ifZ, rv /(1), (as is in this 
study) the following: restrictions on model (9) have to be satisfied. If, n has a zero rank, 
then no stationary linear combination can be identified and the variables in Xr are non 
cointegrated meaning that they can wander arbitrarily far from each other.38 However, if 
n has the reduced rank r, where O S r S n - 1, then II can be decomposed into two n x r 
matrices a and p such that n = ap. The matrix p consists of reduced rank r linearly-
independent stationary combinations or cointegrating vectors (long -run relations), while a. 
can be interpreted as a matrix of vector error correction parameters or short run 
adjustments (also known as feedback coefficients) to the cointegrating relationships, p, In 
such a case some of the elements of a. must be non- zero, that is, there must be Granger 
causality involving the levels of the variables in the system to keep the elements of X, 
from diverging boundlessly. Thus not only can the existence of an equilibriwn relationship 
detennined; but also the relative speed of adjustment of each cointegrating vector to 
3
~ Lack or colntegratlon implies no long-run cqullibrlum among lhe variables. It ls important to note 
that the term equilibrium means different things between economic lheorlsls and economelrlcilms. To 
economic theorists thic term equilibrium refers lo an equality, between desired and actual tran!ll.cllons. 
Whereas, the econometric use or the term makes reference to any long-run relationship among 
stsllonary variables. This means that, colntegralion does not require that the long-run relationship 
(I.e., equilibrium), be generated by market forces. 
disequilibrium shocks. The elements of p are estimated using the, full infonnation 
maximum likelihood approach. 
The beauty of the JJ multivariate cointegration technique is that it makes use of the 
information incorporated in the dynamic structure of the model, whilst at the same time it 
estimates the entire space of the long run relationi;;hips among a set of variables, without 
imposing any normalization on the dependent variable a priori. In this case the joint 
analysis of the PPP and UIP using the JJ multivariate cointegrating allows for possible 
interactions between the goods and capital market. It must be stressed however, that a 
cointegrating vector is not unique. 
4.2.2 Long-run Structural Modeling (LRSM) 
In a multivariate context, such as the one given by the combined PPP and UIP model, a 
vector error correction model subject to deficie: ,t rank restrictions on the long-run 
multiplier matrix, ll, may contain multiple cointegrating vectors termed cointegration 
rank. In such a case, the individual cointegrating vectors are under-identified in the 
absence of sufficient linear restrictions on each of the vectors and as such lack any 
meaningful economic interpretation. It is because of this that the VAR has been criticized 
as being devoid of any economic content. Thus in order to avoid this indetenninacy, we 
need to impose appropriate a priori just/exact identifying restrictions and/or over-
identifying restrictions preferably obtained from the long-run equilibrium properties of a 
suitable underlying economic theory. Restrictions can either be coefficient restrictions or 
symmetry restrictions or both. For example, one can impose homogeneity anr1 zero 
restrictions in order to identify the structural model from an estimated VAR. Long-run 
structural modeling endeavors to achieve this end by estimating theoretically meaningful 
long-run relationships through testing both just identifying and over-identified restrictions 
on the cointegrating vectors based on theories (in this case the PPP and UIP theories). In 
other words, LRSM provides a practical approach to discriminate between the vectors by 
incorporating long-run structural relationships suggested by theory in an otherwise 
unrestricted VAR model (Garrett et al, 1999). 
In a simple case where r = I, typically the one restriction needed to identify the 
cointegrating relation can be viewed as a 'nonnalizing' restriction, which could be applied 
to the coefficient of any of the integrated variables which enter the cointegrating relation 
(by fixing its coefficient to unity) without changing the likelihood function. However in 
the more general case where r > 1, the number of such 'normalizing' restrictions must be at 
least equal to r linear independent restrictions on each of the cointegrating vectors, which 
needs to be supplemented with further r2 - r a priori restrictions. The log-likelihood ratio 
statistic to test over identifying restrictions is asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared 
( %2 ) variate with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions 
(v), namely n - r1 > 0. A large value of z' on (v) indicates that over-identifying 
restrictions are not consistent with data. Estimation of the model subject to all the (exact 
and over-identifying) restrictions, thus enables a test of the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions and hence of the economic theory, to be carried out. The long-run structural 
modeling approach described in Pesaran and Shin (1997) and Pesaran, Shin and R Smith 
(1998), was used in this study to test just and over-identifying restrictions. 39 
4.2.3 Vector Error Correction Modeling (VECM) and Exogeneity 
A practical feature of cointegrated variables is that their time paths are influenced by the 
extent of any deviation from long run equilibrium. After all, if the system is to return to 
equilibrium, the movement of at least some of the variables must respond to the magnitude 
of the disequilibrium. Thus, having identified the vector either exactly identified or over-
identified, a natural step to examine the shorMenn dynamics influenced by temporary 
deviations from a long run relationship (or PPP as in our case) would be to fonnu1ate a 
relationship called Vector Error Correction Modeling (VECM). VECM seeks to uncover 
the propagation mechanism underlying the behavior of the dynamics under consideration 
or to indicate the direction of the Granger (temporal) causality. VECM is also known as 
the Granger representation theorem. 40 
39 According to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), this test of over-identifying restrictions on the 
cointegrating relations, pre-assumes that the variables, Xt = (y1 , x1 ), are I (1), and the number of 
cointegrating relations, r, is correctly chosen, 
40 The Granger Representation theorem states that, for any set of I (1) variablrs, error correction and 
colntegration are equivalent representations, In a colntegrated system, {z} does not Granger cause lv,} 
if lagged values !!.z,.1 does not enter the 11y, equation and if y, does not respond to deviations from the 
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Engle and Granger (1987) established that in the presence of cointegration, i.e., once a 
number of variables (say, x1 and y,) are found to be cointegrated there always exists a 
corresponding representation of data known as error correction fonn, which represents the 
dynamics of the series. More formally, ifx, andy, are both integrated of order 1, and they 
are cointegrated so that Z. - x1 - Ay, is I (0), then Engle and Granger (1987) showed that it 
must be the case that that the following error correction mechanism is correct: 
AX, = a1z1-1 + p1iagged(Ax1, 6.y1 )+&11 
(10.1) 
(10.2) 
whet'e, at least one of a, or a2 is nonzero and &11 and &21 are white noise errors. 
This error correction representation implies that changes in the dependent variable are a 
function of the level of dis equilibria in the cointegration relationship ( captured by the error 
correction tenn), as well as changes in other explanatory variable(s). This way, the error 
correction term, captures the dynamics of the system whilst incorporating the equilibrhun 
suggested by economic theory (Dolado et al 1990). Equally, through the error correction 
mechanism, a proportion of the disequilibrium from one period is corrected in the next 
(Caesar 1090). In this case we exploit the idea that there may exist co-movements between 
the exchange rate, price levels and interest rate differentials, and the possibilities that they 
will trend together in the long-run stable equilibrium. If the VECM test results display 
signs of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity they are corrected using the Newey-West 
test. 
Cointegration and error correction modeling is applied in this analysis because it holds 
several intuitive implications. When the variables are cointegrated, then in the short-run, 
deviations from the long run equilibrium will feed back on the changes in the dependent 
variable in order to force the movements towards the long-run equilibrium. If the 
dependent variable (say the change in the nominal exchange rate as is in this case) is 
driven directly by this long-run equilibrium error, then it is responding to this feedback. If 
not, it is responding only to short-tenn shocks to the stochastic environment. The Granger 
causality or the endogeneity of the dependent variable can be evidenced through the 
statistical significance of the I-test of the lagged error correction tenn and/or the F-test 
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applied to the joint significance of the sum of the lags of each explanatory variable. In 
other words, the F-tests of the differenced explanatory variables, give us an indication of 
the short term causal effects, whereas the validity of the long-run relationship is implied 
through the significance of the t-test(s) of the lagged error correction term(s), which 
contain the long term infonnation since it is derived from the long-run cointegrating 
relationship(s). 
The coefficient of the lagged error correction term however, has the interpretation of speed 
of adjustment parameters and represents the proportion by which the long-run 
disequilibrium in the dependent variable is being corrected in the short period. The larger 
the error correction term the greater the response of that variable to the previous period's 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium. On the other extreme, non-significant values of 
any of the lagged error correction tenns imply that the variable(s) in question are 
unresponsive to the last period's equilibrium error. Such an extreme scenario affects the 
implied long-run relationship and may be a violation of the underlying theory. On the other 
hand, the non-significance of any of the differenced variables, which reflects only the 
short-term relationship does not involve any theory violations, because theory especially 
economic, typically offers very little infonnation on short term relationships (Thomas, 
1993). 
VECM therefore plays the simultaneous role of indicating the direction of Granger 
causality or the endogeneity of dependent variables as well as allowing us to distinguish 
between long tenn and short-term dynamics of variables in the cointegrating system. Thus 
a known novelty of error correction techniques can be illustrated in testing various 
economic issues which are especially elusive with respect to the causal direction. For 
example, Masih and Masih (! 995a, 1997 and 1998) have used a multivariate formulation 
of VECM techniques on several mainstream macroeconomic analyses in order to test for 
the causal chains implied by major paradigms in international macroeconomic theory. 
4.2.4 Intra-Continental/Cross-national Approach (South Africa as foreign country) 
In the intra-continental approach, all variables were treated as endogenous except the 
growth in oil price, which was assumed exogenously determined in the system of 
equations and so the other variables are conditioned on the changes in oil prices. The 
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following, equation in error correction (VECM) fonn is used also assuming unrestricted 
intercepts and no time trends and, using VAR (2): 
(11) 
where, X1 = l_p,, e,,p;, r"r,· J,po1 is the logarithm of the world oil price at time I, Co is a 
vector of intercepts and, I= l, .... ,T,. 
· If the PPP and VIP hold, then theory predicts that we expect to find 2 cointegrating 
relationships among the variables p"p,• ,e11 r, and r,"corresponding to the PPP and UIP 
respectively. For the cointegration rank r = 2, the cointegrating vectors will be, 
(1,-1,-1, o, o) and (o,o,0,1,-1). 
Because the PPP relationship does not involve interest rates and the UIP does not involve 
PPP variables, the two relationships are distinguishable with r = 2 as the necessary 
condition for identification. Therefore, with r = 2 as a necessary condition for 
identification, there should be a 2-1 = 1 restriction on each vector. Where there are 4 
restrictions on the first vector comprising of 2 exclusions and 2 equality restrictions and 4 
restrictions on the second vector comprising 3 exclusions and 1 equality restriction and 
hence each vector is over- identified. 
4.2.5 The Intercontinental Approach (US as the foreign country). 
Unlike the intra-continental approach where domestic and foreign prices are all assumed to 
be endogenously detennined, such a symmetric treatment of domestic and foreign 
variables does not seem necessary in small open economies like those of SADC, where it 
is highly unlikely that changes in domestic variables have a significant impact on the long 
run evolution of foreign (world) prices or interest rates. Therefore, under the 
intercontinental approach we adopt Pesaran and Smith (l 999)'s argument that in the 
context of small open economies, it can be plausible to a priori assume that some of the I 
(1) variables in the cointegrating vector autoregressive model (VAR) are long forcing, in 
the sense that in the long run they are not caused by other variables in the model. Whilst 
these long forcing variables are indeed detennined by economic processes, they are not 
influenced by domestic variables and therefore can be viewed as being detennined outside 
the system and are conditioned in explaining the remaining variables. 
According to Pesaran and Smith (1999), the imposition of such exogeneity restrictions is 
likely to result in substantial reductions in the nwnber of freely estimated parameters. 
Exclusion restrictions on exogenous variables can also aid identification to the coefficient 
matrix of the current endogenous (in this case domestic) variables. In their line of thought, 
the a priori restrictions that certain variables do not appear in particular domestic equations 
may be much more plausible, than a priori restrictions that structural shocks are 
orthogonal, an argument adopted in this study. This however, as Pesaran and Smith (1999) 
were quick to point out, does not rule out contemporaneous or short tenn interactions 
between the weakly exogenous I (1) variables and the endogenous I (1) variables, a fact 
that might change their asymptotic distributions to some unknown extent. 
In the case of SADC, where most of the countries in the saL1ple are poor, small and 
moderately open economies heavily dependent on oil imports, the important shocks to the 
world prices and interest rates are not only exogenous but observable because, it can be 
fairly easy to measure their impact on the economy. In Southern Africa, the price of oil is 
therefore a natural exogenous variable. Similarly, the foreign prices and foreign interest 
rates are also treated as exogenous. Therefore for the intercontinental approach the two 
foreign variables and oil prices are treated as weakly exogenous I (I), and are thus 'long 
forcing variables'41 • This treatment of the oil price variable is a slight change from earlier 
analyses in other studies (see Johansen and Juselius, 1992 and, Pesaran and Smith 1996) 
where changes in the log of oil prices and its lagged values were treated as strictly 
exogenous I (0) variables in the cointegrating VAR model. This approach taken in 
previous literature and adopted in the intra-continental approach excludes the possibility 
that there exist cointegrating relationships, which involve the oil prices. However, 
according to Garratt et al (2001) and Pesaran and Smith (2000), the appropriate method of 
~, The concept or long forcing Is runy dlscuued In Granger and Lin (1995) and Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith (2000) and Is weaker than the concept or Granger non-causality, In the sense that it allows ror 
lagged changes In the endogenous variables to Influence foreign prices, foreign interest rates and oil 
prices, although It still rule!! out shocks to the endogenous variables to have any long-run Impacts on 
foreign interests nr.d prices and, oil prices. It must also be noted that., the exogenous treatment or 
foreign prices, foreign interests and oil prices could Involve loss or efficiency In estimation Ir they are In 
ract not long rorelng. 
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allowing for oil price effects is to include an integrated version of the I (0) variables in the 
llllderlying co integrating VAR, which in the context of this application implies adding the 
log of oil price to the list of I (1) exogenous variables, and then testing the validity of 
excluding the level of oil prices, from the cointegration relations. If the restriction is 
rejected, then it is imposed. The following system of equations in error correction form 
was tested using varying observations 
where, 
~ 
.6.y, =Coy +Cif+AAr1 + i._f1y&,_1 +IIyz,_1 +e, ,., 
,-, 
8Xf =aox + ~rtr&,_, +vx, 
,_, 
t = 1,2, ... ,n 
c, =(-rr,r) 
• z, = (y, ,x, ), which is= ( p1 ,e1,r,,r; ,p,•po) 
(12,1) 
(12.2) 
• y, = (p, ,e,, r, ) or the vector of jointly detennined (endogenous) /(1) variables 
• x, = (rt, p,", po) or vector of structurally exogenous I (!)variables, which are long 
forcing. 
• There is no vector of exogenous/ detenninistic I (0) variables. 
• The disturbance vectors SJ and v, satisfy the following assumptions: 
µ, =(::)· iid(O, E) (12.3) 
where L is a symmetric positive-definite matrix 
The intercept and trend coefficients C0y and C 1y are 3 x 1 vectors; IIy is the long-run 
multiplier matrix of order (3, 6)42 and r,,, ar1y,r2y,···,rp-t., are (3, 6) coefficient 
41 Equation (11,2) contains the restriction that n1 = O, which implies that the elements or the vector 
process {x, t 1 are not colntegrated among themselves. Moreover the lnrormatlon available from the 
differenced VAR (p -1) model (11.2) ror {x, };:1 is red11ndant for efficient conditional estimation and 
Inference concerning the long-run parameters Ilr as well as deterministic and short run parameten c0 , 
c1 ,A and q, of(lt.1). 
matrices capturing the short-nm dynamic effects, whilst A is a 3 x 3 short nm 
coefficient matrix. 
The VECM in (11.1) differs in a number of important respects from the usual VAR 
formulation for VECM (see (9)) analyzed inter- alia by Johansen (1991). Firstly, (11.1) 
allows for a subsystem approach in which the mx vector of random foreign variables x1 
is the forcing variables or common 'stochastic trends' in the sense that the error 
correction tenns do not enter in the sub-system for x, (given by (11.2). Therefore 
cointegration analysis applied using the inter-continental approach, allows for 
contemporaneous and short-tenn feed backs fromy, to x, but requires that no such feed-
backs are possible in the long run. The weakly exogenous I (l) variables (foreign prices 
and foreign interests and oil prices as in this case) x,, are the 'long-run forcing' 
variables of the system. Secondly, the cointegration analysis critically depends on 
whether the underlying VECM contains intercepts and or time trends, and whether the 
coefficient intercepts, Cizy, and the time trends, Cly, are restricted. As in Pesaran (1997), 
this study assumed that, intercepts are wrrestricted and the time trends are restricted and 
hence the level of y 1 will exhibit no linear detenninistic trends for all values of the 
cointegrating rank, r = Rank (lly).43 Therefore, C0 ,e O and C1 = (-ll,y ). The VECM 
combining the two systems of equations (11.1) and (11.2), is represented by: 
(12.4) 
Fort= 1,2, ... ,n, where 
(Y,) (sµ) (c'') (-TI,r) (TI') (r') z, = x, ' µ, = v, • Co= aox ' C1 = 0 •II= 0 ' r, = fx 
This equation with the option of restricted trends was used for the analysis. A constant was 
also included to capture the linear trends, which were observed in price level variables 
when the data was plotted. 
oil This assumption of unrestricted Intercepts and restricted time trend1t ls referred to as case IV In 
Pe!aran, Shin and Smith (2000). I so 
The co integration rank hypothesis stated in the context of (11.5) is 
Hr: Rank [CTy] =r r= 0, ... , n 
where n, =a,P 
If the PPP and UIP holds, economic theory suggests the existence of two long run relations 
defined as, p, - e, - p; and lj -lj' respectively. We therefore expect to get, r = 2 
cointegrating relationships and the vectors will be: 
(I, -1, -1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0, I, -1) 
4.2.6 Generalized Variance Decomposition Analysis and Relative Causality 
Since wuestricted VARS are over-parameterized they are not particularly useful for short-
term forecasts. However understanding the properties of the forecast errors is exceedingly 
helpful in uncovering inter relationships among variables in the system. Inference from 
using VECMs, in the way of F- and /-tests as explained in (4.2.4) may be interpreted as 
within sample causality tests. They indicate only the Granger causality of the dependent 
variable within the sample period, but they neither provide an indication of the dynamic 
properties of the system, nor allow us to gauge the relative strength of the Granger causal 
chain beyond the sample period. Variance Decomposition Tests are an extension of the 
VECM as they allow out of sample testing of the Granger exogeneity or endogeneity of the 
dependent variable. In addition, VD Cs provides a measure of the extent to which a variable 
is exogenous in comparison to other variables in the system, 
Results of forecast error variance decompositions, also termed out-of-sample causality 
tests, indicate that by partitioning the variance of the forecast error of a certain variable 
into proportions attributable to shocks in each variable in the system including its own, we 
are able to gauge the relative causality of the variables initially identified as being 
endogenous or exogenous via the vector error correction model. In more simple terms, the 
forecast error variance decomposition tells us the proportion of the change or movements 
in the value of a sequence (or the variable) in a given period due to its own shocks versus 
shocks to other variables. If & :, shocks explain none of the forecast error variance of (y,) 
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at all forecast horizons, we can say that the (yJ sequence is exogenous. This is in line with 
Sims (1982) findings, that a variable that is optimally forecast from its own lagged values 
will have all its forecast error accounted for by its own disturbances and hence, it is 
exogenous. In applied research, it is typical for a variable to explain most of its forecast 
error variances at short horizons and smaller proportions at longer horizons. 
As results based on standard or orthogonalised VDCs have been empirically found to be 
generally sensitive to the lag length used and to the ordering of variables, to circumvent the 
problem, this study applies the generalized VDCs advanced and applied in Lee and 
Pesaran (1993). 
4.2. 7 Generalized Impulse Response Functions and Persistent Profiles 
Finally having estimated the structural cointegrating VAR model, we use it in the 
examination of the economy's short-run dynamic properties of our model. To achieve this 
an analysis of generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) and persistence profiles (PF) 
are conducted in an attempt to examine the effect of shocks in causing deviations from 
long- run equilibrium and to gauge the speed with which, the PPP and UIP for the 
economies under study converge back to equilibrium after a variable specific or system 
wide shocks. The information from VDCs can be equivalently represented by the graphs of 
the impulse response functions (IRFs). As stated by Pesaran and Shin (1994), focusing on 
the long run only as is often done when testing for cointegration has the danger of malting 
empirical research irrelevant or at best rather of limited use for policy analysis. Pesaran 
and Shin (1994) cite Keynes (1923, p. 80) who put it in the following way: 
"But this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all 
dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous 
seasons they can only tell us that when the stonn is long past the ocean is flat 
again," 
It is therefore imperative that the analysis of cointegration is accompanied by some 
estimates of the speed with which the economy or markets under consideration return to 
their equilibrium states once shocked. That is of-course assuming that the equilibrium 
exists as is in this case. Such analysis is particularly valuable where two or more 
cointegrating relations characterizing equilibrium have been identified. One of the best 
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methods to establish the speed of convergence is to apply the impulse response approach, 
originally due to Sims (1980) to estimate the time profile of the effect of "particular" or 
variable specific shocks on all the model's endogenous variables or on the cointegrating 
relations. While shocks on individual variables in a cointegrating VAR model do not 
dissipatet but persist forever, the effect of shocks on the cointegrating relations is bound to 
dissipate. There are two types of impulse response functions, orthogonalized and 
generalized. As previous studies have invariably shown, because of the dependence of the 
orthogonal method on the ordering of variables in the system, this method produces highly 
disparate if not nonsensical results when the ordering of variables is changed, therefore the 
generalized approach was used in this application. 
The second method to gauge the speed with which deviations from long-run relations in 
the model are eliminated is to apply persistence profiles as proposed in Pesaran and Shin 
(1994). In direct contrast to impulse response fimctions, which focuses on the impact of 
variable-specific shocks, persistence profiles are best used to map out the dynamic 
response path of "system wide shocks" or composite shock on the cointegrating relations. 
In simple economic te1ms, persistence profiles are used to estimate the speed with which 
the economy or markets under consideration r~m to their equ!librium states. The profiles 
are constructed so that they take the value of unity on the impact of the shock and tend to 
zero as the time horizon tends to infinity assuming that the long-run relationship is in fact 
cointegrating. Persistence profiles of near integrated or I (1) time series variables are 
transitory and eventually converge to zero as the economy returns to its steady trend, but 
they can be substantially different from zero for protracted periods. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This chapter outlines the results and implications of empirical tests on the data. Due to the 
number of countries investigated and huge volumes of results generated, most computer 
test results are commented on but not reported in this paper. However the results are 
available on request from the author. 
5.1 Unit Root Tests and Order of VAR 
In order to apply cointegration techniques to this data series, it was first necessary to 
detennine the dimensions of the VAR. This entailed deciding the number of k integrated 
variables to be jointly modeled in the VAR, detennining which variables should be 
included as 1(1) endogenous Qointly determined and explained in the model) and, 
determining whether or not to include any exogenous (determined outside the model) or 
1(0) variables in the model. It was also necessary to determine whether or not to include an 
intercept or time trend in the VAR analysis, as well as establishing the lag length of the 
y::u,ables or the order ofV AR. 
Firstly, consideration of purpose, judgmer.", economic theory guidance and previous 
empirical research was used to inform the choice and number of variables jointly modeled 
as well as the functional form. True, other factors such as economic fundamentals like real 
output levels, level of goverrunent spending, net foreign assets accumulation and 
cumulated current account balances were initially considered for inclusion into the VAR. 
However, apart from the fact that results from previous work along these lines have been 
mixed, when the lack of transparency and accuracy in the data from most of the sample 
countries was considered, it was deemed prudent to drop out these variables. Including 
more variables whilst using monthly data was also not favored because as a practical 
matter the more variables are added, the quicker the degrees of freedom are eroded. 
Moreover, including other variables to capture the fundamental factors would have made it 
difficult to impose linear PPP and UIP theory restrictions to the cointegrating vectors at the 
long-run structural modeling stage. 
As stated by Pesaran and Smith, cited in McAleer and Oxley (1999), the immense benefit 
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of using economic theory to impose structure on the VAR is that in addition to 
substantially reducing the dimensionality of the estimation problem, it also increases the 
efficiency of the estimates and the power of the tests. Therefore given the importance of 
system properties, the theory has to be used to impose some structure on the system rather 
than to impose ad hoc restrictions on individual (dynamic) coefficients. 
The second step was data analysis. In order to embody the long-run relations (in this case 
the PPP and UIP) within a suitable macroeconometric model, it is important that the 
variables used in the empirical analysis can be reasonably be argued to be I (I). To 
ascertain this investigations were undertaken to, establish the stationarity or order of 
integration of the variables of the empirical model under consideration and, to detennine 
whether the series are I (I) in nature. All variables used namely, exchange rates, price 
indices and interest rates and world oil prices are, time series data, and it is an established 
fact that most time series data is non -stationary in level fonn. This was also observed 
when the data was plotted on graphs for all variables except the Namibia/South Africa and 
Swaziland/South Africa exchange rates, which were found to be stationary in level fonn 
( see appendix data figures). The interest rates were found to have a general upward trend 
but are mean reverting. To establish and confirm this, the data was tested for a unit root or 
nonstationarity using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips Perron (PP) (1988) 
unit root tests procedures. Both these tests are conducted on the null hypothesis that there 
is nonstationarity or one unit root in the variable under question. Despite it not being very 
powerful in finite samples, the ADF and PP tests were especially favored because they 
have good power characteristics as compared to other unit root tests in literature. 
In determining the order of integration each of the two tests discussed above was 
performed with a constant and with and without a trend variable. For either standard ADF 
tests or PP tests, the choice of lag length k may affect the test results, hence this study 
follows the procedure suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991) where you start with an 
upper bound, k,nax,on k. If the last lag is significant, choose k = kmax, and if not, reduce k by 
one until the last lag becomes significant. A summary report of the ADF and PP results 
computed over varying observations for the different countries and, for the period ranging 
from 1979Ml to 2001M5, for the levels and 1st differences of all variables are presented in 
Appendix Table 1. Several points are worth noting in relation to these results. First, with 
few exceptions the results show that the null of non-stationarity is accepted for the 
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following variables in level fonn but not for the Namibia/South Afiica and 
Swaziland/South Africa exchange rates variables. The null of non-stationarity is however 
rejected in the first difference fonn for the ADF test and the PP test for the rest of the 
variables that are non-stationary in level fonn, indicating that, most of the tested variables 
are first difference stationary or an I (1) process. The evidence that the variables are 
described by an, I (1) process are strong based on the consistent results of the two tests. 
So, combining parsimony, these unit root tests and the a priori knowledge that, all the six 
variables, like most time series data are generally considered to be integrated of order of 
one, the null hypothesis ofnonstationarity (in 1st difference) was accepted for all variables 
under consideration, except the Namibia/South Africa and Swaziland/South Africa 
exchange rate variables. Further investigations established that these two exchange rates 
are stationary in level fonn because the two currencies are pegged against each other 
around one to one basis. Therefore the PPP was not tested for intra-continental approach 
for Namibia and Swaziland because their exchange rates were found to be I (0). 
Accordingly, the rest of the analysis proceeded under the assumption that the time series 
relevant for our cointegration test are all integrated of same order I (1 ), which of course is 
a necessary condition for time series to be cointegrated. This finding is also consistent wit.i. 
other studies focusing on the post Bretton Woods period where it is clear that exchange 
rates interest rates and price level variables are characterized by a non stationary process. 
The only intervention dummy variable, which was included in the model, was the growth 
in the world oil prices and only for the intra-continental approach. No other detenninistic 
dummies were included because they were considered insignificant given the short sample 
size used. 
Subsequently, based on the observation that the plot of the data over the period under 
study indicated no upward trend in difference form for all variables except SA/Namibia 
and SA/Swaziland exchange rates, and the a priori knowledge which suggests that interest 
rates tend to be mean reverting in the long run, the VAR was estimated without a 
deterministic trend for the intra-continental approach. However no a priori restrictions on 
intercepts were assumed and the VAR was estimated with unrestricted intercepts to 
account for the constant in the equation. For the intercontinental approach, we assumed 
unrestricted constants and restricted trends. Over-identifying restrictions were then used to 
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test the validity of including a trend that is, testing the co-trending hypothesis that the trend 
coefficients in the cointegrating relations are equal to zero. 
Finally, before cointegration tests were conducted on the data for each country, the order 
of the vector autoregression was selected in order to detennine the number of lags of the 
variables to be included in the cointegration model. Due to their voluminous amow1t the 
test results of the VAR selection are not included in this paper, but are available upon 
request from the author. In line with the common empirical practice, the order of VAR k 
was chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion or Schwartz Bayesian Information 
Criterion subject to, the lag length choice passing the Lagrange- Multiplier test for the 
absence of serial correlation. For most of the countries, consideration of the Akaike 
Information Criterion generally suggested an optimal VAR order of two while the 
Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion generally suggested VAR order 1. Subsequent 
analysis of the residuals of the individual equations in the VAR for serial correlation for all 
variables, concluded that a VAR of two was a reasonable choice, with a few exceptions 
(Country- specific VAR order selection results are reported later under the respective 
cmmtry's cointegration res\.alts as some countries used higher VAR orders). Moreover the 
selection of VAR (2) was considered prudent on the grounds that the consequences of 
over-estimation of the order of VAR is less damaging than under-estimating it especially 
where the sample is reasonably large (see Kilian (1997)). 
The cointegration tests are based on the procedure suggested by Johansen (1988) and 
Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1991) already discussed above. For each country the number 
of cointegrating vectors is sequentially determined using the Maximum eigenvalue statistic 
(,l_ .)44 and the trace statistic (,l,-), as well as the Akaike information criterion (AIC), 
the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). 
44 The Johansen 2nd Juselius procedure offers two likelihood ratio statistics that test for colntegrating 
vectors and they both follow non-standard distributions. Fi~stly in the case of ma:dmnm eigenvalue 
test, if based on the value of the statistic the null of r = 0 can be rejected, then the explicit alternative 
null hypothesis that there is at most one colntegrating vector(rs 1) is tested and so on. Secondly, in an 
n-variable case OS r Sn -1, Johansen (1988) also proposes another likelihood ratio test known as the 
. 
'trace' test for determining the number or cc.integrating relationships. The trace statistic tests the 
hypothesis that there are at most r distinct cointegrating vectors. 
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5.2 Estimation and Testing of Mod.els 
Given the non-stationarity of all variables for the countries considered, the vector of 
interest rates, exchange rates and prices is viewed as a system of possibly cointegrated 
variables (Engle and Granger, 1987). As such the number of cointegrating relationships 
between them was estimated. The Johansen maximum likelihood procedure (1992) was 
used to estimate the number of cointegrating vectors and to derive a likelihood ratio test for 
the null hypothesis that there are a given number of these relationships. As the specific 
cowitry approach was used to investigate the propositions under study because findings are 
intended to benefit national policy makers. the results are reported on a country-by-country 
basis. Conclusions that the PPP and VIP variables move together in the long run for each 
country were drawn where at least one cointegrating vector was foWld at the conventional 
95% significance level. Long-run structural modeling (LRSM) was then used to detennine 
the validity of the two propositions in their symmetry and proportionality conditions. 
Of these two tests, however, the mBilmum eigenvalue test is expected to provide more accurate results 
than the trace statistic (JJ, 1990), However as argued by Juselius (1995), the results of the trace and 
maximum eigenvalue test statistics of the I (I) variables analysis, I.e. from the estimation of the model 
without allowing for I (2) trends, must be Interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, the 
conditioning on intervention dummies and /or weakly exogenous variables ls likely to change the 
asymptotic distributions to some (unknown) extend. Second, the asymptotic critical values may not be 
very close approiimatlons in small samples. Also these two tests do not Impose the symmetry and 
proportionality restrictions. The statistical package used in the cointegratlon analysis ls Mlcrofit 4.0 
(Pesaran and Pesaran , 1997). The assymptotic distributions for both the trace and maximum 
eigenvalue statistics are tabulaled and presented in Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Osterwald-
Leman (1992). 
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5.2.1 BOTSWANA 
• Botswana Simple PPP and UIP 
Intra-Continental Approach 
Using the AIC and SBC selection criteria, the tests for order of VAR selects 2 and 3 as 
order of VAR for the PPP and UIP respectively. Diagnostic tests (LR test) for possible 
serial correlation in the residuals of the individual equations suggest that autocorrelation is 
not a problem in the present application. Cointegration results for simple PPP using and 
UIP using selected order of VAR are presented in Appendix Table 2. 
PPP 
The vectorial process used to test the PPP hypothesis is defined by; 
,-, 
AX, =8+ Lr,AX,_, +nx,_p +e, (13) 
,., 
where X1 = (p1, e1, p,}45, rand n repres~nt short and long-run coefficients and 6 is a 
constant. 
Both the Maximum eigenvalue (Amu:) and the Trace statistics (A,=) suggest r = 2. The 
hypothesis r = 0 is rejected against r = 1, and the hypothesis r = I is rejected against r = 2 
but the hypothesis that r = 2 cannot be rejected against r = 3 etc. However, according to 
the PPP theory we only expect one cointegration relationship and so the finding of more 
than one co integrating vector tends to complicate the interpretation of results, as it may not 
be possible to identify the structural relationship. However since there is cointegration we 
conclude that the simple weak form PPP does seem to hold because the variables do move 
~s The equation tested for PPP is defined by the system X. = (p,,ei.p,} wberep is the domestic price, e 
is the exchange rate and p • is the foreign price. Equation (13) was used for all countries' simple PPP 
tests throughout the analyses. 
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together in the long run 46• To reach definite conclusions on the validity of the theory we 
impose the theory restriction~. Asswning r = 1 in line with the PPP theory under 
proportionality and symmetry, the coefficients of the cointegrating vector J3 should satisfy 
J3PPP = (p - e - p • = 1 - 1 - I), when the coefficient on the domestic price has been 
nonnalized to one. But, first we impose the exact identifying restriction p = I to the 
cointegrating vector p = (LBCPI (p), LBSAR (e), LSACPI {pJ), yields the following 
exactly identified estimates: 
p, =[1.too 
(none) 
e 
2.7432 
(4.152) 
p" J 
-0.1170 
(0.9109) 
where the log likelihood function (LL) subject to just- identifying restrictions= 2675.9.47 
The vector does not support the PPP theory because only the foreign price coefficient has 
the right sign. Next we imposed over-identifying restrictions based on the strict PPP theory 
restrictions where, PPPP • (p - e - p ') = (I - I - I). These were also rejected as the log 
likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing these restrictions was computed to be 39.82, 
which is way higher than the 95% critical value of the chi~ squared distribution with two 
degrees of freedom. The symmetry and proportionality restrictions are thus rejected at the 
conventional 95% significance level.48 
UIP 
For the UIP the system of equations used in the analysis, is represented by the following 
vectorial process: 
(13) 
46 The term weak form validity (PPP or UIP), ls used where the nrlables are cointegrated but the 
theory restrictions are rejected, whereas, strong rorm validity ls where there ls colntegration and the 
economic theory restrictions are accepted. 
~
7 The LL ls the masimlzed value of the log-likelihood function for the just-identified case. All 
computations reported in thls chapter are carried out using Mlcrofit 4.0. (See Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1997) 
41 Under proportionality and symmetry, the coefficients or the colntegrating vector P should satisfy P "" 
(1~1-1) when the coefficient on the domestic price bas been normalized to one. In contrast to the trace 
and maximum eigenvalue tests, rejection of the null for the tests of these restrictions ls evidence against 
the strong form or PPP theory in its symmetry and proportionality conditions. 
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where X1 = (r1, r,)49, rand II represent short and long-run coefficients and c5 is a constant. 
The simple UIP is rejected at the conventional 95% critical level, as there is no 
cointegration between domestic interest (LBDR) rates and foreign interest rates 
(LSATB).'° 
Intercontinental Approach 
For the tests for order of VAR both the AIC and SBC selects 2 as order of VAR. 
Diagnostic tests (LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual 
equation suggests that autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. 
Cointegration results for simple PPP using and UIP using order of VAR = 2 are presented 
in Appendix Table 3. 
PPP 
For the PPP using model (13), both the Maximum eigenvalue (-<=) and the Trace 
statistics (A.,=) suggests om! cointegrating vector, r = 1 at the five percent level. The 
hypothesis r = 0 is rejected against r = 1, but the hypothesis that r = 1 cannot be rejected 
against r = 2. This result is in line with the PPP hypothesis, which posits that there should 
be only one cointegrating relationship between the PPP variables namely, (p- e - p • = 1-1-
1) hence, we conclude ~t the intercontinental PPP variables move together in the long 
run. However without imposing the PPP theory restrictions it is accordingly difficult to 
draw definite conclusions on whether the PPP proposition hold in its proportionality and 
symmetry conditions so we apply restrictions to this statistical vector based on economic 
theory. Assuming r = l, which is also in line with the PPP theory, we present the estimates 
of the cointegrating coefficients normalized on the coefficient of the domestic price 
(LBCPI (p)) - 1). The estimated results of cointegrating vector, ~ - (LBCPI (p), LBER 
(e}, LUSCPl(p )) are: 
4
~ The equalioo tested for PPP is denned by the system X, = (r1 ,r,) where r is the domestic interest rate 
and r • is the foreign price. Equation (13) was ustd for all countries' simple PPP tests throughout the 
analyses. 
50 There is however one colntegraton relation at the 90% significance level But to limit the scope of 
this study further analysis was only carried out where there was cointegratlon at the 95% sigoificance 
level. Overall conclusions will also be drawn based on the 95% signincance level 
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P, =(l.~O l (none) 
e 
-0.1599 
(0.1253) 
p· J 
-2.9001 
(0.3313) 
where LL= 2786,5 
The vector supports the PPP theory as both domestic exchange rate and foreign price has 
negative coefficients, but not in its symmetry and proportionality conditions. The imposed 
symmetry and proportionality over-identifying restrictions, based on the strict PPP 
restrictions represented by PPPP = (p - e - p) = {l - 1 - 1) were subsequently rejected. The 
log likelihood ratio statistic (LR) for testing these restrictions was computed to be 26.23, 
which is way higher than the critical value of the chi- squared distribution with two 
degrees of freedom. The simple PPP therefore holds but not under the symmetry and 
proportionality restrictions. 
UIP 
Using model (13), the UIP between Botswana and the US is rejected, as there is no 
cointegration between Botswana deposit rates and US interest rates at the 95% significance 
level. 
• Botswana Joint PPP and UIP 
Intra-contin-ental Approach 
We use model (11) defined earlier, where, X, = IP" ei,p;, r,. r,' 1 and po, is the logaritlun 
of the world oil price at time t. Cois a vector of intercepts and, t = 1, .... ,T,. 
PPP 
Using the optimal VAR order of 2, both the(-<_) and the(-<,=) suggest r = l, at 95% 
critical value. The hypothesis of no cointegration (namely r = 0) is rejected against null 
hypothesis that there exists one cointegrating relation (namely r = 1) but the hypothesis 
that r = 1 cannot be rejected against r = 2 at the 95% significance level. The Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) also unanimously 
selects r = 2, while the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) suggest r = 1. Considering these 
statistical results there is some ambiguity in choosing the number of cointegrating 
relationships among the six 1 (1) variables. However the long-run economic theory posits 
that, based on arbitrage in the commodity and capital markets, we should expect two 
cointegrating relations (i.e., r = 2): the PPP arbitrage condition; 
• p,-e,-p, -1(0) 
and the interest rate arbitrage relation ( which is the long-run implication of the uncovered 
interest parity hypothesis); 
r,-r,*-1(0) 
Also according to Pesaran and Smith (1999) any empirical analysis involves balancing, 
consideration of purpose (the relevance of the model and its intended use), theory 
(consistency with prior knowledge), and statistical adequacy (itself a function of fit and 
parsimony). They further demonstrate that, in case of choosing the nwnber of cointegration 
relations, this balancing act can be particularly difficult because not only are there usually 
a large number of choices required to establish a specification but also because statistical 
criteria may not be very informative about these choices. Using this line of argument, in 
this application it was deemed proper and in conformity with economic theocy to set r = 2 
for the purposes of further analysis. 
Using Long-run structural modeling (Pesaran and Shin, 1997) we first obtain estimates of 
the cointegrating coefficients (together with their asymptotic standard errors) normalized 
on the following exact (theocy) identifying restrictions: 
P11 =1, P1, =0 
He: P,1 =O,p,, =1 
where we have denoted the two cointegrating vectors associated with the coefficients of 
x, = l_p,,e,.1j,p; .r,· J fiy, P, =<Pu ,P,2 ,p13 ,Pu ,P1,), P2 = ( P21 1 P22 ,Pn ,p24 • Pi, ) 
representing the PPP and UIP respectively. The test yield the following estimates: 
Variable p e r p r 
P1 1 -0.5841 0 -0.8301 0.2491 (1.8854) (0.4159) (0.7182) 
p, 0 2.1816 1 0.4920 -0.8718 
(3.0934) (0.6858) (1.2199) 
with the maximized value of the log-likelihood function being 4737.4 (LL= 4737.4) and, 
where asymptotic standard errors are given in brackets51 
51 For details of computational algorithms see Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, Section 19,8) 
[ 93 
The first vector represents the PPP condition and the exchange rate (LBPSAR (e)) and 
foreign price (LSACPI (p)) have the expected signs although not equal to 1mity. Vector 2 
stands for the UIP condition, and the foreign interest rate (LSATB(r )) has the right sign. 
However, since the above exact-identifying restrictions do not impos1, any testable 
restrictions on the cointegrating VAR, over-identifying restrictions based on the two long 
run theories under study, were imposed on the cointegrating vectors (CVs) in order to test 
their validity. 
In addition to the exact- identifying restrictions (HE), the over-identifying restrictions 
based on the PPP theorem where (p,- e1-p1' -I (0) 5 1 - 1 - 1), namely P12 =Pu= -I, 
and Pis = 0, produced the following estimates: 
Variable p e r p r 
p, 
ftppp= 1 -1 0 -1 0 P, 2.3835 0.5704 -0.7821 
0 (3.9145) 1 (0.9246) (1.3026) 
LL= 4731.7 
The log likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing the three over-identifying restrictions is 
computed to be 11.34 - 2(4737.4- 4731.7), which is significrJttly above the 0.05 critical 
value of the chi-squared distribution (x.2) with 3 degrees of freedom, suggesting that the 
theory restrictions are rejected at 95% significance level. Modified versions of the PPP 
with either the domestic interest rate (LBDR (r)) or foreign interest rate (LSATB (e)) 
unrestricted were also tested but were all rejected at the 95% critical level as the LR 
statistic obtained were all above the critical chiMsquared distribution with 2 degrees of 
freedom.52 
Next, taking HE as the exact identifying restrictions, we provide tests for the UIP theory 
restrictions, where r - / = I -1, namely /322 = Pu = 0 and Pij = -I, we obtained these 
results: 
"According to Garrat at al (2001, Section S.1) tests for over-Identifying restrictions are invariant to 
the choice ortbe exact identifying restrictions, 
Variable p e r p r 
p, 1 3.8834 0 0.6332 0.4325 
(7.5371\ {J.7058\ (3.2352\ 
p, 0 0 I 0 -1 
LL=4729.4 
The LR statistic of 16.06, obtained for testing the imposed UIP over-identifying 
restiictions is above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-squared distribution with 3 degrees of 
freedom. The UIP theory restrictions are therefore rejected. The exchange rate (LBPSAR 
(e)) and foreign price (LSACPI (p')) in vector one representing the PPP also have the 
wrong signs. 
Subsequently the hypothesis testing for the over-identifying restrictions on the joint PPP 
and UIP were tested and also rejected at 95% significance level. The LR obtained was 
50.38, which is way above the critical value of the Chi-squared distribution with 6 degrees 
of freedom at the 95 percent level. However, since these over-identified cointegrating 
vectors namely p, = (JJ11, P12, p,,,pu, p,,, =l, - l, -1, 0, 0) and P2 = (ft,,. P22, p,,,p,., p,,, 
= 0, 0, 0, l, -1), are consistimt with the PPP and UIP theory restrictions, we adopted them 
for use in analyzing the short run dynamic properties of the model. 
The Vector Error Correction Model 
Having identified the vectors, a natural step is to examine the short-tenn dynamics 
influenced by temporary deviations from the long-run relationship, is to formulate a vector 
error correction modeling relationship. VECM also known as, Granger representation 
theorem seeks to indicate the direction of Granger causality. The error correction 
coefficient represents the proportion by which the long-run disequilibrium in the dependent 
variable is corrected in the short period. Results for vector error correction modeling are 
presented in Table 2 below. 
The error correction term for the domestic price equation (LBCPI (PJ) associated with the 
first cointegrating vector representing the PPP has the correct sign and passes the 
diagnostic tests for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. It is however very small, 
indicating a very slow gravitation back to equilibrium once shocked. Theory predicts that 
the error correction term must be significantly different from zero and the larger the 
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equation's error correction coefficient (in absolute value), the faster the variable's return to 
its equilibrium once shocked. The result, also indicate that domestic prices are relatively 
endogenous and partly bears the brunt of short-run adjustment to restore long-term 
equilibrium after any shock to the system. 
Table 4, 
Botswana: Rednced Form Estimates of Error Correction Coefficients and Diagnostic 
Statistics-Intra-Continental Approach. 
Equation a, a, R' z1,(12) zJ,(1) z!(2) z~,(1)" 
ALBCPl(p,) -0.021 -0.009 0,090 16.74 0.26 1148.6 
(0.007) (0.010) [0.159] [0.610] [0.000] 
ALBPSAR(e,) 0,025 0.013 0,081 18.57 2.15 1321.1 
(0.025) (0.037) [0.099] [0.142] [0.000] 
ALSACPI( p;) 0.005 -0.015 0.184 37.25 7.29 85.54 
(0.005) (0.009) [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] 
6LBDR(r1) -0,008 -0.023 0.147 16.37 6.65 2125.2 
(0.006) (0.009) [0.175] [O.OIO] [0.000] 
ALSATB( r,°) 0.000 0,014 0.155 30.16 0.24 148.51 
(0.006) (0.006) [0.003] [0.621] [0.000] 
Notes: The results are estimated by OLS based on colntegratlng VAR (2) using the equation: 
/j,x, =0 + f1Ax,_, +a1P1x,.1 +a2P2x,.1 +&, 
0.02 
[0.898] 
0.155 
[0.693] 
12.60 
[0.000] 
44.14 
[0.000] 
50.17 
[0.000] 
where /Jx,_1 =f, "Vhich are I (0) and a 1 and a 2are five dimensional matrices of 
adjustment or feedback coefficients and the two error correction terms are given by; 
41,1,1-1 =p, -e, -p;, 
42., .. 1 =r, -r," 
The figures in (.) are estimated asymptotic standard errors whereas those In [.] are the 
corresponding p -values. The bold faced estimates denote slgniOcance at O.OS leveL The 
diagnostic tests are chi-squared statistics for the following; zi-(12) ls the Lagrange 
multiplier statistic for testing the null or no serial correlation, xJF (1) Is Ramsey's RESET test 
statistic, z! (2) is the Jarque- Bera statistic for testing the null of Gaussian errors, and 
x!1-:(l )is the statistic for testing the null of no heteroskedastlcity. The number In (.) Indicates 
the degrees offreedom 
S> Full estimation of resulUt are available on request from the author. 
Although they have the highest R2, error correction equations for both domestic (LBDR 
(r,)) and foreign interest rates (LSATB (r;)) equations pass only the functional fonn test 
and fail all other tests. Their error correction terms associated with the two cointegrating 
vectors are significant indicating that interest rates are relatively endogenous and do 
respond to correct short~run deviations from equilibrium, albeit at a crawling pace.The 
exchange rate equation (LBPSAR (e)) pnsses the serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
tests, but both error correction tenns are insignificant indicating no response to restore 
back equilibrium once shocked. The exchunge rate is therefore exogenous and causality 
moves from the exchange rates.In tenns of the R2, the foreign price equation (LSACPI (p)) 
performs best, explaining 0.28 of the price variation over the sample period. However the 
equation fails all diagnostic tests, and all the error correction terms are insignificant. 
Only diagnostic tests of the domestic price and exchange rate are satisfactory as far as tests 
for the residual serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and functional fonn are concerned. 
The diagnostic tests show that the assumption of normally distributed errors is rejected in 
all the error correction equations. 
Forecast Error Variance Decompositions 
A sample of the VDC results generated for all the variables LBPCPI ( p,), LSACPI ( p; ), 
LBPSAR (eJ, LBDR (r,) and LSATB (r;J with unrestricted intercepts and no trends are 
included in Table 3. Variance decompositions allow for out of sample testing of Granger 
exogeneity or endogeneity of the dependant variable and also provide a measure of the 
extent to which a variable is exogenous in comparison with other variables in the system. 
They achieve this end by providing a literal breakdown of the change in the value of the 
variable in a given period arising from changes in the same variable in addition to changes 
in other variables in previous periods. 
The exchange rate (LBPSAR (e)) seems to be the most exogenous variable closely 
followed by foreign interest rate (LSATB (r)). This is inferred as the greater part (93% for 
exchange rate and 92% for foreign interest) of its shock/variance is being explained by its 
own hmovations compared to own shocks contributing to explaining the rest of the 
variables. Foreign prices (LSACPI {p •) are also relatively exogenous with 70 percent of its 
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forecast error accounted for by its own disturbances. On the other hand the domestic price 
(LBCPI (j,)) and the domestic interest (LBDR (r)) variables are relatively endogenous with 
their own shocks explaining 0.48 and 0.64 of their variances over the forecast horizon 
respectively. These results seem to indicate the strength of the Granger causal chain than 
the VECM results. Caution must be given though that VDC results give only relative 
indicators. 
Table 5: 
Botswana: Variance Decomposition Results 
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LBCFl WJ wltb Hratri<ted lourttpt, olld DO mods. 
G<Hnlloed ,._. Er-n>r.-orioo<e deeomposltlo,, forurloblo 
LBDR (r) lritb ura1rlcttd lmrupbud ao in.di. 
HORIZON LBCl'I LBPSAA um, LSACPI =n HORIZON 
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LBPSAR 
"" 
LSACl'l LSAm 
• 
.. 
" 
" .. 
• 
., (< (,) ., 
,.oo 0.12 O.JO OJI 
••• 0.17 O.OS 0.11 
0.71 OJI o.os O.LS 
o• O.~O o.os 0.17 
O.SJ 0.% 0.0! 0.18 
... 0,!1 o• 0.18 
C..enlloed Fonur1 Em,rvorian« deeoo,poo~lo• r~ vorioble 
l..BPSAR (•} .itb ollralri<ted iOltr;"'flts ood uo tm,dt. 
" ,.oo 
O.Dl 
O.ol 
o.oi 
0.01 
"' 
0 
.. 
" 
" 
• 
• 
., r,, M ., 
•• O.Ol ,.oo 0.00 
0.18 0.00 0,11 0.00 
0.1~ 0.00 O.IL 0.00 
O.H 0.00 0.74 0.00 
0.17 0.00 0.69 0.00 
0.17 0.00, 
"' 
0.01 
Gaionlued futcffl Em1rv.ubaa, "°'°"'p<111l!IM, tun,W,lt 
LSACPI (p) wltl. urtdritled bltaupU old ao tradr. 
(r"J 
0,0] 
0.01 
0.05 
0.12 
0.16 
0.21 
HOlllZON LBCPI 
"'"''' "" 
lSACPl um HOIUZON 
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"" 
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.. 
" 
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0.01 ,.oo O.Dl 0.00 
0.0] 0.00 000 0.00 
0.00 ua ... 0.00 
0.01 o.~1 O.Ol 0.00 
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O.OS 
"" 
o• 0.01 
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LSATB (/J,.hb oo.atri<l<d 11-,U ud H lfflds. 
" 0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
000 
• •• 
o.o, 
., (,) (,) ., ii) 
• 000 0.00 0.00 ,.oo 0.00 
.. 000 0.00 0.00 o.~ o.o, 
• 0.00 0.00 0.01 
,~ 0.00 
• 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.76 0.12 
• 0.00 0.01 0.00 o.n 0.1~ 
• 000 O.DI 0.00 
"" 
0.SB 
HOR!ZON UICPl LBPSAA 
"" 
=a• =n 
• 
.. 
" 
" 
.. 
• 
., 
"' 
(,) ., ,, 
0.00 om 0.0! 0,00 ,.oo 
0.00 o.oi 0.00 0.01 0.00 
0.00 o.ot O.OL 0.01 0.00 
O.oJ O.QL O.OL 
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0.% 
00, O.uL 0.03 O.OL 0.00 
0.02 O.QI o.• O.OL o.n 
Notes: The bold faced amounts denote in percentage the variable's variance es:plalned by own shocks 
over the forecast horizon 
Impulse Response Analysis 
Impulse response analyses are useful in that they can be used to estimate the time profile of 
the effect of "particular" shocks to the cointegrating relations. The generated generalized 
impulse response analysis of the individual equations and cointegrating vectors to one 
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standard shock in the domestic price (LBPCPI ( p,)) and exchange rate (LBPSAR (eJ) 
equations are portrayed in Figure 1 below. The first 2 figures A and B show generalized 
impulse response paths on each variable to one standard error (SE) shock in the equations 
of the domestic price (LBPCPI (p;)) and exchange rate (LBPSAR (eJ) respectively. 
Effects of these shocks on the level of individual series seem to persist forever, reflecting 
their unit root properties. The results are the same for shocks to the equations for foreign 
price and domestic and foreign interest variables. 
Figure I A 
G1n1r1llzed 1mpu1H Rnpon11(11) to Ont S.E. thoek In 1111 t,qu1llon fot 
LSCPI Figure 1 C 
0.0 
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Figure 1 B Figure I D 
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""""'" 
0.000,p-·--::;..=------
~.oo 
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~.o 
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""""" 
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f CV2 
Figure ~1: Botswana Generalized Impulse Responses to a unit domestic price and 
exchange rate shock to the individual series and to the cointegrating vectors. 
Noles: The horizon is in months and CVI and CV2 In figures C and D represent the 2 
cointegratlng relations PPP and UIP respectively. 
The last two figures C and D show the effects on the two cointegrating vectors Oong-run 
relations) to one standard error shock in the domestic price (LBPCPI (p,)) and exchange 
rate (LBPSAR (e,)) respectively. The effects of the shocks disappear eventually, but the 
speed with which this occurs varies considerably across the different arbitrage conditions 
depending on the variable shocked. With LBPCPI ( p,) the shocks are slowly dissipated 
and the cointegrating vectors return to their equilibriwn values in about 8 years for both the 
UIP and the PPP arbitrage conditions. However, when the exchange rate (LBPSAR (e,)) is 
shocked the effect to the cointegrating vectors is different. Whereas the uncovered interest 
rate parity condition quickly adjusts to its long-run equilibrium in 2 years, the PPP relation 
returns to equilibrium after about 6 years (72 periods). Response paths for the two, 
arbitrage conditions also vary when other variables are shocked. 
Persistence Profiles 
Unlike impulse response functions, persistence profiles measure the time profile of the 
effect of a system-wide shock on the co integrating relations. Persistence profiles also have 
the advantage that they are unique and do not require prior orthogonalization of the shocks. 
Figure 2 illustrates the persistence profiles. 
Persistence Profile of the affect of a system-wide shock to CV'{s) 
1. 
/ CV1 
1. 
o. 
/ CV2 
o.o O 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 15050 
Horizon 
Figure-2: Botswana Persistence profiles 
Notes: The variables in the VAR (2) model are p"p,°,e,,r, and r/. The graphs 
define the L ong·run relationships In the following manner, the first 
colntegraling relation CVI is f or the PPP and the second one CV2 is for the 
UIP and P.1 =(1, -1,-1, 0, 0) and P., =(0, 0, 0, 1, 1) are the PPP and 
UIP vectors respectively. The horizon is one month, 
1100 
The point estimates in Figure 2 clearly show that the estimated persistence profiles of the 
PPP condition converge to zero fairly quickly while that of the UIP relation talces much 
longer. The Persistence profile of the PPP relation overshoots for barely two months then 
declines to zero moderately fast, totally converging to zero after three years. The 
convergence of PPP to equilibrium is in sharp contrast to that of the UIP, which talces five 
years to return to equilibrium. 
Intercontinental Approach 
For the tests for order of VAR both the AIC and SBC selects 2 as order of VAR. 
Diagnostic tests (LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual 
equation suggests that autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. Using 
model (12) defined above, Appendix Table 5, presents cointegration rank statistics defined 
by the eigenvalue and the trace statistic respectively, together with the corresponding 
asymptotic critical values at the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels reproduced using 2 as 
order of VAR. Both statistics reject the hypothesis that there is any cointegration relation 
between the six I (1) variables under investigation. Since these results are in conflict with 
the predicted confines of economic theory, that there should be two long run 
(cointegrating) relations namely the PPP and UlP relations defined as,p,- e, - Pt • and r1 -
r,*, respectively, we reject the results of the statistical analysis. No further analysis was 
attempted because the variables do not move together in the long run (i.e., they are not 
cointegrated). 
One can sunnise therefore that the joint PPP and UIP between the US and Botswana does 
not hold using the data in the present application. 
Country summary and policy recommendations 
Comparing both results for the intra-continental and intercontinental approach, it is 
recommended that the financial planners in Botswana use South Afiica as the foreign 
country rather than the US when modeling their exchange rate using combined PPP and 
UIP. This is hardly surprising considering that Botswana and South Africa belong to 
SACU and have stronger trade links than those between Botswana and the USA. In this 
application the joint intra-continental PPP and UIP does hold better than the intercontintal 
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one for which there is no cointegration, a conclusion in agreement with previous empirical 
studies because of strong trade links and lower transportation costs, a fact which fosters 
arbitrage in both the goods and capital markets. However when the simple PPP s adopted 
for exchange rate modeling it does not matter whether the foreign country is SA or USA 
and in both cases there is cointegmtion. 
Another conclusion is that the simple UIP does not hold both in the cross~national and 
. 
intercontinental approaches, a conclusion also in line with previous studies. As such there 
is no merit in using the simple UIP for Botswana exchange rate modeling. It is therefore 
important that, when the UIP is adopted for exchange rate determination, it be combined 
with the PPP. 
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5.2.2 MAURITIUS 
• Simple PPP and UIP, and Joint PPP and UIP 
Intra-continental and International Approaches 
Results for cointegration tests both for the simple PPP and UIP as well as the combined 
model are contained in Appendix Tables 2 to 5, Using the trace and maximum eigenvalue 
selection criterions, not in one instance was there found to be any cointegration between 
the variables in either the cross-national or the intercontinental approach. As there was no 
cointegration at the conventional 95% significance level, no further analysis was 
attempted. 
Country summary and policy recommendations 
In the current application the validity of the PPP and UIP both in their simple fonn and as 
a joint model was rejected for the intra-continental approach as well as the intercontinental 
approach. However since the sample period used was very short ( compared to that of oL'ter 
countries in the sample) due to data availability dictates, it is not prudent to globally reject 
the validity of the PPP and UIP in Mauritius outside the current sample. As empirical 
literature is of the opinion that both the PPP and UIP do not hold in the short run, it is 
possible that rejection could be attributable to sample period length and, it is therefore 
recommended that the theories be tested using a different or longer sample period before 
valid conclusions can be reached. This recommendation, is in line with Juselius (1995)'s 
reasoning that, failure to find cointegration rank might be due to the fact that the 
asymptotic critical values (i.e., the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics) may not be 
very close approximations in small samples. 
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5.2.3 NAMIBIA 
• Simple PPP and UIP 
Intra-Continental Approach 
PPP 
The simple intra-continental PPP was not tested under this approach because the necessary 
cointegration requirement that all variables be I (0) was not satisfied (see section 5.1 and 
Appendix Table I). This is because the Namibian dollar and the South Africao rand are 
pegged on a one to one basis and so testing this approach was deemed irrelevant and 
trivia1. 
UIP 
We use model (13) to test the validity of the simple UIP theory. Using VAR (2), both the 
maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistic suggest one cointegrating relation at the 95 % 
significance level. In line with theory and setting r = 1 the estimates of the cointegration 
coefficients when the vector p = (r - r) is normalized on the domestic interest rate (LNTB 
(r )) coefficient are: 
~' -(1.~oo 
(none) 
-0,;;59) where LL-684.81 
(0.0065) 
As these results lack any meaningful economic interpretation, we further impose the UIP 
over-identifying restrictions denoting PrnP = (r - r • = 1 -1 ). The log-likelihood ratio 
statistic yielded from these theory restrictions is 15.68, which is significant and exceeds the 
critical value of the chi-squared distribution with I degree of freedom. The theory 
restrictions are therefore rejected at the conventional 95% significance level indicating 
that, the cross-national simple UIP does not hold for Namibia in its symmetry and 
proportionality conditions. However the weak fonn UIP docs hold because the variables 
move together indicating a long-run relationship. 
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Intercontinental Approach 
For the tests for order of VAR we select 2. Diagnostic tests (LR test) for possible serial 
correlation in the residuals of the individual equation suggests that autocorrelation is not a 
problem in the present application. Cointegration results for simple PPP using and UIP 
using order ofV AR= 2 are presented in Appendix Table 3. 
PPP 
Using (13) for testing the PPP proposition, both the Maximum eigenvalue ( ,i_) and the 
Trace statistics ( ..i,roce) suggest r = 1. This result is in line with the PPP hypothesis where 
we expect one cointegrating relation, so we conclude that the intercontinental PPP 
variables do move together in the long run. However to arrive at definite conclusions 
regarding the validity of the PPP proposition we apply LRSM to this statistical vector 
based on the PPP theory symmetry and proportionality restrictions. First, assuming r = 1 
we present the estimates of the co integrating coefficients nonnalized on the coefficient of 
the domestic price (LNCPI = I). The estimated results obtained using this just-identifying 
restriction to the cointegration vector denoted by p = (LNCPil!J), LNER(e), LUSCP!w)) 
are: 
PE= [1.ioo 
(none) 
e 
-0.1636 
(0.1343) 
p' J 
-2.6663 
(0.6028) 
where LL= 1319.9 
The vector seems to support the PPP theory as both the domestic exchange rate and the 
foreign price coefficients have the right signs, but we cannot draw any structural 
conclusions without testing for the over-identifying theory restrictions. The imposed 
symmetry mid proportionality over-identifying restrictions based on the strict PPP 
condition where, p,PP = II' - e - p) = (I - I - I) were rejected. The log likelihood ratio 
(LR) statistic for testing these restrictions was computed to be 24.4, which is higher than 
the critical value of the chi- square test with two degrees of freedom. Therefore simple PPP 
in Namibia's case using the current sample data does not hold llllder the symmetry and 
proponionality restrictions although the weak form PPP is valid because the variables are 
cointegrated. 
I tos 
UIP 
Using model (13) to test the validity of the simple UJP theory and optimal VAR (2), both 
the maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistic suggest no cointegrating relation at the 95 
percent significance level, indicating that the cross-continental simple UIP does hold in the 
Namibian case. See Appendix Table 3 for the co integration results. 
• Joint PPP and UIP 
Intra-Continental Approach 
The validity of the PPP using the intra-continental approach was not tested using data in 
this application because the Namibia/South Africa exchange rate contained no unit root in 
its level form or was I (0). Please see Appendix Table 1 for unit root tests results. Again 
the reason for the stationarity is because the two currencies are pegged one to one. 
Intercontinental Approach 
For the order of VAR we select 2. Appendix Table 5, presents Namibia's cointegration 
rank statistics defmed by the eigenvalue and the trace statistic respectively, together with 
the corresponding asymptotic critical values at the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels 
reproduced using VAR (2) estimated using model (12). Both the ;t= and -<,_ statistics 
accept the hypothesis that there is, at most one, cointegration relation between the six I (1) 
variables under investigation. Since these results are not in agreement with the predicted 
confines of economic theory that there should be two long nm ( co integrating) relations, 
namely the PPP and UIP relations defined as, p, - e, - p, • and r, - r,• respectively; we set 
aside the results of the statistical analysis and adopt theory restrictions for further analysis. 
Consequently we proceed as if there are two cointegrating relations. We will however 
return to analyze the statistical results that r = I later. 
We now examine the validity of the PPP and UIP hypothesis using the long-run structural 
modeling advanced in Pesamn and Shin (1997). The novel of this approach is that it 
enables us to test the validity of these hypotheses and to identify factors that could explain 
the reason(s) for their breakdown. The two cointegrating vectors associated with 
z; = (p,,e,,r,,p; ,r,• ,po,,t) are denoted by Pt = (p01,P11,P21,PwP41,Ps1•P;1) and 
p; = V102,P1i,P22,P32,p42 ,Ps2,P;2) respectively, viewing p; as explaining domestic 
prices and p; domestic interest rate. The first six elements are the coefficients of the I (1) 
variables and the last element (i.e., p61 , i = 1, 2) refers to the time trend. As exact 
identification of these vectors requires the imposition of two restrictions per vector, the 
follor ... ing ex~ctly identifying restrictions are chosen as constraints and do not impose any 
testable restrictions on the cointegrating VAR model: 
H,: P. =(~ 
Which produced the estimate 
p e 
I -0.4299 
P.E = (0.4438) 
0 -1.8807 
(8.6117) 
LL•= 1185.7 
• 
• 
r 
0 
1 
0 
1 
p • 
-1.4462 
(1.7571) 
-2.8863 
(39.484) 
:) • • • • • • 
• I r po 
--0.0621 --0.0074 -0.0082 
(0.5322) (0.0624) (0.0028) 
0.2780 -0.1488 0.0131 
(0.9135) (1.2987) (0.0299) 
where, LLE (r = 2) is the maximized value of the log likelihood function for the justified 
case or subject to exactly identifying restrictions. Asymptotic errors are given in 
parentheses. 
We then proceeded to test a number of hypotheses using the above just- identified model 
as a basic model and imposing over-identifying restrictions. First, since we do not expect 
these long -run relations to include a linear trend, we first test the co-trending hypothesis 
H00, namely that, P61 = P62 = 0 and is represented by: 
• 
• 
0 
1 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
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Under Hoo the restrictions were collinear and there was no convergence. Hence the 
hypothesis that there are no linear trends in the cointegrating relations is rejected. 
Individual tests of Hco were then undertaken separately for each. v~tor and they produced 
different results. Whereas the co- trending restrictions were accepted in the second vector 
standing for the UIP, they were rejected for the PPP or 1st vector. We term this hypothesis 
Hoo• for further analysis. 
Second the hypothesis implied by the PPP and UIP theories that the level of oil prices do 
not enter these long-run relationships denoted by Hpo is tested and it yields: 
• • t p e r p r po 
1 -0.4101 0 -1.4049 -0.5851 0 0.0081 
P,ro = (0.1716) (0.7772) (0.0278) (0.0028) 
0 -1.0114 1 -1.1394 -0.1862 0 0.0127 
(0.8750) (4.1396) (0.1368) (o.OIJ7) 
LL,,,= 1185.5 
The LR statistic associated with these 4 over-identifying restrictions is 0.34, and thus does 
not reject the Hpo hypothesis at the 95 % significance level. The joint Hoo• f'I Hpo produced 
the following results: 
p 
I 
P.co,PO 
0 
LL00, ,,., = 1184.9 
e 
0.4055 
. (0.1661) 
--0.8834 
(0.9805) 
• r p 
0 -1.0177 
(1.0832) 
I 4.3711 
(4.6155) 
• r 
0.5846 
(0.0285) 
--0.1786 
(0.1622) 
po 
0 
0 
t 
0.0088 
(0.0021) 
0 
The LR statistic obtained under, these 3 over-identifying restrictions is, 1.64, and thus do 
not reject the Hoo• n Hpo hypothesis at the 95 % critical level. It can also be seen that the 
value of the trend in the first vector representing the PPP is almost insignificant. 
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Consequently, tests for the validity of the PPP and UIP propositions are tested given Hco• n 
Hpo (only the second vector is co-trended) 
Under the UIP hypothesis given Hco• n Hpo: 
Hu,p p, =(~ 
the estimate of which is: 
p e 
1 0.5233 
P.wp = (0.1105) 
0 0 
LLu1P = 1178.3 
• 
0 
r 
0 
1 
0 
1 
p • 
-1.2801 
(0.7979) 
0 
• • 
0 -1 
• r 
-0.0322 
(0.1672) 
-1 
0 
0 
po 
0 
0 
I 
0.0095 
(0.0024) 
0 
The LR statistic obtained under these 6 over-identifying restrictions is 14.78, and thus 
rejects the UIP hypothesis (given Hco• n H;,o) at the conventionaJ 95 % significance level. 
Similarly under the PPP hypothesis and Hoo• n H,. (the PPP vector includes a trend) 
p, =(~ -1 0 -1 0 0 ;) Hppp 
• I • • 0 
The following estimate was produced. 
• • po I p e r p r 
1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0.0009 
P.,,pp = 
(none) 
0 -1.3496 I 6.0285 -0.2066 0 0 
(!.0610) (5.2085) (0.1885) 
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LL,,,= 1169.3 
The LR statistic for testing the PPP hypothesis is 32.89, which is highly significant 
compared to the 0.05 critical value of the Chi- squared distribution with 6 degrees of 
freedom. Thus the hypothesis of the PPP Gointly with Ho,, r, H,.) is rejected at the 
conventional 95% percent significance level. 
~ .• ,oral modifications to the PPP hypothesis (denoted by H,,,•) that allow for the effect of 
either domestic interest rate or foreign interest rate or both to be unrestricted were 
subsequently considered. They were all rejected, as the LR statistics obtained in each case 
were much higher than the critical value of Chi-squared distribution with x degrees of 
freedom. 
Finally in our long -run structural modeling, taking the urunodified PPP and UIP (rejected) 
versions we estimated the cointegrating relations under the PPP and VIP over-identifying 
restrictions Gointly with Hoo• n Hp.o): 
Huw,,r,, p,,,,11,, =(~ 
which yields: 
p e r 
fJ•PPP/IIP = 1 -1 0 
0 0 I 
• p 
-1 
0 
-1 
0 
r 
0 
-J 
• 
0 
1 
po 
0 
0 
-1 
0 
I 
0 0 
-1 0 
0.0050 LL= 1168.2 
(0.0008) 
0 
The LR statistic of 35.09 is above the 0.05 critical value of the Chi-squared distribution 
with 9 degrees of freedom. Thus the joint PPP and UIP theory restrictions considered 
jointly with Hco n Hpo is rejected at the 95% significance level despite, there being a 
cointegration relationship between the variables. 
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The Vector Error Correction Model 
Conditional on the above long-run estimates, we have the following expressions for the 
error correction tenns: 
• • 
P1z1-1 =Pr-1 -e1_1 -p,_1 +0.005/, 
• • P2z,_1 =r,_1 -r,_1• 
where /lz,_, =f, wltich are I (0). 
To check the resultant model's statistical adequacy, the folloWll'g VECM was estimated: 
.6.y, =c0 -a,py1 + Allx, + 'PiAz,_. + a,/Jz,_1 +u, 
where et.1y and a.2y are three dimensional vectors of adjustment (error correction) 
coefficients associated with the 2 cointegrating relations PPP and UIP respectively. The 
number of error correction equations in the present application is 3, corresponding to the 
jointly detennined variables of the model namely domestic prices {LZNCPI (p,)), exchange 
rate (LNER (e,)) and domestic interest rates (LNTB (r, )). The estimates of these 
adjustment coefficients together with a number of diagnostic test statistics) are presented in 
Table 4. 
The equation for the change in domestic prices (LNCPI (p}) passes all the diagnostic tests, 
with the equation also explaining 0.16 of the price variation over the sample period, Its 
error correction tenn associated with the first cointegrating relation explaining long-run 
price movements has the correct sign and is significant but, it is very small indicating an 
equilibrating but very slow adjustment process for Namibia prices in response to changes 
in the domestic interest rate and the exchange rate. The change in the domestic interest rate 
(LNTB (r)) equation performs the best in tenns of the R2, explaining 18 percent of interest 
rate variation over the sample period and passing all diagnostic tests except the functional 
form tests. However, its error correction tenns associated with both cointegrating relations 
are insignificant, suggesting no response to equilibrium for Namibia's interest rates in 
response to the domestic prices and exchange rate movements. Lastly, the error correction 
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term of the exchange rate (LNER (e)) equation associated with the first cointegration 
vector representing the PPP that is fairly significant suggesting a slow but moderate 
response to restore long·nm equilibrium once shocked. 
The diagnostic statistics of the equations in Table 4 are generally satisfactory as far 3S the 
tests of the residual serial correlation, functional f01m and heteroskedasticity m·e 
concerned. However, It is clear from the diagnostic statistics that, the assumption of 
normally distributed errors is rejected. Generally speaking, tiitrrefore, diagnostic tests are 
satisfactory and the equations appear to capture the time series properties of these two 
macroeconomic aggregates in Namibia over the sample period. 
Namibia: 
Equation 
6.LNCPl(p,) 
6LNER(e1) 
6.LNTB (r,) 
Table 6: 
Reduced Form Estimates of Error Correction Coefficients and 
Diagnostic Statistics· Intercontinental Approach 
•,, •,, R' ,ri,(12) x:A1) xt(2) 
-0.024 -0.003 0.169 19.14 0.069 0,777 
(0.006) (0.002) [0,085] [0.792) [0.678) 
0.055 0.005 0,115 9.34 5.78 31A8 
(0.027) (0.011) [0.674) [0.016) [0,00J 
-0.007 -0.002 0.181 9.15 2.72 152.19 
(0.007) (0.002) [0.690] [0.099] [0,00J 
x1,(I} 
4.92 
[0,027) 
1.64 
[0.200] 
0.42 
[0.518) 
Notes: The ECM results are estimated by OLS based on cointegrating VAR (2). The two error 
correction terms are given by; 
:1.r+1 = p,_, - e,_1 - p1"_1 +O.OOSt, 
The figures in (.) are estimated asymptotic standard e'l'ror.i whereas those in [,] are the 
corresponding p •Values. The bold faCOO estimates, denotes statistical significance at 0.5 
level.The diagnostic tests are Chi squared statistics for the following; z:C{t2) is the Lagrange 
multiplier statistic for testing the liUII ofno serial correlation, zif-(1) is Ramsey's RESET test 
statistic, %,~ (2) is the Jarque- Bera statistic for resting the null of Gaussian errors, and 
ztn{l) is the statistic for testing the null of no heteroskedastlcity. The number in (.) indicates 
the degrees of freedom. 
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We now return to consider the estimation results under cointegration rank r = 1, which is 
what the statistical results suggested (see Appendix Table 5). For this scenario we express 
z; = (p,,e1,1j,p;,1i· ,po1,t) by P.=(p, ,p2 ,p3 ,p4 ,Ps ,p6 ,P1r ). Under the exact-identifying 
restriction normalized on domestic price (LNCPI (p)) coefficient i.e., p1 = 1, we obtained 
the following estimates: 
/J, G =[~ 
none 
LLE = 1178.0 
e 
0.4974 
(0.1110) 
r 
0.0358 
(0.2119) 
p' 
-1.5497 
(0.8792) 
r' 
0.0721 
(0.0227) 
Imposing the restrictions implied by Hpo that is f}6 = 0, yields: 
[
P e 
/J,ro = 1 0.5234 
none (0.1106) 
LLPO = 1177.8 
r 
--0.1121 
(0.1748) 
p' 
-1.2772 
(0.8000) 
r' 
0.0794 
(0.0204) 
po 
0.01277 
(0.02233) 
po 
0 0.0095 I ] 
0 (0.0024) 
I 
-0.0087 
(0.0026), 
The LR statistic for these two restrictions is 0.30, which is below the 95 % critical value of 
the Chi-squared distn"bution with 2 degrees of freedom. These restrictions are therefore 
accepted. While imposing restrictions implied by Hpo were accepted, those restrictions 
implied by the co-trending hypothesis (Hoo) were rejected. This result is similar to the one 
obtained when r = 2 and thus the co-trending hypothesis implied by the theories is rejected. 
Further, imposing the restrictions that the coefficients of e, and Pi" are both equal to -1, 
namely, fl2 and p4 = -1, as indicated by the PPP hypothesis and setting the coefficients of r, 
and r,• to zero (see below) are strongly rejected. The LR statistic obtained of 22.11 is 
significantly higher than the 95 % critical value of the chi-squared distribution with 5 
degrees of freedom. 
Hppp /J. =(1 -I 0 -1 0 0 •) 
and it yields: 
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e r p" r" 
-1 0 -1 0 
po 
0 
0 
I J 0.0044 
(0,0006) 
LL,,,= 1166.9 
Consequently a number of modifications to the PPP hypothesis with either the domestic 
interest rate or the foreign or interest rate or both unrestricted were also rejected. 
We also asswned that the single cointegrating relationship in fact represents the UIP 
hypothesis. Normalizing on the coefficient of r, and estimating the cointegrating relation 
subject to UIP restrictions fjointly with Hpo), namely P, =I, P, =-1 and 
P1 = /32 = P4 = P6 =0, and leaving P1t unrestricted, we obtain: 
P,u,, =( ~ e 0 r I p' 0 r" po -1 0 o.i088 J LLuw = 1162.9 
(0.0036) 
The LR statistic for testing these five (5) restrictions is equal to 30.15 and therefore 
strongly rejects the UIP hypothesis if r = 1. Several other modifications to the UIP 
hypothesis were attempted but were all strongly rejected. 
These results are fairly close to those obtained assuming r = 2 above where the PPP and 
UIP theory restrictions of proportionality and symmetry were also rejected. Therefore as 
far as the tests for the PPP and UIP are concerned the main conclusion does not seem to be 
affected by assuming the cointegration rank to be r = I or r = 2. 
Country summary and policy recommendations 
One can sunnise that, in the case of Namibia, it would seem that although the variables are 
cointegrated, the restrictions imposed by symmetry and proportionality conditions for both 
the PPP and UIP propositions, either when tested in their simple form or when tested 
together are rejected. Again we are drawn to the conclusions drawn by (Edison et al, 1997) 
that despite there being significant cointegrating vectors, the symmetry and proportionality 
conditions are rejected. But without there being any pattern in the coefficients of these 
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cointegrating vectors, it is accordingly frustrating to attempt to provide an economic theory 
that could account for the theories' proportionality and symmetry rejections. 
However because the price and interest rate differentials and the exchange rates are 
cointegrated, Namibia can still apply these propositions in their exchange rate modeling. 
j us 
5.2.4 SOUTH AFRICA 
Because if the dual exchange rate regime which South Africa reverted to and from 1979 to 
1995 the sample was broken into two parts. First we tested the sub- sample from 1995 
to2001 when the rand exchange rate was unified. We then tested the whole swnple. Using 
the first scenario, we failed to establish any countegration relationship both for the simple 
PPP and for the joint UIP and PPP. No further analysis was attempted using the sub-
sample and the results were deemed not worth reporting. Only results obtained using the 
full sample are reported. 
• Simple PPP and UIP 
Intra~Continental Approach 
This approach was not tested for South Africa because it was used as the foreign country 
for the approach 
International Approach 
For the order of VAR tests, both the AIC and SBC selects 2 as order of VAR. Diagnostic 
tests (LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual equation 
suggests that autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. Cointegration 
results for simple PPP and UIP using model (13) and order of VAR (2) together with their 
associated 90% and 95% critical values are reported in Appendix Table 3. 
PPP 
Both the maximum eigenvalue (..tmax) and the trace statistics (..t,~1 ) suggest r = 2. 
Although this result is at variance with the PPP hypothesis where we expect one 
cointegrating relation, because the three PPP variables are cointegrated, we conclude that 
the intercontinental PPP variables do move together in the long run and so the weak form 
simple PPP is valid. However, to arrive at definite conclusions on the theory's long-run 
validity, we apply LRSM to this statistical vector based on the PPP theorem. Asswning r = 
1, which is also in line with the PPP theory, we present the estimates of the cointegrating 
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coefficients normalized on the coefficient of the domestic price (LSACPI). The estimated 
results obtained after we impose this just identifying restriction to the vector for J3 = 
(LSACPI(p), LSAER(e), LUSCPI(p')J are: 
Ps = [1~00 
(none) 
where LL= 2787.2 
e 
0.1067 
(0.1893) 
p' J 
-4.4413 
(0.7964) 
The vector does not seem to support the PPP theory as the domestic exchange rate 
coefficient has the wrong sign, but we cannot draw any structural conclusions without 
testing for the over-identified theory restrictions. The imposed symmetry and 
proportionality over-identifying restrictions based on the PPP theory, where (p- e - p) = 
(I - I - I) were strongly rejected, as the log likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing these 
restrictions was computed to be 42.51, which is way above the critical value of the chi-
square test with two degrees of freedom. One can surmise that the simple PPP in the South 
African case using the current sample does not hold under the theory symmetry and 
proportionality restrictions. 
UIP 
Using model (13) and the selected VAR (2), the trace statistic suggests two cointegrating 
relationships between the two UIP variables (see Appendix Table 3 for results) while the 
maximum eigenvalue statistic suggests no cointegration relationship at the conventional 
95% significance level. In line with theory we set r = 1 . .Denotfag the UIP vector, J3 = 
(LSATB(r), LUSTB(rJ), the estimates of the cointegration coefficients normalized on the 
domestic interest rate coefficient are: 
Ps = [1.~00 
(none) 
3.;:39 ) where LL=2033.7 
(4.6401) 
As these results lack any meaningful economic interpretation, we further impose the theory 
over-identifying UIP theory restrictions denoted by Pu1P = (r - r = 1 -1). The log-
likelihood ratio statistic yielded from these theory restrictions is 2.60, which is 
insignificant and is below the critical value of the chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of 
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freedom. The theory restrictions are therefore accepted at the conventional 95% 
significance level indicating that, the international simple UIP does hold for South Africa. 
• Joint PPP and VIP 
Intra-Continental Approach 
The validity of the PPP using the intra-continental approach was not tested using data in 
this application because South Afiica was the nurnerait-e country for this approach. 
Intercontinental Approach 
For the order ofV AR we select 2. Using model (12) for testing the validity of the joint PPP 
and UIP hypothesis, Appendix Table 5, presents cointegration rank statistics defined by the 
maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistic respectively, together with the corresponding 
asymptotic critical values at the 90% and 95% significance levels, reproduced using VAR 
(2). Both statistics accept the hypothesis that there is, at most one, cointegration relation 
between the six I (1) variables under investigation. Since these statistical results are not in 
agreement with the predicted confines of economic theory that, there should be two long 
run ( cointegrating) relations namely the PPP and UIP arbitrage conditions defined as, p1 -
e, - Pi * and r, - r,•, respectively, we adopt theory restrictions for further analysis. 
Consequently we proceed as if there are two cointegrating relations. 
We now examine the validity of the PPP and UIP hypothesis using the long-run structural 
modeling advanced in Pesaran and Shin (1997). The novelty of this approach is that, it 
enables us to test the validity of these hypotheses and to identify factors that could explain 
the reason(s) for their breakdown. The two cointegrating vectors associated with 
z; = (p,,e,,1j,p; ,'i· ,po1,t) are denoted by p; = V3wPn,PwP31 ,P41 ,Ps1,P;1) and 
p; = {ft02 ,P12,P22,p32 ,p42 ,p52,p;2} respectively, viewing p; as explaining domestic 
prices and p; domestic interest rate. The first six elements are the coefficients of the I (1) 
variables and the last element (i.e., p61 , i = 1, 2) refers to the time trend. As exact 
' identification of these vectors requires the imposition of two restrictions per vector, the 
following exactly identifying restrictions are chosen as constraints and do not impose any 
testable restrictions on the cointegrating VAR model: 
J 11s 
represented by: 
H,: P.=(~ 
Which produced the estimate: 
p e 
I 0.9956 
P., = (0.6148) 
0 -0.1569 
(0.3167) 
LLE = 2591.2 
r 
0 
I 
P,1 =I:P,1 =0 
p02 =0:p,, =I 
• 0 
• 
• p 
-0.7665 
(t.5350) 
-1.3538 
0.8461 
• • • :) • • • 
r" po I 
-0.6608 0.2692 -0.0174 
(2.4898) (0.1366) (0.0105) 
-1.4469 0.03695 -0.0056 
(1.1621) (0.0638) (0.0057) 
where, LLE (r = 2) is the maximized value of the log likelihood function for the justified 
case or subject to exact- identifying restrictions. Asymptotic errors are given in 
parentheses. 
We then proceeded to test a number of hypotheses using the above just- identified model 
as a basic model and imposing over-identifying restrictions. First, since we do not expect 
these long -run relations to include a linear trend, we first test the co-trending hypothesis 
Hco, namely that, P61 = P62 = 0 and represented by: 
• 
• 
0 
I 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
Under the H., hypothesis the following estimates we obtained the LR statistic of 13.34, 
which is well above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-squared (12) distribution with 2 
degrees of freedom. Hence the hypothesis that there are no linear trends in the 
cointegrating relations is rejected. 
Second the hypothesis implied by the PPP and UlP theories that the level of oil prices do 
not enter these long-run relationships denoted by Hpo is tested. The Hpo hypothesis 
restriction is rejected at 95 percent level because the LR statistic obtained was above the 
0.05 critical value of the x..2 distribution, with 2 degrees of freedom. However the 
hypothesis that only the first cointegration vector representing the PPP does not include oil 
prices Hpo, is accepted as the LR statistic obtained of 1,05 is lower than the 0,05 critical 
value of the x2 distribution. with I degree of freedom. The joint testing of the Hco n Hpo• 
hypotheses is also rejected at the 95% significance level as the LR statistic obtained, was 
above the 0.05 critical value of the x2 distribution, with 3 degrees of freedom. We 
conclude that for South Africa, the joint PPP and UIP cointegration relation contains 
significant trend coefficients and that the oil price variable for the UIP vector enters the 
cointegrating relation with a significant coefficient. 
Consequently, tests for the validity of the modified PPP and UIP propositions including a 
trend in both vectors and oil prices in the DIP vector only (Hpo•) were carried out. 
Under the UIP hypotl1esis: 
p, =(~ 
the estimate of which is: 
p e 
1 0.9110 
P.wp = (0.4440) 
0 0 
-~- ----------
• 
0 
r 
0 
1 
0 
1 
• p 
-2.8406 
(0.8920) 
0 
• 0 :) • 0 -1 • 
• po I r 
-1.2693 0 -0.0108 
(2.1585) (0.0043) 
-1 0.1417 0.0004 
(0.0747) (none) 
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LLm, = 2581.4 
Again the LR statistic of 19.67 is above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-squared 
distribution with 4 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the UIP hypothesis considered jointly 
with Hpo•., is rejected. 
Similarly under the PPP hypothesis given Hpo• and represented by: 
Hppr p, =(~ -I 0 -1 0 0 :) 
• I • • • 
The following estimate was produced: 
e • r' po I p r p 
P.ppp 
I -I 0 -l 0 0 0.0095 
= (0.0066) 
0 1.0891 I -1.4031 -l.9173 0.2107 -0.0106 
(0.6493) (0.5520) (!.6811) (O.l 152) (0.0089) 
LL,,,= 2586.2 
The LR statistic for testing the PPP hypothesis is 10.12, which is significant when 
compared to the 0.05 critical value of the chi- squared distribution with 4 degrees of 
freedom ( 4 is the total number of over-identifying restrictions). Thus the hypothesis of the 
PPP Oointly with H,.,) is rejected at the 95 percent significance level. 
Finally in our long -run structural modeling, taking the unmodified PPP and UIP rejected 
versions we estimated the cointegrating relations under the PPP 8:fld UIP over-identifying 
restrictions Gointly with Hp.o• ); 
Hw,.,,, P,,PPPIP =(~ 
which yields; 
-I 
0 
0 
l 
-I 
0 
0 0 
-I • 
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p e 
/J.PPP,UIP = I 
-1 
0 0 
LLPPP,UIP = 2567 .2 
r 
0 -1 0 
I 0 -1 
po 
0 
1.3359 
(none) 
t 
0.0048 
(0.0010) 
0.0043 
(none) 
The LR statistic of 48.02 is above the 0.05 critical value of chi-squared distribution with 7 
degrees of freedom. Thus the joint PPP and UIP hypothesis restrictions, considered jointly 
with Hpo• are rejected at the 95% significance level. 
The Vector Error Correction Model 
Conditional on the above long-run estimates, we have the following expressions for the 
error correction terms: 
/J1z,_1 = p,_, -e1-1 - p;_1 +0.00481, 
- . p2z,_1 =r1-1 -r1-1 +1.3359po+0.43t. 
where /Jz,_, =q, which are I (0). 
To check the resultant model's statistical adequacy, the following VECM was estimated: 
where ctJy and a.2y are three dimensional vectors of adjustment (error correction) 
coefficients. The number of error correction equations in the present application is 3, 
corresponding to the jointly determined variables of the model namely domestic prices 
(LSACPI (j,J), exchange rate (LSAER(e1)) and domestic interest rates (LSATB (r, )). The 
estimates of these adjustment-coeffici ... 11ts together with a number of diagnostic test 
statistics are presented in Table 5 below. 
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South Africa: 
Equation 
&LSACPl(p,) 
ALSAER(e1) 
ALSATB (r,) 
Table 7: 
Estimates of Error Correction Coefficients mad Diagnostic 
Statistics- Intercontinentnl Approach 
a,, .,, R' z.:0(12) z;,(1) z!(2) 
--0.007 --0.000 0.289 16.99 6.40 125.59 
(0.001) (0.000) [0.150) [0.011) [0.000) 
-0.005 0.005 0,038 25.25 0.30 871.44 
(0.009) (0.006) [0.014) [0.579) [0.00) 
0.0020 --0.000 0.174 23.66 1.71 178.77 
(0.0014) (0.000) [0.023) [0.190) [0.00) 
z!,(I) 
13.34 
[0.000) 
0.66 
[0.414) 
60.89 
[0.00) 
Notes: The ECM results are estimated by OLS based on colntegratlng VAR (2). The two error 
correction terms are given by; 
;1,1+1 = P,-i - e1_1 - p,"_1 + 0.0048t, 
42,1+1 =r,_, -r,~1 +1.3359po+0.43t. 
The figures in (,) are estimated asymptotic standard errors whereas those In [.] are the corresponding 
p-values. The bold faced estimates denote statistical significance at the 0.05 leveL The diagnostic tats 
are Chi squared statistics for the following; z~(12) is the Lagrange multiplier statistic for testing the 
null of no serial correlation, zi:F(l) is Ramsey's RESET test statistic, z!(2) Is the Jarque- Bera 
statistic for testing the null of Gaussian errors, end ztE(l)is the statistic for testing the null of no 
heteroskedasticlty. The number In (,) indicates the degrees offreedom. 
The equation for the change in domestic prices (LSACPI (pJ) passes the serial correlation 
and functional fonn diagnostic tests, with the equation also explaining 0.28 of the price 
variation over the sample period. Its error correction terms associated with the first 
cointegrating relaiion has the correct sign and is insignificant, but is tiny suggesting very 
slow response to restore long-tenn equilibrium once shocked. In tenns of R2 The equation 
for domestic interest rates (LSATB (r, )) performs the best, explaining 18 percent of 
interest rate variation over the sample pedod and passing all diagnostic tests except the 
functional fonn tests. However, its error correction terms associated with the both 
cointegrating relations are also insignificant, suggesting no response to equilibrium for 
South Africa's interest rates in response to the domestic prices and exchange rate 
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movements. The error correction terms for the exchange rate equation (LSAER(eJ) are 
also insignificant and fail all diagnostic tests except the functional form test denoting the 
exogeneity of exchange rates. These VECM results seem to indicate that shocks to the 
system tend to take very long to dissipate and for equilibriwn to be restored. 
Country summary and policy recommendations 
For South Africa the results for the simple UIP are exciting and the use of UIP in their 
exchange rate modeling is recommended. Results for the joint UIP and PPP hypothesis are 
slightly different in that although the variables are cointegrated, the restrictions imposed by 
symmetry and proportionality conditions for both the PPP and UIP propositions are 
rejected. As observed for most of the sample countries, om, is drawn to the conclusions 
drawn by (Edison et al, 1997) that despite, there being significant cointegrating vectors, the 
symmetry and proportionality conditions are rejected. But without there being any pattern 
in the coefficients of these cointegrating vectors, it is accordingly frustrating to attempt to 
provide an economic theory that could account for the theories' proportionality and 
symmetry rejections. 
Also worth pointing out is the observation that for South Africa, the joint PPP and UIP 
hypothesis enters cointegration with a significant trend and that the oil price variable for 
the UIP vector enters the cointegration relation with a significant coefficient. This attests to 
the effect that the oil price plays a significant factor in the South African economy, as the 
country is a major oil importer. 
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5.2.S SWAZILAND 
• Simple PPP and UIP 
Intra-Continental Approach 
PPP 
The validity of the PPP using the httra-continental approach was not tested using data in 
this application, because the Swaziland/South Africa exchange rate was fouud to be I (0) 
(see Appendix Table 1). As is the case for Namibia the reasons for the stationarity is 
because the currencies are pegged on a one to one basis. 
UIP 
With the simple UIP, using model (13) and optimal VAR (2), both the maximum 
eigenvalue and the trace statistic suggest one cointegrating relation at the 95· percent 
significance level. In line with theory and setting r = I the estimates of the co integration 
coefficients nonnalized on the domestic interest rate coefficient for the vector P = 
(LSWDR (r), LSATB (r )) are: 
P=[1.~oo 
(none) 
r• ) 
-0.8819 
(0.0065) 
where LL=2016.5 
As these results lack any meaningful economic interpretation if theory restrictions are nOt 
imposed, we further impose the UIP theory over-identifying restrictions namely PuIP = (r -
f = 1 -1). The log-likelihood ratio test yielded from these theory restrictions is 0.34, 
which is insignificant and less than the critical value of the chi-squared distribution with 1 
degree of freedom. The theory restrictions are therefore accepted at the conventional 95% 
significance level indicating tha~ the cross-national simple UIP does bold for Swaziland. 
As is the case with Namibia this result is expected because South Africa and Swaziland 
both belong to SACU, their currencies are pegged one to one and they have strong 
economic and financial ties. 
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Intercontinental Approach 
For the tests for order of VAR both the AIC selects 2 for order of VAR. Diagnostic tests 
(LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual equation suggests 
that autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. Cointegration results for 
simple PPP using and UIP using order ofV AR (2) are presented in Appendix Table 3. 
PPP 
Using model (13), for the PPP both Amaii: and 2,rore suggests r = 1. This result is in 
agreement with the PPP hypothesis where we expect one cointegrating relation hence we 
conclude that the intercontinental PPP variables move together in the long run. However to 
arrive at definite economic conclusions on the validity of the PPP, we apply LRSM to this 
statistical vector based on economic theory. Adopting the statistical l'esult r = 1, which is 
also in line with the PPP theory, we present the estimates of the cointegrating coefficients 
normalized on the coefficient of the domestic price (LSWCPI). The estimated results from 
this just identifying restriction to the vector for p - ((LSWCPI(j,J, LSWER(e), 
• LUSCPI(j, )) are: 
p.-[1.~00 
(none) 
e 
--0.2420 
(0.0686) 
p• J 
-2.8342 
(0.1987) 
where LL - 2307.8 
The vector does seem to be compatible with the PPP theory as both the domestic exchange 
rate and foreign price coefficients have the expected signs, but we cannot draw any 
structural conclusions without testing for the over-identified theory restrictions. The 
imposed symmetry and proportionality over-identifying restrictions based on the PPP 
theory where, PPPP = (p- e - p) = (I - I - I) were rejected because the log likelihood ratio 
(LR) for testing these restrictions was computed to be 38.38, which is way higher than the 
critical value of chi- square test with two degrees of fr~edom. The simple PPP in the 
Swaziland case using the current data sample therefore does not hold under the symmetry 
and proportionality restrictions even though the PPP variables are cointegrated. 
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UIP 
Using the vectorial process (13), the UIP between Swaziland and the US is rejected, as 
there is no cointegration between Swaziland interest rates and the US treasury- bill rates. 
o Joint PPP and UIP 
Intra-continental Approach 
The validity of the PPP using the intra-continental approach was not tested using data in 
this application because the Swaziland/South Africa exchange rate contained no unit root 
in its level fonn or was I (0). It was therefore deemed trivial to run statistical tests using 
this approach. 
Intercontinental Approach 
For the tests for order of VAR both the AIC and SBC selects 2 as order of VAR. 
Diagnostic tests (LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual 
equation suggests that autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. Using 
(12) we ran the cointegration tests for the joint PPP and UIP hypothesis. Appendix Table 5, 
presents Swaziland's cointegration rank statistics defined by the eigenvalue and the trace 
statistic respectively, together with the corresponding asymptotic critical values at the 0.05 
and 0.10 significance levels reproduced using 2 as order of VAR. Both statistics accept the 
hypothesis that there is, at most one, co integration relation between the six I (1) variables 
under investigation. Since these results are not in agreement with the predicted confines of 
economic theory that there should be two long run (cointegrating) relations, namely the 
PPP and UIP relations defined a3, Pr - e1 - p1 • and r, - r,• respectively; we set aside the 
results of the statistical analysis and adopt theory restrictions for further analysis. 
Consequently we proceed as if there are two cointegrating relations. We will however 
return to analyze the statistical results that r = ] later. 
We now examine the validity of the PPP and UIP hypothesis using the long-run structural 
modeling advanced in Pesaran and Shin (1997). The beauty of this approach is that it 
enables us to test the validity of these hypotheses as weJl as identify factors that might be 
responsible for their breakdown. The two cointegrating vectors associated with 
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z; = (p,,e,,r,,p;,,;-,po,,t) are denoted by p; = (A,,P11 ,/3w/331 ,P41 ,/3s1oP6°i) and 
p; = V302,/JmP22,Pn,/342 ,Ps2,P~) respectively, viewing Pi" as explaining domestic 
prices and p; domestic interest rate. The first six elements are the coefficients of the I (1) 
variables and the last element (i.e., /36,, i = 1, 2) refers to the time trend. As exact 
identification of these vectors requires the impositions of two restrictions per vector, the 
following exactly identifying restrictions are chosen as constraints and do not impose any 
testable restrictions on the cointegrating VAR model: 
H,: P.=(~ 
Which produced the estimate: 
p e 
l -0.8876 
P,, = (0.6388) 
0 0.4177 
(0.3674) 
LL.=2103.0 
• 
• 
r 
0 
l 
0 
1 
p' 
0.7113 
(1.7140) 
-1.2823 
(0.9767) 
• • • :) 
* * • 
• t r po 
7.0311 -0.1486 -0.0034 
(5.2726) (0.2215) (0.0024) 
-3.7461 -0.1212 -0.0001 
(3.0160) (0.1258) (0.0013) 
where LLE ( r = 2) is the maximized value of the log likelihood function for the justified 
case or subject to exactly identifying restrictions. Asymptotic errors are given in 
parentheses. 
We then proceeded to test a number of hypotheses using the above just- identified model 
as a basic model and imposing over-identifying restrictions. First, since we do not expect 
these long -run relations to include a linear treL..;., we first test the co-trending hypothesis 
Hw, llll!llely that, P,1 = p61 = 0 and is represented by: 
Hco· p =(1 
. • 0 
• 
• 
0 
1 
Under H00 the following estimates were obtained: 
• * • 
• • • 
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p e r p' r' po t 
I -1.6781 0 1.9565 12.5911 -0.3605 0 
P•co = (!.0963) (3.3489) (9.8835) (0.4082) 
0 0.3599 I -1.1166 -3.2794 0.1037 0 
(0.3030) (0.9249) (2.7255) (0.1123) 
LL.,,= 2100.8 
The log-likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing the two, over-identifying restrictions for 
co-trending is computed to be 4.35 - 2(2103.0 - 2100.8), which is below the 0.05 critical 
value of the chi-squared (·'i) distribution With 2 degrees of freedom. Hence the hypothesis 
that there are no linear trends in the cointegrating relations is not rejected although there 
was a linear trend in the underlying VAR model. 
Second the hypothesis implied by the PPP and UIP theories that the level of, oil price do 
not enter these long-run relationships denoted by Hp0 is tested. To conserve space, only the 
results of this hypothesis combined with the co-trending hypothesis, Hoon Hpo is reported 
and, it yields 
p e r p' r' po t 
I -1.1256 0 0.2735 6.9739 0 0 
P.co,PO = (0.44.2) (1.3386) (3.5757) 
0 0.1990 I -0.6271 -1.6514 0 0 
(0.1301) (0.3949) (1.0478) 
LL..,,,,= 2099.4 
The LR statistic associated with these 4 over-identifying restrictions is 7.11, and thus does 
not reject the Hco n Hpo hypothesis at the conventional 95 percent level. Individual tests of 
Hpo undertaken separately from Hoo also produced similar results. Consequently, tests for 
the validity of the PPP and VIP propositions are tested, given Hco n Hpo. 
Under the UIP hypothesis, given Hco n Hp we have: 
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·p =(l 
. • 0 
the estimate of which is: 
p 
1 
0 
LLu1P = 2095.9 
e 
-0.9374 
(0.3453) 
0 
• 
0 
r 
0 
1 
0 
1 
p' 
• 
0 
-0.3219 
(1.0662) 
0 
• 
-1 
r' 
0 
0 
6.3934 
(2.7703) 
-1 
po I 
0 0 
0 0 
Again the LR statistic of 14.1 is equal to the 0.05 critical value of the chi-squared 
distribution with 7 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the UIP hypothesis considered jointly 
with Hco n Hpo, is marginally accepted. 
Similarly under the PPP hypothesis and Hco ri Hpo represented by: 
·p =(1 -1 0 -1 0 0 i) Hppp . • 0 
• 1 • • 0 
The following estimate was produced: 
• r' po I p e r p 
1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 
p•PPI' = 
0 -0.1768 I -0.4293 -0.6049 0 0 
(-0.0811) (0.1333) (NONE) 
LLppp = 2088.8 
I t30 
The LR statistic for testing the PPP hypothesis is 28.24, which is highly significant 
compared to the 0.05 critical value of the chi- squared distribution with 7 degrees of 
freedom (7 is the total number of over-identifying restrictions). Thus the hypothesis of the 
PPP Gointly with Heon Hpo) is rejected at the 95 %t significance level. 
We subsequently considered several modifications to the PPP hypothesis (denoted by 
Hppp•) that allow for the effect of either domestic interest rate or foreign interest rate or 
both on the real exchange rate to be unrestricted respectively. The following are the 
restrictions and results: 
i) unrestricted foreign interest: 
H,,pp. P. =(~ 
which yields 
p 
1 
0 
LL,,,,= 2089.2 
e 
-1 
0.1743 
(0.08532) 
-1 
• 
r 
0 
1 
0 
1 
-1 
• 
p" 
-1 
-0.4477 
(0.1419) 
• 
• 
r• 
0 
0 
2.0928 
(2.9205) 
-1.J119 
(0.279:) 
po 
0 
0 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
The LR statistic for testing Hppp• with unrestricted foreign interest rate is 27 .52, which is 
well above the 0.05 critical value of the x.2 with 6 degrees of freedom hence this modified 
PPP version is rejected. Modified PPP versions where the domestic interest rate and both 
the domestic and foreign interest rates are unrestricted are also rejected at the conventional 
95% significance level. 
Taking the unmodified PPP, but rejected version and the marginally accepted UIP we 
finally estimated the cointegrating relations under the PPP and UIP over-identifying 
restrictions Gointly with Hco n Hp.o), represented by: 
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HUIP :/J,l'PP,UIP =(~ -1 0 0 1 -1 0 0 -l 0 0 i) 
The LR statistic of 34.74 is above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-squared distribution 
with 10 degrees of freedom. Thus the PPP and UIP hypothesis considered jointly with Hco 
n Hpo is rejected at the 95% significance level. We however adopt these theory restrictions 
for the analysis of the short run dynamics of the model. 
The Vector Error Correction Model 
Conditional on the above long-run (rejected) theory restrictions, we have the following 
expressions for the error correction tenns: 
where Pz,-, =,;, which are I (0). 
To check the resultant model's statistical adequacy the following VECM was estimated: 
where a.1y and a.2y are three dimensional vectors of adjustment (error correction) 
coefficients. The number of error correction equations in the present application is 3, 
corresponding to the jointly determined variables of the model namely domestic prices 
(LSWCPI (pJ), exchange rate (LSWER (eJ) and domestic interest rates (LSWDR (r, )). 
The estimates of these adjustment coefficients together with a munber of diagnostic test 
statistics are presented in Table 6, below. 
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Table 8: 
SwazHand: Estimates of Error Correction Coefficients and Diagnostic Statistics~ 
Intercontinental Approach 
Equation •,, 
·~ 
R• zJ.c(12) zJ,(1) z!(2) z!,(I) 
<iLSWCPI(p,) -0.124 -0.065 0.065 20.13 0.02 2893.8 4.76 
(0.012) (0.058) [0.065] [0.888] [0.000] [0.029] 
.6.LSWER(e,) 8.048 0.184 0.042 28.74 1.96 744.31 1.35 
(0.017) (0.085) [0.004] [0.161] [0.00] [0.245] 
ALSWDR(r1) -0.005 -0.022 0.150 14.01 5.24 723.82 0.50 
(0.002) (0.011) [0.300] [0.022] [0.00] [0.479] 
Notes: The ECM results are estimated by OlS based on colntegratlng VAR (2), The two error 
correction terms are given by; 
The figum in(.) are estimated asymptotic standard errors whereas those In [.] are the corresponding 
p-val11es. Tile bold faced es'limatts denote statistical significance Ill the 0.05 leveL The diagnostic tests 
are Chi squared statistics for the following; z:C (12) U the Lagrsnge multiplier statistic for testing the 
n1Jl1 of no serial correlation, zJ.,..(1) Is Ramsey's RESET test statistic, z!(2) ls the Jarque- Bera 
statistic for testing the null of Gaussian errors, and z!At)ls the statistic for testing the null of no 
heteroskedastlclty. The number in (.) Indicates the degrees of freedom. 
The equation for the change in domestic price equation (LSWCPI (),)) passes the serial 
correlation and functional fonn diagnostic tests, but marginally fails the heteroskedasticity 
test and the nonnality test and on1y explains 0.06 of the price variation over the sample 
period. However, the error correc!ion term associated with the first cointegrating relation 
explaining long-run price movements (or PPP), has the correct sign and is highly 
significant, suggesting a moderately high speed of convergence to equilibrium for 
Swaziland prices in response to the domestic interest rate and the exchange rate 
movements. Hence the domestic price variable is endogenous. 
The change in the domestic interest rate equation (LSWDR (r}), performs the best 
explaining 0.15 of the price variation over the sample period and passing all diagnostic 
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tests except the nonnality tesi. However, the error correction term a11sociated with the 
interest rate although it has the correct sign and is statistically insignificant is very small 
suggesting a crawling speed of convergence back to equilibrium once shocked. Both error 
correction coefficients for the exchange rate (LSWER (e)) equation associated with the 
two cointegrating relations are highly significant and moderately large suggesting a 
moderate speed for the equation to return to its equilibrium once it has been shocked. The 
larger the error correction coefficient (in absolute value) the faster is the system or 
economy's return to its equilibrium, once shocked. The result also indicates that the 
exchange rate is relatively endogenous, that is, Granger causality moves from domestic 
prices to the exchange rate. 
Generally, the diagnostic tests for all variables are satisfactory as far as tests for serial 
correlation, heteroskedasticity and :functional fonn are concerned, but the assumption of 
nonnally distributed errors is rejected in all the error correction equations. The equation for 
the change in exchange rate (LSWER (e)) also suffers from serial correlation. 
We now return to consider the estimation results wider cointegration rank r = 1, which is 
what the statistical results suggested (see Appendix Table 5). For this scenario we express 
z; = (Pi,e,,r,,p,• ,r,• ,po,,t) by P.=(ft1 ,P2 ,p3 ,P4 ,P5,P6 ,P1r ). Under the exact-identifying 
nonnalization restriction domestic price (LSWCPI) is equal to one i.e., P1 = l, we obtained 
the following estimates: 
' 
e 
-0.8293 
(0.5917) 
r 
0.1394 
(!.3076) 
• p 
O.S:\25 
(1.7773) 
• r 
6.5086 
(5.2817) 
po 
-0.1317 
(0.2053) 
t 
-0.0034 
(0.0022) , 
LL,=2092.5 
Imposing the restrictions implied by Hco n Hpo yields: 
P""·ro =(r 
• • 
~] e r p r po -1.1342 0.0436 0.3008 -7.0458 0 (0.5442) (1.8431) (1.6987) (4.5951) 0 
LLoo.po = 2090.8 
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The LR for these two restrictions is 3.44, which is below the 95 percent critical value of 
the ch.i-squared distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. These restrictions are therefore 
accepted. Further, imposing the restrictions that the coefficients of e, and p; namely, 
p, and p, are both equal to -1 and p3 and Ps are equal to zero, as indicated by the PPP 
hypothesis, arc strongly rejected. So are modified PPP restrictions where in addition to the 
PPP over-identifying restrictions (combined with Hco n Hpo) either the domestic interest 
rate or the foreign interest rate is unrestricted. Modifications where both domestic and 
foreign in,terest rates are unrestricted. are also rejected. at the conventional 91%' significance 
level. 
We also assumed that the single cointegrating relationship in fact represents the UIP 
hypothesis. Normalizing on the coefficient of r1 and estimating the cointegrating relation 
subject to UIP restrictions Qointly with H00 r, H,.), namely P., = I and 
P, = P, =P, = P, =P,, =0, we obtain: 
. (p 
PouJP = O 
e r • p 
0 
• r po 
-1 0 ~ J LLm, = 2078.2 0 I 
The LR statistic for testing these six (6) restrictions is equal to 28.78 and therefore strongly 
rejects the UIP hypothesis if r = I. Further modifications of the UIP hypothesis were also 
tested but, were all rejected. 
One can conclude that as far as tests of the PPP hypothesis are concerned, the main 
conclusion would seem unaffected regardless of whether one assumes the cointegration 
rank to be r = 1 or r = 2. With both r = 1 and r = 2, the modified versions of the PPP are all 
rejected. However with the UIP when r = 2 the UIP hypothesis, given Heo n Hpo is 
marginally accepted and one can conclude that the VIP hypothesis appear to be compatible 
with the data when r = 2 and not where r = 1. This conclusion, agree with the results from 
the simple UIP tests where the theory restrictions are accepted. 
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Country Summary and Policy Recommendations 
From the results obtained from this application, it is recommended that the fiscal planners 
for Swaziland, adopt either the simple intra~continental UIP in their exchange rate 
modeling, because in what is a rare phenomenon in the UIP empirical literature, the UIP 
proposition is valid for Swaziland, in its symmetry conditions. However, it must be pointed 
out that this result could be biased because of the Common Monetary Area (fonnerly Rand 
Monetary Area. The Common Monetary Area is made up of South Africa, Swaziland 
Lesotho and Namibia all who use the rand as a legal tender. As such their interest rates are 
likely to move together. 
Swaziland monetary authorities could also use the joint UlP and PPP model as the UlP 
also holds in the intercontinental case when the joint PPP and UIP are tested. The PPP 
however does not seem to hold in its proportionality and symmetry conditions using the 
current data sample as the theory restrictions are rejected. The variables ho"\\-ever, do move 
together in the long run because they are cointegrated. 
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5.2.6 TANZANIA 
• Simple PPP and U1P 
Intra-Continental Approach 
The tests for order ofV AR, selects 2 for both the PPP and UIP. Diagnostic tests (LR test) 
for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual equation suggests that 
autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. We use VAR order of 2 for the 
cointegration tests. Cointegration results for simple PPP using and UIP using selected 
order ofV AR (2) are presented in Appendix Table 2. 
PPP 
Using (13) to test the PPP theory, the maximum eigenvalue (J-,) trace statistics (J,_) 
suggest r = 2 and the trace statistics suggests r = 1. However, according to the PPP theory 
we only expect one cointegration relationship and so this finding of more than one 
cointegrating vector tends to complicate the interpretation of results as it may not be 
possible to identify the structural relationship without carrying out further tests. Assuming 
r = 1 in line with the PPP theory, under proportionality and symmetry, the coefficients of 
the co integrating vector representing the PPP should satisfy p = (p - e - p' = 1 - 1 • l) 
when the coefficient on the domestic price has been nonnalized to one. Imposing the exact 
identifying restrictionp =Ito the vector p = (LTCPl (p), LTSSAR (e), LSACPl (p')) 
yields: 
e 
-3.6013 
(3.6829) 
p' J 
-6.7592 
(5.5288) 
where the log likelihood function for the just identifying restrictions= 2675.9. 
The result shows thet, although the vector does support the PPP theory in the sense the! 
both the foreign price coefficient and the exchange rate coefficients have the right sign. but 
the symmetry and proportionality conditions are not met. Over-identifying restrictions 
were then imposed based on the PPP theory namely, PPPP = (p- e-p) = (! - 1- 1). These 
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over-identifying restrictions were subsequently rejected as the log likelihood ratio (LR) for 
testing these restrictions was computed to be 8.34, which is higher than the critical value of 
the chi- square test with two degrees of freedom. The symmetry and proportionality 
restrictions are thus r~jected at the conventional 95% significance level. 
UIP 
Using equation (13), all cointegration test statistics unanimously rejected the simple UIP 
indicating that, there is no long-run equilibrium relationship between domestic interest 
(LTDR(r)) rates and foreign interest rates (LSA m (r J). 
Intercontinental Approach 
For the tests for order ofV AR both the AIC and SBC select 3 as order ofV AR. Diagnostic 
tests (LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual equation 
suggests that autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. Cointegration 
results for simple PPP and UIP basing our analysis on (13) and using order of VAR (3) are 
presented in Appendix Table 2. 
PPP 
For the PPP both the maximum eigenvalue(-<_) and the trace statistics(-<,=) suggest r 
= 2. This result is not in line with the PPP hypothesis where we expect one co integrating 
relation, However since the three PPP variables are cointegrated, we conclude that the 
weak form intercontinental holds because the PPP variables do move togeth,:r in the long-
run. Consequently, in order to arrive at definite conclusions on the proposition's validity, 
we apply LRSM to this statistical vector based on economic theory. Assuming r = l, 
which jg also in line with the PPP tht:ory, we present the estimates of the cointegrating 
coefficients normalized on the coefficient of the domestic price (L TCPl(p)), The results 
obtained from this just-identifying restriction to the PPP vector represented by, p = 
(LTCPl(p}, LTER(e}, LUSCPl(pJ) are: 
P• = [1.~00 
(none) 
e 
0.8963 
(1.7922) 
p" ) 
-2.9001 
(0.3313) 
where LL= 873.05 
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The vector does not seem to support the PPP theory as the domestic exchange rate 
coefficient has the wrong sign, but we cannot draw any structural conclusions on the 
validity of the proposition without testing for the over-identified theory restrictions. The 
imposed symmetry and proportionality over-identifying restrictions based on the PPP 
theory namely: PPP - ( p - e - p) - (1 - 1 - 1 ) were accepted as the log likelihood ratio 
(LR) statistic for testing these restrictions was computed to be 2.59, which is below the 
critical value of the chi- square test with two degrees of freedom. The simple PPP in the 
Tanzanian case using the current sample therefore holds under the symmetry and 
proportion.ality restrictions. 
UIP 
The UIP between Tanzania and the US is rejected, as there is no cointegration between 
Tanzania and US interest rates. 
• Joint PPP and UIP 
Intra-continental Approach 
For estimation purposes we base our analysis on model (11). Using the optimal VAR (2), 
both the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics suggest r = 1 at the 95% critical value. 
The hypothesis of no cointegration (namely r = OJ is rejected against null hypothesis that 
there exists one cointegrating relation (namely r = IJ but the hypothesis that r = 1 cannot 
be rejected against r = 2 at the 95% significance level. The Akaike information criterion 
(AlC), and the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) also unanimously selects r - 3, while the 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) suggest r = 1. Considering these statistical results there 
is some ambiguity in choosing the number of cointegrating relationships among the five I 
(1) variables. However the long -run economic theory states that based on arbitrage in the 
commodity and capital markets, we should expect two cointegrating relations (i.e., r = 2): 
the PPP relation 
p1-e1-p/ -1(0) 
and the interest -rate arbitrage relation ( which is the long-run implication of the 
uncovered interest parity hypothesis) 
r, - r,* ...... J (0) 
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Also according to Pesaran and Smith (1999), any empirical analysis involves balancing, 
consideration of purpose (the relevance of the model and its intended use), theory, and 
statistical adequacy. They further demonstrate tha.t~ in the case of choosing the number of 
cointegration relations this balancing act can be particularly difficult, because not only are 
there usually a large number of choices required to establish a specification but, also 
because statistical criteria may not be very infonnative about these choices. Using this line 
of argument, in this application it was deemed proper and in cOnformity with economic 
theory to set r = 2 for the purposes of further analysis. 
Using Long-run structural modeling (Pesaran and Shin, 1997) we first obtain estimates of 
the cointegrating coefficients (together with their asymptotic standard errors) nonnalized 
on the following identifying restrictions: 
P11 =l, p,, =0 
p,. =0,Pn=l 
where we have denoted the two cointegrating vectors associated with coefficients of 
X, =lp,.e1,'i,P;,r,·jby, Pi =(p11,P12 ,P1J ,Pu ,Pis), P2 = ( P21,P22 ,Pn ,P14 ,P2s ), 
yielding (asymptotic standard errors are in brackets): 
Vector p e r p r 
P, l -1.8962 0 -4.9171 -0.4467 
(1.0989) (2.3262) (0.6559\ 
P, 0 -0.3346 I 7.3904 2.8796 
(5.0942) (10.670) (2.7986\ 
LL= 1053.9 
The first vector represents the PPP condition and the exchange rate {L TS SAR (e)) and 
foreign price (LSACPI (p)) have the right signs although not equal to unity. Vector 2 
stands for the UIP condition, but the foreign interest rate (LSATB (r)) has the wrong sign. 
However, since the above exactly identifying restrictions do not impose any testable 
restrictions on the cointegrating VAR, over-identifying restrictions based on the two long 
run theories under study, were imposed on the cointegrating vectors (CVs) in order to test 
their validity. 
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The over-identifying restrictions based on the PPP theorem, represented by, PPP-;;;,, (p, - e, 
• 
- p, - I (0) s I - I - I) produced the following maximum likelihood estimates: 
Vector p p' • e r r 
PEPPP = P, 0 -1 0 -1 0 
P, I -4.7391 I -12.739 0.5881 
12.0336\ 19.2313) 11.0797) 
LL= 1051.9 
The log Jikelihood ratio (LR) for testing the three over-identifying restrictions is computed 
to be 4.00, which is well below the 0.05 critical value of the chi-square distribution with 3 
degrees of freedom, suggesting that the theory restrictions are accepted at 95% significance 
level. So the Tanzania intra-continental PPP proposition is valid. 
Using UIP theory restrictions namely PulP = (r - r • = 1 -1) we obtained: 
Vector p e r p r 
P, I -1.9698 0 -3.5073 0.3037 
10.5308\ 10.4318\ 10.3525\ 
P, 0 0 I 0 -1 
LL= 1048.5 
The LR statistic of 10.86, obtained for testing the imposed UIP over-identifying 
restrictions is above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-square distribution with 3 degrees of 
freedom. The UIP theory restrictions are therefore rejected. However, the exchange rate 
(LTSSAR (e)) and foreign price (LSACPI (p )) in the first vector have the right signs. 
Subsequently the hypothesis testing for the over-identifying restrictions on the joint PPP 
and UIP were tested and also rejected at the 95% significance level. The LR obtained was 
28.59, which is above the chi-squared distribution critical value at 0,05 with 6 degrees of 
freedom. However since these cointegrating vectors (1, - I, -1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 1, -1) 
standing for the PPP and UIP respectively, are consistent with theory restrictions, they 
were adopted for use in analyzing the short run dynamic properties of the model and all 
further analysis. 
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The Vector Error Correction Model 
Having identified the cointegrating vectors the next step is to estimate the VECM in order 
to identify the short run properties of the model. Results for vector error correction 
modeling are reported in Table 7 below. 
The error correction tenns from the change in domestic price (LTCPI (p)) all have the 
correct signs and pass the diagnostic tests for functional form and heteroskedasticity, but 
fails the autocorrelation test. Its correction coefficient associated with the first vector 
though very small is significant, indicating a very slow gravitation back to equilibrium for 
the equation once shocked. This result indicates that domestic prices are relatively 
endogenous and partly bears the brunt of short-run adjustment to restore long-tenn 
equilibrium after any shock to the system. The error correction terms for the domestic 
interest rate (LTDR (r)) equation have the correct signs but are insignificant indicating that 
domestic interest rates are exogenous and do not respond to correct short-run deviations 
from equilibrium. The error correction coefficients for the change in foreign interest 
(LSATB (r,')) equation also have the correct signs and pass all diagnostic tests except the 
normality test. Its error correction associated with the second cointegrating condition, 
representing the UIP is very small but significant signifying very slow adjustment to 
restore equilibrium once shocked. 
The error correction equation for, the exchange rate equation (LTSSAR (e)) passes all 
other diagnostic tests except the normality test but its error correction terms are very small, 
have the wrong signs and are insignificant implying the exogeneity of exchange rates. In 
tenns of the R2• the foreign price (LSACPI (p}) equation perfonns best, explaining 0.39 of 
the price variation over the sample period. Its error correction term associated with the first 
cointegrating vector representing the PPP, is also significant but very small suggesting 
very slow adjustment to restore back long -run equilibrium. This also indicates that 
domestic prices are to some small degree exogenous. 
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Tanzania: 
Equation 
t.LTCPl(p,) 
6LTSSAR(e1) 
t,LSACPl(p;) 
ALTDR(r,) 
M.SATB(r,•) 
Table 9: 
Estimates of Error Correction Coefficients and Djagnostic Statisticsu 
Intra-continental Approach 
a, a, R' x.i,,(12) x;,,(1) z!(2) z~,(1) 
-0.051 -0.009 0.250 30.04 1.45 1037.0 2.96 
(0.019) (0.010) [0.003] [0.228] [0.000] [0.085] 
-0.037 -0.013 0.033 6.98 0.11 22.96 0.22 
(0.026) (0.015) [0.859] [0.734] [0.000] [0.641] 
-0.004 -0.001 0.392 15.88 2.08 16.71 10.12 
(0.002) (0.001) [0.197] [0.149] [0.000] [0.001] 
-0.089 -0.056 0.093 14.76 8.93 186.70 11.15 
(0.058) (0.032) [0.255] [0.003] [0.000] [0.001] 
0.025 0.028 0.298 8.38 0.17 37.45 0.17 
(0.025) (0.014) [0.754] [0.677] [0.000] [0.683] 
Notes: The results are estimated by OLS based on co integrating VAR (2) using the equation: 
llx1 =O+r1Ax1_1a1p1x1 .• 1 +a2P2x1_1 +e, 
where /Jx1_1 =?, which are I (0) and a1 and a 2are five dimensional matrices of 
adjustment or feedback coefficients and the two error correction terms are given by; 
t;1,1+1 =p-e-p" , 
t2r+1 =r-r•. 
The figures in (.) are estimated asymptotic standard errors whereas those In [,] are the 
corresponding p -values. The bold faced estimates denote statistical significance at the O.OS 
level. The diagnostic tests are Chi squared statistics for the following; zi:;(12) is the 
Lagrange multiplier statistic f0r testing the null of no serial correlation, z~(l) is Ramsey's 
RESET test statistic, z!(2) is the Jarque- Bera statistic for testing the null of Gaussian 
errors, and z!s(l) is the statistic for testing the null of no beteroskedasticlty, The number In 
(.) Indicates the degrees of freedom. 
Forecast Error Variance Decompositions 
Variance decompositions allow for out of sample testing of Granger exogeneity or 
endogeneity of the dependant variable and also provide a measure of the extent to which a 
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variable is exogenous in comparison with other variables in the system. They achieve this 
end by providing a literal breakdown of the change in the value of the variable in a given 
period arising from changes in the same variable in addition to changes in other variables 
in previous periods. A sample of the VDC results generated for all the variables namely, 
domestic price (LTCPI (p,)), exchange rates (LTSSAR (e1)), foreign price (LSACPI 
(p;)), domestic interest rates (LTDR (r,)) and foreign interest rates (LSATB (r, 0 )) are 
included in Table 10 below. 
Table 10: 
Tanzania Variance decomposition 
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The exchange rate (LTSSAR (e)) seems to be the most exogenous variable. This is inferred 
as the greater part 85% of its variance is being explained by its own innovations compared 
to own shocks contributing to explaining the rest of the variables. On the other hand, the 
domestic price (LTCPI (p)) appears to be the most endogenous with its own innovations 
only explaining 17% of its shock whilst its shocks explain 70% of the exchange rates 
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variance over the forecast horizon. Also, the domestic (LTDR (r)) and foreign (LSATB 
(r*)) interest rates and foreign prices (LSACPI (p*)) are relatively endogenous with own 
shocks explaining 0.46, 0.57 and 0.53 of their variances over the forecast horizon 
respectively. These results seem to be reasonably compatible with VECM :findings. 
Impulse Response Analysis 
Impulse response analyses are useful in that they can be used to estimate the time profile of 
the effect of "particular'' shocks to the individual equations or to cointegrating relations. 
The generated generalized impulse response analysis of the individual equations and 
cointegrating vectors to one standard deviation shock in the domestic price (LTCPI (p,)) 
and exchange rate (LTSSAR (e)) equations are portrayed in Figure 3 below. 
Figure3A 
Generalized Impulse Response{•) to one S.E. shock In the equst.lon re 
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Figure3 B 
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Figure3 C 
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Figure3 D 
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Figure -3: Tanzania Generalized Impulse response 
Notes: Horizon is in Months and CVI and CV2 in figures (C) and (D) stands for the PPP and UIP 
vectors respectively. 
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The first 2 figures (A and B) show impulse response paths for each variable to one SE 
shock to the equations of the LTCPI (p;} and LTSSAR (e,) correspondingly. As is often 
the case in empirical literature, effects of these shocks to individual equations seem to 
persist forever reflecting their unit root properties. The results are the same for shocks to 
other variables. Figures (C and D) show impulse response of cointegrating vectors to one 
SE shocks also in the domestic price equation (LTCPI ( p, )) and the exchange rate 
(LTSSAR (e1)} respectively. The results are more or less the same regardless of the 
variable shocked with the shocks taking very long to dissipate. Whereas the first 
cointegrating vector representing the PPP return to their equilibrium values in about 135 
months (l lyears), the shock to the second CV for the UIP seem to persist for longer. Our 
finding is in line with empirical literature and confirms the cointegration tests result. 
Persistence Profiles 
Unlike impulse response functions, persistence profiles measure the time profile of the 
effect of a system-wide shock on the cointegrating relations. Persistence profiles also have 
the advantage that they are unique and do not require prior orthogonalization of the shocks. 
Figure 4 illustrate the persistence profiles. 
Persistence Profile of the effect of a system-wide shock to CV'(s) 
1. 
I CV1 
1. 
0. 
I CV2 
~o •5 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 15u O 
Horizon 
Figure -4: Tanzania Penistence Profiles 
Notes: The variables In the VAR (2) model are p1,p," ,e1,r, and ,,•. The first 
colntegratiDg relation CV1 Is for the PPP and the second one CVl ls for the VIP and 
P,, =(1,-1,-1, 0, 0) and P,, =(0, 0, O, I, 1) are the PPP and VIP vectors 
respectively. Horizon is in months 
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Intercontinental Approach 
For the tests for order of VAR both the AIC and SBC selects I as order of VAR. 
Diagnostic tests (LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual 
equation suggests that autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. 
Appendix Table 5, presents cointegration rank statistics defined by the · maximum 
eigenvalue and the trace statistic respectively, together with the corresponding asymptotic 
critical values at the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels reproduced using VAR (1) and 
model (12). 
Both the maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistic, suggest one cointegration relation 
between the six I (1) variables under investigation. However, in line with the predicted 
confines of economic theory that there should be two long run (cointegrating) relations 
namely the PPP and UIP relations defined as p1 - e, - p, • and r1 - r,* respectively, we 
assume r = 2 for all further analysis. 
We now examine the validity of the PPP and VIP hypothesis using the long-run structural 
modeling advanced in Pesaran and Shin (1997). The novel of this approach is that it 
enables us to test the validity of these hypotheses and to identify factors that might be 
responsible for their breakdown. The two cointegrating vectors associated with 
z,• = (p,,e1,r,,p; ,lj• ,po,,t) are denoted by Pi" = (.o01 ,P11 ,P21,P31,PwPwP:1) and 
p; = (fl02 ,PmPwP32 ,P42 ,P,2,p;2 ) respectively, viewing Pi" as explaining domestic 
prices and p; domestic interest rate. The first six elements are the coefficients of the I (1) 
variables and the last element (i.e., p61 , i = l, 2) refers to the time trend. As exact 
identification of these vectors requires the impositions of two restrictions per vector, the 
following exactly identifying restrictions are chosen as constraints and do not impose any 
testable restrictions on the cointegrating VAR model: 
H,: p, =(~ • 
• 
0 
I 
• 
• 
• • :) 
• • 
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Which produced the estimate: 
p 
1 
P., = 
0 
LL.=734.57 
e 
2.5589 
(4.8498) 
-0.6357 
(0.6569) 
r p• 
0 31.6713 
(62.3299) 
l 2.6839 
(8.3994) 
• r po t 
-3.9422 0.05993 -0.0801 
(26.2170) (0.7764) (0.13356) 
-5.1954 -0.0010 -0.0002 
(3.5288) (0.1046) (0.0180) 
where LLE (r = 2) is the maximized value of the log likelihood function for the justified 
case or subject to exactly identifying restrictions. Asymptotic errors are given in 
parentheses. 
We then proceeded to test a number of hypotheses using the above just- identified model 
as a basic model and imposing over-identifying restrictions. First. since we do not expect 
these long -run relations to include a linear trend, we first test the co-trending hypothesis 
Hoo, namely that, P,1 = P61 = 0 and represented by: 
• 
• 
0 
l 
• 
• i) • • • • 
Under the hypothesis H00 the restrictions were collinear and there was no convergence. 
Hence the hypothesis that there are no linear trends in the cointegrating relations is 
rejected. Individual tests of Hoo were then undertaken separately for each vector and they 
produced different results. Whereas the co- trending restrictions were accepted in the 
second vector standing for the UIP, .ltey were rejected for the PPP or 151 vector. We term 
this hypothesis H00, (where only l.ile UIP vector is co-trended) for further analysis and it 
yields: 
p e r p• • r po I 
1 2.6030 0 32.3523 -3.9400 0.0537 0,0816 
. (2.9565) P.co• = (17.8733) (26.5352) (0,5581) (0.0345) 
0 -0.6418 I 2.5889 -5.1957 -0.009 0 
(0.3773) (!.0267) (3.5719) (0.0724) ) 
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LLeo• = 734.55 
The restrictions are accepted because the LR statistic computed for the one restriction was 
insignificant. 
Second the hypothesis implied by the PPP and UIP theories that the level of oil prices do 
not enter these long-run relationships denoted by Hpo is tested and it yields: 
p e r • p • r po t 
1 2.7867 0 35.4233 -3.4353 0 0.0881 
p,PO = (4.3852) (44.5935) (27.28258) (0.0980) 
0 --0.6732 1 2.0613 -5.2801 0 0.0011 
(0.6014) (6.0844) (3.7215) (0.0134) 
LL.po= 734.56 
The LR statistic associated with, these 2 over-identifying restrictions is, 0.01, and thus 
does not reject the Hpo hypothesis at the conventional 95 % significance level. The joint 
Hro• n Hpo (where only the second vector is co-trended) produced the following results; 
p e r p • r' po t 
1 2.5329 0 31.8833 -2.8219 0 0.0802 
P,co•,PO = (2.8356) (12.3988) (25.0698) (0.0219) 
0 --0.6374 1 2.5604 -5.3666 0 0 
(0.3780) (1.0046) (3.4082) 
LLeo• .po = 734.6 
The LR statistic obtained under these 3 over-identifying restrictions is 0.01, and thus do 
not reject the Hro• r. Hpo hypothesis at 95 % significance level. It can also be seen that the 
value of the trend in the first vector representing the PPP is almost insignificant. 
Consequently, tests for the validity of the PPP and UIP propositions are tested given Hco• ri 
Hpo. 
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Under the UIP hypothesis given Heo• n Hpo represented by: 
p, =(~ • 0 • • 0 ;) HUIP 0 I 0 -1 0 
the estimate of which is: 
p e r • p • po I r 
1 -1.9418 0 50.2628 -33.9501 0 0.0808 
P.wp = (0.5753) (13.2975) (8.5744) (0.0221) 
0 0 1 0 -1 0 0 
LLu1, = 727.08 
The LR statistic obtained under these 6 over-identifying restrictions was 14.98, and thus 
rejects the UIP hypothesis together with the hypothesis Hoo• n Hpo at the 95 % critical 
level. 
Similarly under the PPP hypothesis and Hoo• n Hpo (the PPP vector includes an unrestricted 
trend), and is represented by: 
Hppp p, =(~ -1 
• 
0 
1 
-1 0 
• • 
0 
0 ~) 
The estimate failed to converge, thus the hypothesis of the PPP Gointly with II«,, ('\ H,,) 
was rejected. 
Several modifications to the PPP hypothesis (denoted by H,,,,) that allow for the effect of 
either domestic interest rate or foreign interest rate or both on the real exchange rate to be 
unrestricted respectively were subsequently considered. They were all rejected, as the LR 
ratios obtained in each case were much higher than the critical value of chi-squared 
distribution with x degrees of freedom. 
Finally in our long -nm structural modeling, talcing the unmodified PPP and UIP versions, 
we estimated the cointegrating relations under the PPP and VIP over-identifying 
restrictions Gointly with Hco• ('\ Hp.0): 
Hu,,,,,, /J,,,,µ1, =(~ 
which yields: 
p e r p 
• 
P.pppµJP = 1 -1 0 -1 
0 0 1 0 
• 
-1 
0 
r 
0 
-1 
• 
0 
I 
po 
0 
0 
-1 
0 
I 
0 
-1 
0.0046 
(0.0043) 
0 
0 
0 
LLppp, UIP = 712.39 
The LR statistic of 44.34, well exceeds the 0.05 critical value of the chi-squared 
distribution with 9 degrees of freedom. Thus the PPP and UIP hypothesis considered 
jointly with Hoon Hpo is rejected at the95% significance level. 
The Vector Error Correction Model 
Conditional on the above long-run (rejected) theocy restrictions, we have the following 
expressions for the error correction tenns: 
• • P1z,.1 = p,_, - e,_1 - P,.1 + 0.0046!, 
where /!z,_1 =/;, which are I (0). 
To check the resultant model's statistical adequacy, the following VECM was estimated: 
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where a1y and a2y are three dimensional vectors of adjustment (error correction) 
coefficients. The number of error correction equations in the present application is 3, 
corresponding to the jointly determined variables of the model namely domestic prices 
(LTCPJ (p1)), exchange rate (LTER (e,)) and domestic interest rates (LTDR (r, ). The 
estimates of these adjustment coefficients together with a number of diagnostic test 
statistics are presented in Table 9 below. 
Table 11: 
Tanzania : Estimates of Error Correction Coefficients and Diagnostic Statistics~ 
Intercontinental Approach 
Equation •,, 
·~ 
R· z:C(12) z;,(1) z!(2) z1,(1) 
ALTCPI(p1) -0.057 0.046 0.197 29.51 0.97 690.66 3.51 
(0.019) (0.058) [0.003] [0.323] [0.000] [0.061] 
ALTER(e,) -0.036 -0.054 0.047 8.86 2.04 32.99 0.21 
(0.017) (0.085) [0.715] [0.153] [0.00] [0.646] 
ALTDR(r,) -0.019 -0.053 0.099 9.53 18.64 147.15 18.49 
(0.006) (0.022) [0.657] [0.000] [0.00] [0.00] 
Notes: The ECM results are estimated hy OLS based on cointegratlng VAR (I). The two error 
correction terms are given by; 
~1.1+1 = Pt-i - e1_1 - Pt-i + 0.0046t , 
The figures in(,) are estimated asymptotic i::tandard ei;-rors whereas those In [,] are the corresponding 
p-values. The bold faced estimates denote statistical significance at the 0.05 level, The diagnostic tests 
are Chi squared statistics for tfte following; zi-(12) is the Lagrange multiplier statistic for testing the 
null of no serial i:orrelatiou, ziAt) Is Ramsey's RESET test statistic, z!(2) is the Jarque- Bera 
statistic for testing the null of Gaussian errurs, and z1e{l)is the statistic for testing the null of no 
heteroskedaslicity. The number in(.) Indicates the degrees of freedom. 
The equation for the change in domestic price (L TCP! (p}) passes the heteroskedasticity 
and functional form diagnostic tests, but fails the serial correlation and the normality tests. 
It explains 0.197 of the price variation over the sample period. Its error correction term, 
associated with the first cointegrating relation explaining long run price movements, has 
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the correct sign and is significant, indicating a marginal speed of convergence to 
equilibrium for Tanzani~ prices in response to the domestic interest rate and the.exchange 
rate shocks. Hence prices are endogenous. The equation for the_ change in the· dome.Stic 
interest rate (LTDR (r)) performs the worst passing only the serial correlation diagnostic 
test and explaining a meager 0.09 of the price variation over the·sample period. However, 
the error correction term associated with the second vector representing the UIP althotigh 
small is statistically significant suggesting a crawling speed of convergence to equilibrium. 
The error correction term for the exchange rate (LTER(e)) associated with the PPP ( or I") 
vector is small and has the wrong sign indicating that the exchange rate has a small but 
negative response to restore equilibrium. 
Country summary and policy recommendati@ns 
Comparing both results for the intra-continental and intercontinental approach, it is 
recommended that the financial plailllers in Tanzania use America rather than South Africa 
when modeling their exchange rate using simple UIP because in this rare case, the 
proposition is valid in its symmetry and proportionality conditions. This finding although 
supported well by the statistical data is economically counter-intuitive especially when one 
considers that Tanzania's economy is one of the poorest countries in the world. But then it 
could also be because their currency has been free floating since 1995. However when 
using the combine PPP and UIP model the intra-continental approach performs better 
because the PPP proposition is valid in its symmetry and proportionality theory 
restrictions. 
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5.2.7 ZAMBIA 
• Simple PPP and UIP 
Intra-Continental Approach 
The tests for order of VAR select 2 as order ofV AR for both the PPP and UIP. Diagnostic 
tests (LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual equation 
suggests that autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. Cointegration 
results for simple PPP using and VIP using selected order of VAR (2) and equation (13) 
are presented in Appendix Table 2. 
PPP 
For the PPP the maximum eigenvalue suggests r = I and the trace statistics suggests r = 2. 
According to the PPP theory we only expect one cointegration relationship and so the 
existence of more than one cointegrating vector tends to complicate the interpretation of 
results. Hence we adopt the maximum eigenvalue result, which is also suggested by the 
SBC criterion. Assuming r = 1, in line with the PPP theory, we present the estimates of the 
cointegrating coefficients nonnalized on the coefficient of the domestic price 
(LZACPI(p)). The results of this just identifying restriction for the cointegrating vector 
denoted by~= (LZACPI (p), LZKSAR (e), LSACPI (p )) are: 
P, =[1.~00 
(none) 
e 
-0.3506 
(0.5880) 
p' J 
-0.8707 
(2.7035) 
The Log likelihood statistic subject to the exact identifying restrictions is equal to 1200.8 
The vector supports the PPP theory only in as far as both domestic exchange rate and 
foreign price have negative coefficients but does not enable us to test any theory and so we 
further impose PPP theory restrictions. Imposed over~identifying restrictions based on the 
strict PPP theory symmetry and proportionality conditions where, (p - e - p) = (1 - I - 1) 
were rejected as the LR statistic of 25.4 is higher than the chi~ square test with two degrees 
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of freedom. The simple PPP therefore does not hold in its symmetry and proportionality 
conditions even though the variables are cointegrated. 
UIP 
With the simple UIP, using the VAR order of 2, the maximum eigenvalue suggests one 
co integrating relation and so does the trace statistic at the 1 O % critical level. In line with 
theory and setting r = 1 the estimates of the cointegration coefficients normalized on the 
domestic interest rates are for the cointegrating vector denoted by, J} = (LZATB(r), 
LSATB(r)) 
P, =(1.:00 
(none) 
where LL= 1034.3 
r 
. J 12.355 
(17.198) 
As these results lack any meaningful economic interpretation, we further impose the UIP 
theory over-identifying restrictions where (r - r • = I -1 ). The log-likelihood ratio test 
statistic from these theory restrictions is 1.81, which is insignificant and below the critical 
value of the chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom. The theory restrictions are 
therefore accepted at the conventional 95% significance level. We conclude that the intra-
continental simple UIP does hold in the Zambian case. 
Intercontinental Approach 
For the tests for order of VAR both the AIC and SBC selects 2 as order of VAR. 
Diagnostic tests (LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual 
equation suggests that autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. 
Cointegration results for simple PPP using and UIP obtained using equation (13) and VAR 
(2) are presented in Appendix Table 2 
PPP 
For the PPP both the maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistics suggests r = 0. The 
hypothesis that r =0 cannot be rejected against r = 1 at 95% significance level. This result 
however conflicts with the PPP hypothesis where we expect one cointegrating relation and 
so we conclude that, the simple intercontinental PPP does not hold. 
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UIP 
The UIP between Zambia and the US is also rejected, as there is no cointegration between 
Zambia's interest rates and US interest rates. 
• Joint PPP and UIP 
Intra-continental Approach 
Using model (11) with unrestricted intercepts and no trends to test the joint PPP and UIP 
hypothesis and optimal VAR of order two, the maximum eigenvalue statistic suggests, r = 
2 and the trace statistic suggests r = 4. The Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) suggests r = 
1 and the Akaike Iinfonnation Criterion (AIC) and the Hanoan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) 
select r = 5. Considering these statistical results, the data hi this application seems 
hopelessly uninfonnative on the choice of the number of co integrating relationships among 
the five I (l) variables, Turning to the long-run economic theory based on arbitrage in the 
commodity and capital markets, we should expect two cointegrating relations (i.e., r = 2): 
the PPP relation; 
p,-e,-p,' -1(0) 
and the interest-rate arbitrage condition ( which is the long-run implication of the 
uncovered interest parity hypothesis); 
r,-r,+-1(0) 
It therefore seems reasonable to set r = 2 for the purposes of further analysis. 
Applying long-run structurai modeling (Pesaran and Pesaran, I 997) we first obtain 
estimates of the cointegrating coefficients (together with their asymptotic standard errors) 
normalized on the following identifying restrictions: 
p,, =I, p13 =0 H,= p,, =0,Pn =I 
where we have denoted the two cointegrating vectors associated with coefficients of 
x, =l,,,,,,,r,,p;.r,·j by, P, =(p,, ,p,, ,p" ,p,. ,p,,}, P, = ( p,, ,p,, ,Pn ,p,. ,p,, ), 
yielding (asymptotic standard errors are in brackets): 
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Variable p~ ~ p e r r 
(P1l l -2.1621 0 7.1434 -35.145 
(1.739"' (11.016) (37.570) 
(P2) 0 -0.9243 1 5.0131 -13.355 
(0.8751) (5.5638) (19.057) 
LL= 2282.4 
The first vector represents the PPP condition and although the exchange rate (LZACPJ 0,)) 
estimate has the right sign, the foreign price (LSACPI (p )) estimate has the wrong sign 
and both are not of the expected magnitude of unity. Vector 2 stands for the UIP condition, 
and the foreign interest rate (LSA TB (r ;) has the right sign but is not equal to the expected 
value of unity (1). However, since the above exactly identifying restrictions do not impose 
any testable restrictions on the cointegrating VAR, over-identifying restrictions based on 
the two long run theories under study were imposed on the cointegrating vectors (CVs) in 
order to test their validity. 
The over-identifying restrictions based on the PPP theory, where PPP= 
(0) 5 1 - 1 - 1) produced the following maximum likelihood estimates: 
Variable p e r p" 
(P1) 1 -1 0 -1 
(P,) 0 -0.0638 1 -0.9935 
(0.2321) (1.4164) 
LL =2273.6 
• (p,-e,-p, ... / 
r 
0 
12.057 
(6.6173) 
The log likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing the three over-identifying restrictions is 
computed to be 17.48, which is well above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-square 
distribution with 3 degrees of freedom, suggesting that the theory restrictions are rejected 
at the conventional 95% significance level. We also tested modified versions of the PPP 
with either the domestic interest rate (LBDR (r)) or foreign interest rate (LSATB (r)) 
unrestricted, but they were all rejected at the conventional 95% level as the LR statistics 
obtained were, above the critical value of the chi-squared distribution with 2 degrees of 
freedom. 
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Using UIP theory restrictions (r- r· = 1-1) We obtained: 
Variable p e r p r 
(~1) 1 -0.8096 0 -0.2261 -17.109 
Pu1p= 
(0.2809) (1.4658) 16.4815) 
(~2) 0 0 1 0 -1 
LL-2274.5 
The LR statiastic of 15.76, obtained for testing the imposed UIP over-identifying 
restrictions is above the conventional 0.05 critical value of the chi-square distribution with 
3 degrees of freedom and so the theory restrictions are rejected. The UIP theory restrictions 
are therefore rejected. The exchange rate (LZKSAR) and foreign price (LSACPI) 
coefficients in vector one however, have the right signs but do not satisfy the PPP 
proportionality condition of unity one expects. 
Subsequently the hypothesis testing for the over-identifying restrictions on the joint PPP 
and UIP were tested and also rejected at the 95% significance level. The LR obtained was 
62.62, which is way above the chi-squared distribution critical value at 0.05 with 6 degrees 
of freedom. However since these cointegrating vectors (1, - 1, -1, 0, 0) and (O, 0, 0, 1, -1) 
representing the PPP and UIP respectively, are consistent with theory restrictions, they 
were adopted for use in analyzing the short run dynamic properties of the model (VECM) 
and for all further analyses. 
The Vector Error Correction Model 
Our next step was to formulate a vector error correction modeling relationship, which 
seeks to indicate the direction of Granger causality. The error correction coefficient 
represents the proportion by which the long-run disequilibrium in the dependent variable is 
corrected in the short period. Results for Zambia vector error correction modeling are 
presented in Table 10 beiow. 
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Table 12: 
Zambia: Estimates of Error Correction Coefficients and Diagnostic Statistics-
Intra-Continenta1 Approach 
Equation a,, a,, R' x1,(12) %~,(1) x!(2) %~,(1) 
ALZACPI(p,) -0.008 -0.004 0.368 20.24 0.24 837.75 2.26 
(0.009) (0.012) [0.063] [0.624] [0.00] [0.133] 
ALZKSAR(e,) 0.11 0.001 0.091 10.31 1.15 1625.2 38.73 
(0.038) (0.053) [0.589] [0.283] [0.00] [0.00] 
ALSACPI( p;) -0.002 -0.005 0.268 40.28 6.20 25.61 5.98 
(0.001) (0.002) [0.000] [0.013] [0.00] [0.14] 
ALZAMTB (r,) -0.004 -0.043 0.319 19.81 5.75 1295.2 1.99 
(0.010) (0.014) [0.071] [0.017] [0.00] [0.158] 
ALSATB(r,') -0.001 0.000 0.187 14.94 2.42 71.66 42.83 
(0.001) (0.002) [0.24] [0.119] [0.00] [0.000] 
Notes: The results are estimated by OLS based on eolntegrating VAR (2) using the equation: 
llx, =8+r1!:lx1_1 +a1p1x,_1 +a2p2x1_1 +e, 
wt,ere flx1-1 =t;, which are I (0) and a 1 and a 2are five dimensional matrices of 
adjmitment or feedback coefficients and the two error correction terms are given by; 
t;1,1+1=p-e-p", 
:2.1+1 =r-r•. 
The figures in (.) are estimated asymptotic standard errors whereas those in [.] are the 
corre!:ponding p -values. The bold facedestlmates denote statistical significance at the 0.05 
level. The diagnostic tests are Chi squared statistics for the following; zi,(12) is the 
Lagrange multiplier statistic for testing the null of no serial correlation, z;.F(1) is Ramsey's 
RESET test statiJtic, z!(2) is the Jarque- Bera statistic for testing the null of Gaussian 
errors, and z~it) Is the statistic for testing the null of no heteroskedasticlty, The number in 
(.) indicates the degrees offreedom. 
The error correction terms from the domestic price equation (LZACPI (p)) perfonns best 
explaining 36% of the price variance over the sample period. Both error correction terms 
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have the correct sign and pass all the diagnostic tests except for nonnality. The error 
correction tenns are however insignificant, indicating nil response to shocks. Theory 
predicts that the error correction tenn must be significantly different from zero and the 
larger the equation's error correction coefficient (in absolute value), the faster the 
variable's return to its equilibrium once shocked. The insignificance of the error correction 
terms is also an indication in part that domestic prices are exogenous 
The error correction term for the change in domestic interest rate equation (LZAMTB (rJ) 
associated with the UIP cointegrating relation has a small but significant negative impact 
on current interest rate changes indicating a scanty gravitation back to equilibrium once 
shocked. Domestic interest rates are thus relatively endogenous. 11te error corre1.,1ion terms 
for the change in foreign interest rates equation (LSATB (r,")) passes only the functional 
form and serial correlation tests and are insignificant indicating that, foreign interest rates 
are exogenous. The error correction coefficient for the exchange rate (LZKSAR (eJ) 
associated with the PPP vector, is very significant although it fails the nonnality and 
heteroskedasticity diagnostic tests. The result indicates that Zambian exchange rates a.re 
endogenous and partly bears the brunt of short-run adjustment to restore long-term 
equilibrium after any shock to the system. Finally the error correction coefficients for the 
change in the foreign price equation (LSACPI ( p," )) associated with the two cointegrating 
vector, although very small are significant. 
The results of these tests also give an indication of Granger causality in the model. There is 
causality from the price differentials to the exchange rate and from the foreign interest 
rates to domestic interest rates. 
Forecast Error Variance Decompositions 
Variance decompositions allow for out of sample testing of Granger exogeneity or 
endogeneity of the dependant variable. By telling us the proportion of the change in the 
value of a variable in a given period due to its own shocks versus shocks to other variables 
VDCs help provide a measure of the extent to which a variable is exogenous in comparison 
with other variables in the system. A sample of the VDC tesults generated for all the 
variables domestic prices (LZACPI (p,)), foreign prices (LSACPI (p;J), exchange rate 
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(LZKSAR (eJ), domestic interest rate (LZAIB (r,)) and foreign interests (LSAIB (r;J), 
are included in Table 11 below. 
Table 13: 
Zambia: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions 
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Notes: The bold raced amcunts denote In percentage the variable's varl1nce explained by own shocks 
over the forecast horizon. 
Unlike for other countries where the exchange rate seems to be the most exogenous 
variable, for Zan1bia, the exchange rate (LZKSAR (eJ) is relatively endogenous with its 
own shocks explaining 57% of its movements over the forecast horizon. The exchange rate 
appears to respond to shocks in the domestic prices with exchange rate shocks accounting 
for 63% of domestic price movements. The foreign price is also relatively endogenous 
with its own shocks explaining 48% of variance over the forecast horizon. On the other 
hand, the domestic price and the foreign interest rate variables appear to be the most 
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exogenous. This is inferred as the greater part (92%) of both the domestic price and foreign 
interest rate shock/variance is being explained by its own innovations compared to own 
shocks contributing to explaining the rest of the variables' variances. The domestic interest 
is also largely exogenous as well. These findings seem to be compatible with VECM 
results. 
Impulse response functions 
Impulse response analyses are useful in that they can be used to estimate the time profile of 
the effect of ''particular" shocks to the variables or the cointegrating relations. The 
generated generalized impulse response analysis of the cointegrating vectors to shocks in 
the d<rmestic price (LZACPI (p,)) and the exchange rate (LZKSAR (e1)) equations are 
portrayed in Figure 5 below. 
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The first 2 Figures (A and B) show impulse response paths of the individual equations to 
one SE shock in the LZACPI (p;) and LZKSAR (e,) equations. Unlike for Zimbabwe and 
Botswana, effects of these shocks to individual equations do not persist forever. In fact 
they are dissipated between 2 to 3 years. The results are the same for shocks to equations 
for the other variables. This finding tends to contradict the unit root prope_rties ofthe-d~ta. 
Figures C and D show impulse response of cointegrating vectors to shocks in the domestic 
price (LZACPI ( p,)) and exchange rate (LZKSAR (eJ) respectively. The results slightly 
differ depending on the variable shocked. With domestic prices (LZACPI ( p,)), the shocks 
are slowly dissipated and the cointegrating vectors return to their equilibrium values in 
about 6 to 7 years for both the UJP and the PPP. When the. exchange rate (LZKSAR (eJ) is 
shocked, both the vector for the UIP relation and the PPP relation return to equilibrium 
after about 3 years (36 periods). Impulse response paths also vary when other variables are 
shocked. 
Persistence Profiles 
Figure 6 illustrates the persistence profiles for the two cointegrating vectors representing 
the PPP relation (CV!) and the U!P condition (CV2). 
2 
1 
Persistence Profile of the effect of a aystem-wlde shock to CV'(s) 
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NOTES: Tile variables in the VAR (2) model are p,,p;,e,,r, and r,•. The first 
colntegrating relation CVI is for the PPP and the second one CV2 is for the VIP and 
P., =(1,-l,-l,O,O)and P.,=(0,0,0,1,1) ,,. the PPP and UIP veetors 
respectively. The horizon is in months. 
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Unlike impulse response functions, persistence profiles measure the time profile of the 
effect of a system~wide shock on the cointegrating relations. Both, the estimated 
persistence profiles for the PPP and UIP return to their long-run equilibrium fairly quickly. 
Persistence profile of the PPP relation overshoots for_ barely a month then declines fairly 
rapidly, totally converging to zero within 12 months (I year). This behavior is what the 
founder of the PPP hypothesis Cassel believed should be. Comparatively, the U1P 
persistence profiles overshoots for about 3 months before declining also fairly quickly 
back to zero or equi~ibrium within 24 months (2 years). Our finding is unique in that the 
PPP performs much better than empirical literature suggest, that is, half lives of four to five 
years for long -run equilibrium to be restored after shocks to the system. 
Intercontinental Approach 
Using the AIC and SBC we select VAR (2). Diagnostic tests (LR test) for possible serial 
correlation in the residuals of the individual equation suggests that autocorrelation is not a 
pr0blem in the present application. Appendix Table 5 presents cointegration rank statistics 
defined by the maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistic respectively, together with the 
corresponding asymptotic critical values at the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels 
reproduced using VAR (2) and model (12) with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends. While the max:imwn eigenvalue statistic rejects the hypothesis that there are 
co integration relations between the six I (1) variables under investigation, the trace statistic 
suggests 2 cointegrating relationships at the 95% significance level. The trace statistics 
results are supported by the results of the HQC, which also select r = 2. These results are 
in conformity with the predicted confines of economic theory, that there should be two 
long rwi ( co integrating) relations namely the PPP and UIP relations defined as, Pt - e, -Pt * 
and r, - r,*, respectively. We therefore accept the results of the statistical analysis and set r 
= 2 for further analyses. 
We now examine the validity of the PPP and UIP hypothesis using the long-run structural 
modeling advanced in Pesaran and Shin (1997). The novel of this approach is that it 
enables us to test the validity of these hypotheses and to identify factors that might be 
responsible for their breakdown. The two cointegrating vectors associated with 
z; ={p,.e1,r,,p,",r/,po1,t) are denoted by p; =(ft01,P11 ,P21,PwP41,/J,1,P;1) and 
p; = (;J02,P12,P22,P32~P42 ,/J,2,P~) respectively, viewing Pt as explaining domestic 
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prices (PPP) and p; domestic interest rate (UIP). The first six elements are the coefficients 
of the I (I) variables and the last element (i.e., p., , i= l, 2) refers to the time trend. As 
exact identification of these vectors requires the impositions of two restrictions per vector, 
the following exactly identifying restrictions are chosen as constraints and do not impose 
any testable restrictions on the cointegrating VAR model: 
H,: P.=(~ 
Which produced the estimate: 
p e 
l l.3049 
P., ·- (3.5799) 
0 -0.9889 
(1.9262) 
LLe=869.74 
• 
• 
r 
0 
I 
0 
I 
p • 
-63.1!2 
(91.960) 
-29.673 
(49.477) 
:) • • • • • • 
• I r po 
44.526 -0.3190 0.0839 
(83.430) (1.0854) (0.1271) 
30.163 -0.1460 0.0460 
(44.886) (0.5825) (0.0684) 
where LLe (r = 2) is the maximized value of the log likelihood function for the justified 
case or subject to exactly identifying restrictions. Asymptotic errors are given in 
parentheses. 
We then proceeded to test a number of hypotheses using the above just~ identified model 
as a basic model and imposing over-identifying restrictions. First, since we do not expect 
these long -run relations to include a linear trend, we first test the co-trending hypothesis 
Ho,, namely that, p61 = p61 = 0 and represented by: 
• 
• 
0 
1 
Under Ho, the following estimates were obtained: 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
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l 
p e r p • • t r po 
1 -2.3601 0 15.986 -43.005 0.5803 0 
P.co = (1.8735) (25.465) (49.040) (!.0271) 
0 -1.0358 1 13.931 -18.212 (0.3531) 0 
(1.0542) (14.330) (27.599) (0.5790) 
LLro = 867 .46 
The log-likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing the two over-identifying restrictions for 
co-trending is computed to be 4.57 - 2(869.74-867.46), which is below the 0.05 critical 
value of the chi-squared (x2) distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. Hence the hypothesis 
that there are no linear trends in the cointegrating relations is not rejected although there 
was a linear trend in the underlying VAR model. 
Second, the hypothesis implied by the PPP and UIP theories that the level of oil prices do 
not enter these long-run relationships denoted by Hpo is tested. To conserve space, only the 
result.s of this hypothesis combined with the co trending hypothesis, ffto r. Hpo is, reported 
and it yields: 
p e r p • r' po t 
1 -2.0898 0 12.453 -34.507 0 0 
P,co,PO = (1.2919) (17.722) (32.3796) 
0 -0.8724 1 11.796 -13.067 0 0 
(0.7192) (9.8670) (18.032) 
LLro.po = 867.03 
The LR statistic associated with these 4 over-identifying restrictions is 5.43, and thus does 
not reject the Hoo r. Hpo hypothesis at conventional the 95 % critical level. Individual tests 
of Hpo undertaken separately from llco also produced similar results. Consequently tests for 
the validity of the PPP and UIP propositions are tested given Bro r, H,.,. 
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Under the UIP hypothesis given Hco fl Hpo: 
P. =(~ 
the estimate of which is: 
p 
1 
0 
LLm, = 855.83 
e 
-0.5969 
(none) 
0 
• 
0 
r 
0 
1 
D 
1 
p' 
• 
0 
-7.7581 
(none) 
0 
• 
-! 
r' 
0 
0 
-10.2131 
(4.5733) 
-1 
po I 
0 0 
0 0 
Again the LR statistic of 27.81 is well above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-squared 
distribution with 7 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the UIP hypothesis considered jointly 
with Hco '1 Hpo., is rejected. 
Similarly under the PPP hypothesis and H., r, H,,, 
p, =(~ -1 
• 
which produces the following estimate: 
p e r 
1 -1 0 
P.ppp = 
0 -0.4313 1 
(-0.1796) 
LL,,,= 859.74 
-1 
0 
1 
• p 
6.3561 
(2.5801) 
-1 0 
• • 
r' 
0 
0.9356 
(4.7339) 
0 
0 
po 
0 
0 
I 
0 
0 
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The LR statistic for testing the PPP hypothesis is 20.0 I, which is significant compared to 
the 0.05 critical value of the chi- squared distribution with 7 degrees of freedom (7 is the 
total number of over-identifying restrictions). Thus the hypothesis of the PPP Gointly with 
Hcof'"'I Hpo) is rejected at the 95 % significance: level. 
We therefore consider several modifications to the PPP hypothesis (denoted by Hppp•) that 
allow for the effect of either domestic interest rate or foreign interest rate or both on the 
real exchange rate to be unrestricted respectively. The following are the restrictions and the 
results: 
i) unrestricted foreigG interest: 
P.=(~ -1 0 -1 * 0 ~) Hl'l'P• • 1 • • 0 
which yeilds: 
• p e r p • r po t 
1 -1 0 -1 0.5368 0 0 
/3,/'/'I'• = (5.4747) 
, 
0 --0.4317 6.3618 1.1393 0 0 
(0.1796) (2.5797) (5.1754) 0 0 
LLeee• = 859.74 
The LR statistic for testing Hppp• with unrestricted foreign interest rate is 20.01, which is 
well above the 0.05 critical value of the x.2 with 6 degrees of freedom. So this modified 
PPP version is rejected. The modified PPP version with the unrestricted domestic interest 
and the that with unrestricted domestic and foreign interest were also rejected at the 
conventional 95% critical level 
. 
Tnking the unmodified versions of the PPP and UIP we finally estimated the cointegrating 
relations under the PPP and UIP over-identifying theory restrictions Gointly with Hoo r'I 
B,,): 
J 168 
P.PPJ',UIP =(~ -1 0 0 1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 i) 
The LR statistic of 36.12 is above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-squared distribution 
with 10 degrees of freedom. Thus the PPP and UIP hypothesis considered jointly with H., 
n Hpo is rejected at 95% level. 
The Vector Error correction Model 
Having tested the long-run relationships between the joint PPP and UIP, we move on to 
test the short- term dynamics of the system. Conditional on the above long-run estimates, 
which are the rejected theory estimates, we have the following expressions for the error 
correction terms: 
. . Pi z,-1 = P,-1 - e,-1 - P,-1 , 
where /jz,_, =~. which are I (0). 
To check the resultant model's statistical adequacy, the following VECM was estimated: 
where a,y and a21 are three dimensional vectors of adjustment (error correction) 
coefficients. The number of error correction equations in the present application is 3, 
corresponding to the jointly determined variables of the model namely domestic prices 
(LZACPI (p,)), exchange rate (LZAER (e1)) and domestic interest rates (LZATB (r, ). The 
estimates of these adjustment coefficients together with a nwnber of diagnostic tests are 
presented in Table 12 overleaf. 
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Zambia: 
Equation 
oLZACPl(p,) 
.6.LZAER(e,) 
.6.LZATB(r1) 
Table 14: 
Estimates of error correction coefficients and diagnostic statistics-
Intercontinental Approach 
a, a• R• %~(12) z:A•) z;(2) %~,(1) 
0.003 0.007 0.359 17.64 0.49 724.53 2.95 
(0.009) (0.012) [0.127] [0.483] [0.000] [0.086] 
0.13 -0.060 0.0992 9.95 0.61 3934.0 12.99 
(0.039) (0.050) [0.620] [0.804] [0.00] [0.000] 
0.003 -0.041 0.332 20.47 7.56 1245.2 1.72 
(0.010) (0.013) [0.059] [0.006] [0.00] [0.189] 
Noties: The ECM results are estimated by OLS based on cointegraling VAR (2). The two error 
correction terms are given by; 
t;1.s+1 = P1-1 - e,_1 - P,0-1 
The figures in(.) are estimated asymptotic standard errors wherea, those in [.] are the corresponding 
p -values. The bold fuced estimates denotes significance at 0.05 level. The diBgnostic tests are Chi 
squared statistics for the following; z.ic(I2) is the Lagrange multiplier statistic for testing the null of 
no serial correlation, x;.F (1) Is Ramsey's RESET test statislic, z1(2) is the Jarque- Bera statistic for 
testing the null of Gaussian errors, and z!s{I)is the statistic for testing the null or no 
heleroskedastlcity. The number in(.) Indicates the degrees or freedom, 
The equation for, the domestic price (LZACPI (pJ) passes the serial correlation, 
heteroskedasticity and functional fonn diagnostic tests but fails the normali~ · test. It also 
performs best explaining almost 36% of the price variation over the sample period. 
However, its error correction tenns associated with, the first cointegrating relation (or PPP) 
explaining long run price movements and, the second cointegration relation explaining the 
UIP condition are all insignificant and have the wrong signs, indicating non response to the 
last period's equilibrium error and hence domestic prices are exogenous. 
The domestic interest rate (LZATB (r)) equation also performs well passing 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity tests and explaining 0.33 of the price variation over 
the sample period. However, the error correction tenn associated with the second 
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cointegrating relation explaining domestic interest rate variation although it has the correct 
sign and is significant, it is statistically very small suggesting a crawling speed of 
convergence to equilibrium. It is the error correction tenn associated with exchange rate 
movements (LZAER(e)) in the PPP cointegrating relation, which is highly significant 
inferring 13% speed of convergence to restore long-run equilibrium. The exchange rate is 
therefore endogenous and bears the brunt of short-term adjustments. The finding is similar 
to the one obtained when using the intra-continental approach. 
Country summary and policy recommendations 
With the PPP it does not seem to matter which choice of numeraire currency is used to 
model Zambia's exchange rate as there is cointegration in both cases for the simple PPP as 
well as the joint PPP and UIP. The theory restrictions of proportionality and symmetry are 
however rejected in both cases. The results of the simple intra-continental UIP are more 
exciting a-, the proposition holds in its symmetry conditions. As pointed out for the 
Tanzanian case, this result is economically counter-intuitive, but again it could be because 
the exchange rate was liberalized in 1992. It is therefore recommended that fiscal planners 
and their economic advisers adopt the simple intra-continental UIP to manage their 
exchange rate regimes. The intercontinental UIP is rejected and accordfngly its use is not 
recommended. 
Another interesting conclusion is that Zambia's exchange rate is endogenous in that it 
moves to correct any disequilibrium in the joint long-run PPP and UIP. 
5.2.8 ZIMBABWE 
• Zimbabwe Simple PPP and UiP 
Intra~Continental Approach 
For the order of VAR tests, both the AIC aod SBC w,animously selects VAR (!). 
Diagnostic tests (LR test) for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual 
equation suggests that autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. 
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Cointegration results for simple PPP using and UIP using model (13) are presented in 
Appendix Table 2. 
PPP 
Both the maximwn eigenvalue and the trace statistics suggests r = 1. The hypothesis r = 0 
is rejected against r = 1, but the hypothesis that r = 1 cannot be rejected against r = 2 etc. 
Asswning r = 1 which is also in line with the PPP theory, we present the estimates of the 
cointegrating coefficients nonnalized on the coefficient of the domestic price (LZIMCPI 
(p)). The results of this just identifying restriction for the vector, p = (LZIMCPI (p), 
LZIDSAR (e), LSACPI (p')) are: 
fl, =[1~00 
(none) 
where LL =1994.2 
e 
-1.7722 
(0.4843) 
p 
. ) 
-0.7488 
(0.1457) 
The vector supports the PPP theory, as both domestic exchange rate and foreigt'. price have 
negative coefficients. Imposing over-identifying restrictions based on PPP theory we 
estimated, p,pP = (p - e - p ') = (I - I - 1 ). The PPP symmetry and proportionality 
restrictions were rejected, as the log-likelihood ratio statistic obtained of 14.81 was above 
the chi-square test vlith highly significant. The simple PPP therefore holds but not in its 
symmetry and proportionality conditions. 
UIP 
We use model (13) to test the validity of Zimbabwe UIP. TI1e simple UIP hypothesis was 
rejected, as there was no cointegration between domestic interest (ZIMTB (r)) rates and 
foreign interest rates (LSATB (r}). The cointegrating results are also presented in 
Appendix Table 2. 
International Approach 
For this approach we used equation (13) with unrestricted i11tercepts and no trends. For the 
tests fur order of VAR both the AIC and SBC selects VAR (2). Diagnostic tests (LR test) 
for possible serial correlation in the residuals of the individual equation suggests that 
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autocorrelation is not a problem in the present application. Cointegration results for simple 
PPP using and UIP using order ofV AR= 2 are presented in Appendix Table 3. 
PPP 
For the PPP both the maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistics suggest r = 2. The 
hypothesis r = 1 is rejected against r = 2, but the hypothesis that r = 2 cannot be rejected 
against r = 3. This result is in contradiction with the PPP hypothesis, which predicts that 
there should be only one cointegration relationship. lherefore in the absence of theory 
restrictions this result lacks meaningful economic interpretation. However the fact that the 
three variables are cointegrated means that causation in the Granger sense cannot be ruled 
out. Hence, we impose the PPP restrictions and test for the theory's validity. First, 
nonnalizing the vector on the coefficient of the domestic price (LZIMCPI (p)), and 
denoting the vector by ~ = (LZIMCPI()>), LZ!DSAR(e), LUSCPI()>)), we get: 
P, =[1.~00 
(none) 
e 
-0.8069 
(0.0581) 
p 
. J -1.2656 
(0.3835) 
where, LL = 2228.2 
The vector supports the PPP theory, as both domestic exchange rate and foreign price have 
negative coefficients of nearly equal to unity. Imposed over-identifying restrictions based 
on PPP theory where j3ppp = (p - e - p) = (1 - 1 - 1) were rejected at the 95% significance 
level, as the computed LR ratio statistic of 8.67 was significant compared to the chi~ 
squared distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. 
UIP 
The UIP theory rejected, as there is no cointegration between Zimbabwe interest rates and 
US interest rates. 
• Joint PPP and UIP 
Intra-Contincntul Approach 
Using VAR (2) and model (11) with unrestricted intercepts and no trend, both the 
maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistic suggest r = 1. The hypothesis of no 
cointegration (namely r = OJ is rejected against null hypothesis that there exists one 
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cointegrating relation (namely r = 1), but the hypothesis that r = I cannot be rejected 
against r = 2. The Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and the Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
(HQC) also favor r = 1, but the same is not true of Akaike infonnation criterion (Alt:) 
which selects r = 2. Considering these statistical results there is some ambiguity in 
choosing the nwnber of cointegrating relationships, although evidence weigh more in favor 
of one statistically significant co integration relationship among the five I (1) variables. But 
even this conclusion is in conflict with the long-run economic theory which states that, 
based on arbitrage in the conunodity and capital markets, we should expect two 
cointegrating relations (i.e., r = 2), the PPP relation: 
p1-e,-p,' -/(0) 
and the interest-rate arbitrage relation ( which is the long~run implication of the uncovered 
interest parity hypothesis): 
r,-r,*-I(O) 
Using Pesaran and Smith (1999)'s line of argument stated above (see Botswana analysis 
above), in this application it was deemed proper to set r = 2 for the purposes of further 
analyses in line with PPP and UIP theorems. 
Using Long-run structural modeling (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997) we first obtain estimates 
of the cointegrating coefficients (together with their asymptotic standard errors) 
normalized on the following identifying restrictions: 
/311 =l, /3 14 =0 He= 
P21 =O,P24 =I 
where we have denoted the two cointegrating vectors associated with coefficients of 
X, =1/J,,e,,r,,p; ,r,· J by, 
/31 = (/111 , /312 , /313 , /31, , /31, 1, /32 = ( /32i, /3,, , /313 , /324 , /3,, ), yielding (asymptotic 
standard errors are in brackets): 
Vector p e r p r 
/31 1 -0.2598 0 -0.7823 -2.1844 (1.3067) (0.1965) I? .2183) 
/3, 0 -0.80', 7 l 0.0026 0.2820 (0.95251 (0.1442) 11.6117) 
LL= 3771.4 
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The first vector represents the PPP condition and the exchange rate (LZlMCPI) and foreign 
price (LSACPI) estimates have the right signs although not equal to the expected 
magnitude of unity. The second vector stands for the UIP condition, but the foreign interest 
rate (LSATB) has the wrong sign. However, since the above exactly identifying 
restrictions do not impose any testable restrictions on the cointegrating VAR, over-
identifying restrictions based on the two long run theories under study were imposed on 
the cointegrating vectors in order to test their validity. 
The over-identifying restrictions based on the PPP theory, namely Prrr = (p, - e, - p/ -1 
(0) = l - I - I), produced the following maximum likelihood estimates: 
Vector p e r p r 
f3ppp = /3, I -1 0 -1 0 
/3, 0 -0.8729 l 0.0321 0.7488 
(1.3470) (0.2630) (2.9052) 
LL= 3765.3 
The log likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing the three over-identifying restrictions is 
computed to be 12.14, which is well above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-square 
distribution with 3 degrees of freedom, suggesting that the theory restrictions are rejected 
at conventional the 95% significance level. 
Using UIP theory restrictions we obtained: 
Vector p e r p r 
f3u,p = /3, 1 -1.5708 0 -0.7808 -0.1080 
10.3056\ 10.1068\ 11.5808\ 
/3, 0 0 1 0 -1 
LL= 3767.4 
The LR statistic of 8.02 obtained for testing the imposed UIP over-identifying restrictions 
is marginally above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-square distribution with 3 degrees of 
freedom. The UIP theory restrictions are therefore rejected. However the exchange rate 
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(LZ!MTB) and foreign price (LSACPI) in vector one have the right signs, but are neither 
of the same magnitude nor equal to unity, 
Subsequently the hypothesis testing for the over-identifying restrictions on the joint PPP 
and UIP were tested and also rejected at the 95% significance level. The LR obtained was 
20.17, which is way above the chi-squared distribution critical value at 0.05 with 6 degrees 
of freedom. However since these two cointegrating vectors (1, -1, -I, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0, I. 
-1) representing the PPP and UIP respectively, are consistent with theory restrictions, they 
were adopted for use in analyzing the short run dynamic properties of the model and for all 
further analyses. 
The Vector Error Correction Model 
Vector error correction modeling seeks to indicate the direction of Granger causality. The 
error correction coefficient represents the proportion by which the long-nm disequilibrium 
in the dependent variable is corrected in the short period. Results for vector error 
correction modeling are presented in table 1 overleaf 
The error correction terms from the domestic price (LZIMCPI (p)) all have the correct sign 
and pass the diagnostic tests for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. They are however 
small, indicating a very slow gravitation to restore long-ru equilibrium once shocked. 
Theory predicts that the error correction term must be significantly different from zero and 
the larger the equation's error correction coefficient (in absolute value), the faster the 
variable's return to its equilibrium once shocked. The results indicate that domestic prices 
are endogenous and partly bear the brunt of short~run adjustment to restore long-tenn 
equilibrium after any shock to the system. 
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Table 15: 
Zimbabwe: Estimates of e1Tor correction coefficients and diagnostic statistics-
Intra-Continental Approach 
Equation ;, 
~' 
&· xlc(12) x~,(1) x!(2) x!,(I) 
<>LZIMCPl(p,) -0.036 ·0.044 0.247 17.66 13.22 2849.5 0.78 
(0.006) (0.017) [O. 126] [0.00] [0.00] [0.376] 
6LZIDSAR(e1) ..(),018 0,008 0.047 14.98 26.51 285.59 30.21 
(0.022) (0.062) [0.242] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
,>LSACPl(p,') 0.004 -0.011 0.281 11.12 6.00 223.42 7.67 
(0.002) (0.005) [0.518] [0.014] [0.00] [0.006] 
.6.LZIMTB (r,) -0.007 ·0.004 0.135 33.39 1.96 350.35 18.26 
(0.003) (0.010) [0.001] [0.161] [0.00] [0.006] 
.6.LSATB(r,") 0.000 0.003 0.194 22.07 0.99 99.91 20.69 
(0.002) (0.006) [0.037] [0.319] [0.00] [0.000] 
Notes: The results are estimated by OLS based on co Integrating VAR (2) using the equation: 
Ax, = s + r1 Ax,_1 + a1 Pi x,_1 + a2 P2 x,_1 + e, 
where f)x1_1 =t;, which are I (0) and a 1 and a 2are five dimensional matrices or 
adjustment or feedback coefficients and the two error correction terms are given by; 
41.1+1 =p-e-p·, 
42.1+1 =r - r •. 
The figures In (.) arti estimated asymptotic standard erron whereas those In [.] an: the 
corresponding p -values. The bold faced estimates denote significance at 0.05 level. The 
diagnostic tests are Chi squared statistics for the following; zic(I2) is the Lagrange 
multiplier statistic for testing the null ofno serial co1·relation, z:F(1) is Ramsey's RESET test 
statistic, z!(2) is the Jarque- Bern statistic for testing the null of Gaussian errors, and 
z!6(1) is the statistic for testing the null of no beteroskedastlclty. The number In (.) indicates 
the degrees of freedom. 
Error correction coefficients for both domestic (LZIMTB (rJ) and foreign interest rate 
(LSATB (r,')) equations pass only the functional fonn test and fail all other tests. Their 
error correction tenns except the one for the domestic interest rate equation representing 
the first vector. are also insignificant indicating that interest rates are exogenous. Both 
error correction tenns for the exchange rate (LZIDSAR (e)) equation are also insignificant, 
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have the wrong signs and pass only the serial correlation test demonstrating that, exchange 
rates are relatively exogenous. The foreign price equation {LSACPI ( p; )) perfonns best, 
explaining 0.28 of the price variation over the sample period but the error correction tenns 
are insignificant. in addition, its correction coefficients are significant but very small 
indicating scanty gravitation to restore equilibrium when shocked. 
The results of these tests also give an indication of Granger causality in the model. There is 
causality from the exchange rate to the domestic prices. The domestic price is the most 
endogenous, 
Forecast Error Variance Decompositions 
Variance decompositions allow for out of sample testing of Granger exogeneity or 
endogeneity of the dependant variable and also provide a measure of the extent to which a 
variable is exogenous in comparison with other variables in the system. A sample of the 
VDCs, results generated for the variables LZIMCPI (p,), LSACPI (p;), LZJDSAR (e,), 
LZIMTB (r,) and LSATB (r,') are included in Table 14 below. 
The exchange rate seems to be the most exogenous variable. This is inferred as the greater 
part (92%) of its shocks is being explained by its own innovations at any forecast horizon, 
compared to own variance explained by shocks to the rest of the variables. The foreign 
interest and the domestic interest are ah~ relatively exogenous. On the other hand, the 
domestic price and foreign prices are relatively endogenous with their own shocks 
explaining 0.96 and 0.92 of own variances over the longest forecast horizon respectively. 
These results seem to be compatible with VECM results. Caution must be given though 
that voe results are only relative. 
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Table 16: 
Zimbabwe Variance Decomposition 
Geuenllzed Yonclil EM'Ol'nriu<e deNcip,olllol r.,,nn.,111, 
LZIMCl'l(p) willl uratridw b,lffttpD Hd •• lnah 
~ Forttlll Dnrftnu<l dm•podliu fornrillllo 
WACPl(l)wkll~llli-,rau•Nlnmib. 
HORIZON 
-~· """'"' """ """' ""m 
DORIZON UIMCPI UW>AA =a• 
""'"' 
u,m 
0 
" 
" 
" 
'" 
• 
., 
" 
w· 
" ,.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 
0,56 o.• 0.01 o.• 
o.a o.n 0.00 0.01 
0.11 o.• o.• O.Ql 
0.o7 0.81 •• Ml 
•• o.u o.• 0.01 
c ... ,~-FotfUSI Em:r ••rll•te decompodtloo r ... nrlable 
LZIDSAR(t) wltb Hrat:kkd lal~c· ud RO !mid&. 
e) 
o• 
O.oJ 
"' 
000 
0.00 
0.03 
• 
.. 
" 
" 
• 
• 
OJ 
" 
•t (,) 
000 
'"' 
,.oo 0.00 
0.00 0.00 O.N 0.03 
0.00 
'" 
0.47 0.14 
'"' 
0,0 o~ 
"' 
0.0l o• 0.14 o" 
0.00 • •• 
-
"' 
Geatnlhed , • ._.. lrn,rnrlaaco 4-•pllllllba fornmhlt 
LZIM'(B (t} ~ N...cricttd b,l<r<fPl:I ud N lndo, 
" 0.00 
o" 
o.oo 
"' 000 
•• 
IIOIUZON LZIMCPI 
'"""' 
LSACPI 
"""' 
""m HORIZON "™'" 
~,,.. u=• ..,..,. =m 
0 
" 
" 
" 
'" 
• 
" " 
•t ,,, 
0.00 ,.oo o.oi 0.00 
0.01 0.9l o.• 0.00 
00, o.• 000 0.00 
0.01 o.• o.• 0.00 
0.01 o ... 000 0.00 
0.01 
"' 
0.00 000 
Geatnliud Forccul [m,rvuia11te dtcomp0oltlo11 rornrlable 
I.SATB (,') wltb Hl'fflridod biln<:pl> ud IIO tra,U, 
(,') 
O.ot 
0.00 
0.00 
000 
0.00 
oro 
., ,. •J' 
" " • 0.00 0.00 0.00 ,.oo 0.00 
.. 000 000 000 o.9J 0.00 
.. 0.01 .. o o.oo 0.81 o.oo 
.. 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.81 0.00 
'" •• 
0,0 0.01 0.1S o.oo 
• 0.03 o.a 0.00 '" 
000 
HOIUZON =a• LZIDSAR LSACPJ w= =m 
0 
" 
" 
" 
• 
• 
., (q •t 
" 
e) 
o.oo 0.01 •• 000 ,.oo 
o.• O.ll 0.03 0.00 o• 
O.Ol 0.17 ••• "' 
0.88 
O.Ol 0.,0 0.00 
"' '" 0.00 o" 
'"' 
0,0] o.• 
0.00 OU o.os 000 
-
Notes: The bold faced amounts denote In percentage the variable's ,·ariance explained by own shocks 
over the forecast horizon 
Impulse Response Functions 
Impulse response analyses can be used to estimate the time profile of the effect of 
"particular" shocks to either the cointegrating relations or the individual eqautions. The 
generated generalized impulse response analysis of both the individual equations and the 
cointegrating vectors to shocks in the LZIMCPI (p,) and LZIDSAR (e,) equations are 
portrayed in Figure 7 overleaf. 
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1be first 2 figures A and B show impulse response paths on individual equations to one SE 
shock in the equations of the domestic price (LSACPI ( p; )) and exchange rate (LZJDSAR 
(eJ). It is evident that effects of the shocks to individual equations seem to persist forever 
confirming the variables' unit root properties. The results are the same for shocks to other 
variables. 
The last 2 figures C and D, show impulse response of cointegrating vectors to shocks in the 
LZIMCPI (p,) and LZIDSAR (e1) equations. Shocks in the domestic price (LZIMCPI (),)) 
are slowly dissipated and the cointegrating ver.tors return to their equilibrium values in 
about 3 years for the UIP and 5 years for the PPP (36 months and 60 months respectively). 
When the exchange rate (LZIDSAR (e)) is shocked, it takes a very long time for 
cointegrating Veiry long to return to their equilibrium conditions 
j 1so 
Persistence Profiles 
Unlike impu1se response :functions, which are not unique, persistence profiles are unique 
and measure the time profile of the effect of, a system-wide shock on the cointegrating 
relations. Because they are unique, persistence profiles also have the advantage that they 
do not require prior orthogonalization of the shocks. Figure 8 illustrates the persistence 
profiles. While the estimates of the PPP profiles converge to zero, that of the UIP seem to 
persist forever Persistence profile of the PPP relation overshoots for barely a month then 
declines to zero very slowly, totally converging to zero after 6 years. Sluggish though it is, 
the convergence of PPP to equilibrium is in sharp contrast to that of the UIP, which 
appears to persist forever. This could explain why the cointegration tests for the combined 
PPP and UIP suggested one, instead of two co integrating relations. In view of this finding 
it is not surprising to find that the validity of the UlP proposition has been generally 
rejected in the majority of previous empirical studies. 
Persistence Profile of the effect of a system-wide shock to CV'(s) 
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Zimbabwe Persistence Prordes 
The variables In the VAR (2) model are p"p,\e,,r, and r,". The lint 
cointegrating relation CVl is for the PPP and the second one CV2 is (or the UIP 
and /J,1 =(1,-1,-1, 0, 0) and /J,2 =(0, 0, 0, l, 1) are the PPP and VIP 
vectors respectively. The horizon is In months. 
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Intercontinental Approach 
Both the AIC and SBC selects optimal VAR (2). Diagnostic tests (LR test) for possible 
serial correlation in the residuals of the individual equation suggest that autocorrelation is 
not a problem in the present application. Appendix Table 5, presents Zimbabwe 
cointegration rank statistics defined by the eigenvalue and the trace statistic respectively, 
together with the corresponding asymptotic critical values at the 95 percent and 90 percent 
significance levels reproduced using VAR (2) and model (12). 
Both statistics accept the hypothesis that there is, at most one, cointegration relation 
between the six I (1) variables under investigation. Since the result'I are not in agreement 
with the predicted confines of economic theory that there should be two long run 
(cointegrating) relations, namely the PPP and UIP relations defined as p1 - e1 R p1 • and r1 -
rt* respectively, we set aside the results of the statistical analysis and adopt theory 
restrictions for further analyses. Consequently, we proceed as ifthere are two cointegrating 
relations. We will however return to analyze the statistical results that r = 1 later. 
We now examine the validity of the PPP and UIP hypothesis using the longMrun structural 
modeling technique advanced in Pesaran and Shin (1999). The novel of this approach is 
that it enables us to test the validity of these hypotheses and to identify factors that might 
be responsible for their breakdown. The two cointegrating vectors associated with 
z; =(,,1,e1,r,,p;,r,·,po1,t) are denoted by p; =(/JwPn,P11,P31,P41,P51,P:1) and 
p; = (;Jo2,P12,P22 ,P321P41,P52,P;i) respectively, viewing Pi" as explaining domestic 
prices and p; domestic interest rate. The first six elements are the coefficients of the, I (1) 
variables and the last element (i.e., p61 , i = l, 2) refers to the time trend. As exact 
identification of these vectors requires the impositions of two restrictions per vector, the 
following exactly identifying restrictions are chosen as constraints and do not impose any 
testable restrictions on the cointegrating VAR model; 
H,: P.=(~ • 
• 
0 
I 
• 
' 
• • :J 
' • 
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Which produced the estimate: 
p e r • • I p r po 
1 -0.7444 0 0.4487 -1.1703 -0.1207 -0.0056 
P.E = (0.1005) (0.5652) (0.8853) (0.0724) (0.0030) 
0 -0.3199 1 -0.7569 0.2884 -0.0550 0.0056 
(0.1061) (0.5761) (0.8803) (0.0610) (0.0032) 
LLE = 1880.0 
where LLE ( r = 2) is the maximized value of the log likelihood function for the justified 
case or subject to exact-identifying restrictions. Asymptotic errors are given in parentheses. 
We then proceeded to test a number of hypotheses using the above just- identified model 
as a basic model and imposing over-identifying restrictions. First, since we do not expect 
these long -run relations to include a linear trend, we first test the co-trending hypothesis 
Hco, namely that, ft51 = P62 = 0 and represented by: 
• 0 • • • 
• • • • 
Under Hco the following estimates were obtained: 
• p e r p • r po I 
1 -0.8988 0 -0.4660 -0.9260 -0.0613 0 
P.co = (0.0617) (0.2956) (1.3562) (0.0951) 
0 -0.1620 1 -0.0869 -0.1465 (0.0949) 0 
(0.0689) (0.3417) (!.5336) (0.1094) 
LLro = 1878.5 
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The log-likelihood ratio {LR) statistic for testing the two over-identifying restrictions for 
co-trending, is computed to be 2.98 - 2(1880.00-1878.SO) which is below the 0.05 critical 
value of the chi-squared (x.2) distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. Hence the hypothesis 
that there are no linear trends in the cointegrating relations is not rejected although there 
was a linear trend in the underlying VAR model. 
Second, the hypothesis implied by the PPP and UIP theories that the level of, oil prices do 
not enter these long-run relationships denoted by Hpo is tested. To conserve space, only the 
results of this hypothesis combined with the co trending hypothesis, H00 ri Hpo is reported 
and it yields: 
p e r p' • po I r 
I -0.9020 0 -0.4997 -1.4925 0 0 
P.co,fl(J = (0.5865) (0.2733) (1.1907) 
0 -0.1617 1 -0.0126 -1.0402 0 0 
(0.0861) (0.4100) (1.7340) 
LL00,,, = 1877.5 
The LR statistic associated with these 4 over-identifying restrictions is, 4.98, and thus does 
not reject the the H00 r. Hpo hypothesis at the 95 % critical level. Individual tests of Hpo 
undertaken seperately from Hco also produced similar results. Consequently tests for the 
validity of the PPP and UIP propositions are tested given H00ri Hpo. 
Under the UIP hypothesis given Heon Hp0: 
p, =(~ • 0 0 1 • • 0 -1 0 0 
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the estimate of which is: 
p e r p' • I r po 
I -0.9582 0 -0.4990 -1.5045 0 0 
ft.u,p = (0.0724) (0.2597) (1.1429) 
0 0 I 0 -1 0 0 
LLu1P = 1874.3 
Again the LR statistic of 11.35 is well below the 0.05 critical value of thechi-squared 
distribution with 7 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the UIP hypothesis considered jointly 
with Hco n Hpo., is not rejected. 
Similarly under the PPP hypothesis and H00 n Hpo: 
Hrrr: p, =(~ -1 
* 
The following estimate was produced: 
p e r 
jJ,ppp 1 -1 0 = 
0 -0.1587 1 
(-0.0902) 
LLppp = 1867.5 
-1 
0 
I 
• p 
0.1125 
(0.3152) 
-1 0 
* * 
• r 
0 
-1.1824 
(1.6811) 
0 
0 
po 
0 
0 
i) 
I 
0 
0 
The LR statistic for testing the PPP hypothesis is 25.09, which is insignificant compared to 
the 0.05 critical value of the chi· squared distribution with 7 degrees of freedom (7 is the 
total number of over-identifying restrictions). Thus the hypothesis of the PPP Gointly with 
Hoon Hpo) is rejected even at the 99 percent critical level 
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We therefore consider several modifications to the PPP hypothesis (denoted by Hppp"') that 
allow for the effect of either domestic interest rate or foreign interest rate or both on the 
real exchange rate to be unrestricted respectively. The following are the restrictions and 
results: 
i) unrestricted foreign interest: 
Hr,,. P.=(~ -1 0 -1 • 0 ~) • 1 • • 0 
which yeilds: 
• r' po I p e r p 
fJ.ppp. = 1 -1 0 -1 -5.0703 0 0 (I.8695) 
0 -0.1359 1 0.2596 0.3032 0 0 
(0.8587) (0.3157) (1.2943) 0 0 
LLppp• = 1870,0 
The LR statistic for testing Hppp• with unrestricted foreign interest rate is 20.08 which is 
well above the 0.05 critical value of the x..2 with 6 degrees of freedom. So this modified 
PPP version is rejected. 
ii) unrestricted domestic interest 
H"'' P.=(~ -1 • 
• 1 
which yeilds 
p e r p' 
1 -1 1.3921 
(0.4964) 
0 -0.2378 1 
(0.1263) 
LLppp• = 1869.5 
-1 0 
• • 
• r 
-1 
0.3744 
(0.2265) 
0 
0 
0 
po 
-2.2893 
(3.1067) 
I 
0 0 
0 0 
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The LR statistic for testing Hppp, with unrestricted foreign interest rate is 20.08 which is 
also above the 0.05 critical value of the r...2 with 6 degrees of freedom. So this second 
modified PPP version is also rejected. 
iii) unrestricted domestic and foreign interest: 
H,,,, P,=(: -1 • -1 
* 
1 • 
Which produced the following estimates: 
p e r p' 
P.ppp. = 1 -1 0.9987 -1 (0.4773) 
0 -0.2609 1 0.8028 
(0.2303) (0.6252) 
LL,,,,= 1871.3 
• 
• 
• r 
0 
0 
(-3.3360) 
(1.5767) 
--0.2350 
(3.2020) 
~) 
po I 
0 0 
0 0 
The log-likelihood ratio statistic for testing Hppp• with unrestricted foreign and domestic 
interest rate is 17.44 which is well above the 0.05 critical value of the x2 distribution with 5 
degrees of freedom. So this third modified PPP version is also rejected. 
Taking the unmodified PPP rejected version and the accepted UIP we finally estimated the 
cointegrating relations under the PPP and UIP over-identifying restrictions Gointly with 
Hco n Hp.o) represented by: 
p,PPP.UIP = (: 
-1 
0 
0 
1 
-1 
0 
0 
-1 
0 
0 
The LR statistic of 21.32 is above the 0.05 critical value of the chi-squared distribution 
with 10 degrees of freedom. Thus the PPP and UlP hypothesis considered jointly with Hco 
n Hpo is rejected at the 95% critical level. 
To confirm if with further restrictions to the joint PPP and UIP the joint hypotheses are 
accepted or not, several modified versions of the PPP allowing for the effects of domestic 
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or foreign interest rate variables and, UIP allowing for effects of domestic or foreign prices 
were tested. Results are not recorded here to save space but are available. Both 
modifications to the PPP either leaving the coefficient of foreign interest rate or domestic 
interest rate variable unrestricted [with the UIP over-identifying restrictions, 1j - r; =(1-1) 
holding], were rejected as the LR values obtained were all above the 0.05 critical value of 
the chi-squared distribution with 9 degrees of freed.om. However, modifications allowing 
for either the effects of the domestic prices or the foreign prices to the UIP relations (with 
the PPP over-identifying restrictions Pr -e, - p,• =1-1-1, holding) are accepted, 
The hypothesis testing the over-identified PPP [ p, - e, = p; =(1-1-1)) and the U!P with 
unrestricted foreign price coefficient, Hppp, UJP' is 
P.=(~ -1 0 0 1 -1 • 0 -1 0 0 ~) 
E~tirnates from the cointegrating relations of this over-identified PPP and modified UIP 
Gointly with H,/""\Hpo) are: 
p" • I p e r r po 
p•l'Pl',UIP• = 
1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1.2175 -1 0 0 
(0.9143) 
LLppp, UIP' = 1874.6 
The LR statistic is 10.86, which is well below the 95 percent critical value of the chi-
squared distribution with 9 degrees of freedom. Hence we are unable to reject the joint 
ove'"-identified PPP and modified UIP (allowing for the effects of foreign prices into the 
U!P equation)54 hypotheses. 
54 Similar results are obtained ir instead or the roreign price the coefficient of the domestic price is left 
unrestricted. The LR statistic obtained here ls 14,47, 
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Therefore given Zimbabwe data, it can be reasonably sunnised that, although the 
restrictions on both modified versions of the PPP are rejected when the PPP was tested on 
its own, the PPP is accepted when jointly tested with a modified version of the UIP 
allowing for the effects of either the foreign or the domestic price effects into the 
cointegrating relations. Thus when modeling their exchange rates based on the PPP and 
UIP, Zimbabwe policy makers should employ these two theorems jointly. 
The Vector Error Correction Model 
Conditional on the above long-run estimates, we have the following expressions for the 
error correction terms: 
fJ2z1_1 =r1_1 - r1~1 + 1.2175p,:1 • 
where (Jz,_, =/;, which are I (0). 
To check the resultant model's statistical adequacy, the following VECM was estimated: 
where a,y and a.2y are three dimensional vectors of adjustment (error correction) 
coefficients. The number of error correction equations in the present application is 3, 
corresponding to the jointly detennined variables of the model namely domestic prices 
(ZIMCPI (p,)), exchange rate (ZIMER (e1)) and domestic interest rates (ZIMTB (r, )). The 
estimates of these adjustment coefficients together with a number of diagnostic test 
statistics are presented in Table 15, below. 
The equation for the change in domestic prices (LZIMCPI (j,)) passes most of the 
diagnostic tests except the normality test, with the equation also performing best in 
explaining 0.26 of the price variation over the sample period. Its error oorrection tenn 
associated with the first cointegrating relation explaining long run price movements (or 
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PPP), has a significant but small negative impact on current prices, suggesting a very slow 
speed of convergence to equilibrium for Zimbabwe prices in response to the domestic 
interest rate and the exchange rate. Domestic prices are therefore relatively endogenous. 
The equation for change in domestic interest rates (LZIMTB (r)) performs the worst failing 
all diagnostic tests, except the functional form tests. Its error correction terms are 
insignificant. The error correction terms associated with the exchange rate (LZIMER (e)) 
are all very small also indicating slow response to long run equilibrium once shocked 
Table 17: 
Zimbabwe: Reduced Form Estimates of Error Correction Coefficients and 
Diagnostic Statistics- Intercontinental Approach 
Equation a,, a,, R' x;,,(12) x:,(1) z!(2) 
tiZIMCPI(p,) -0.053 -0.032 0.257 17.43 3.47 2717.8 
(0.009) (0.008) [0.134] [0.063] [0.00] 
tiZIMER(e,) 0.028 0.035 0.063 20.74 I.61 1144.2 
(0.028) (0.024) [0.054] [0.205] [0.00] 
tiZIMTB (r,) -0.013 -0.006 0.149 33.37 0.40 360.75 
(0.005) (0.005) [0.001] [0.525] [0.00] 
z~,(1) 
0,38 
[0.536] 
18.58 
[0.000] 
16.00 
[0.00] 
Notes: The ECM results are estimated by Oi..S based on colntegratlng VAR (2). The two error 
correction terms are given by; 
i:1,1+1 = P,--1 - e,_1 - p;_1 
The figures in(.) are estimated asymptotic standard errors whereas those in [.] are the corresponding 
p -values. The bold faced estimates denotes significance at 0.05 level. The diagnostic tests are Chi 
squared statistics for the following; zk (12) is the Lagrange multiplier statistic ror testing the null or 
no serial correlation, z;F (1) is Ramsey's RESET test statistic, z!(2) is the Jarque- Bera statistic for 
testing the null of Gaussian errors, nnd z!E(I)is the statistic for testing the null of no 
heteroskedastklty. The number in(.) indicates the degrees offreedom. 
We now return to consider the estimation results under cointegration rank r = 1, which is 
what the statistical results suggested (see Appendix Table 5). For this scenario we express, 
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z,• = (Pt,e,,r,,p; ,r,",po1,t) by P.=(p"p2 ,p3,p4 ,Ps ,p6 ,P1r ). Under the exact-identifying 
normalizing restriction domestic price (LZIMCPI (p)) is equal to one, i.e., P1 = 1, we 
obtained the following estimates: 
p e r • p • r po I 
p, = 
1 -0.83407 0.2800 0.2367 -1.0895 -0.1361 -0.1361 
(0.1808) (0.5421) (0.7209) (1.0022) (0.0793) (0.0042) 
LL= 1875.2 
Imposing the restrictions implied by Hco r"\ Hpo yields: 
p r • • I p r po 
p, = 
I -0.9648 0.3878 -0.5047 -1.8959 0 0 
(0.735) (0.4617) (0.2628) (1.0265) 0 0 
LL= 1873.9 
The LR for these two restrictions is 2.42, which is be]ow the 95 percent critica1 value of 
the chi-squared distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. These restrictions are therefore 
accepted. Further imposing the restrictions that the coefficients of e, = p,"= -1 
namely p, and p, = -1 as indicated by the PPP hypothesis are strongly rejected. Modified 
PPP restrictions where in addition to the PPP over-identifying restrictions ( combined with 
Hco r"\ Hpo) either the domestic interest rate or the foreign interest rate is unrestricted were 
also rejected. However modifications with the following restrictions are accepted (both 
domestic and foreign interest rates are unrestricted): 
Hppp : p, =(! -1 * -1 • 0 o) 
and it yields: 
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p e 
/3.ppp = 1 
-1 
r 
0.9843 
(0.4038) 
p' 
-1 
r' 
-3.3969 
(1.3296) 
po 
0 
t 
LL= 1870.4 
0 
Next we assumed that the single cointegrating relationship in fact represents the UIP 
hypothesis. Normalizing on the coefficient of rr and estimating the cointegrating relation 
subject to U1P restrictions (jointly with Hco r. Hpo), namely P3 =1 and 
/31 = /3, = /34 = /3, = /3,r =0, we obtrJn: 
/J,u,, =(0 o 1 o -1 o o) LL= 1854.9 
The LR statistic for testing these six (6) restrictions is equal to 40.57 and therefore strongly 
rejects the UIP hypothesis if r = 1. Further modifications to the UIP were also rejected. 
One can conclude that results will differ depending on whether one chooses r = 1 or r = 2. 
With r = 1, the modified version of the PPP where interest rate differentials are 
unrestricted appear to be compatible with the data, 
Country summary and policy recommendations 
As an overall conclusion on Zimbabwe cointegration findings, it does appear as though the 
simple PPP does hold regardless of whether the foreign country is within the continent or 
outside. However, it does not hold in its strict sense i.e., in its symmetry and 
proportionality conditions. The same is true for the joint PPP and UIP. However, when the 
joint UIP and PPP model is used several modifications must be made to either the PPP or 
UIP propositions (as a1ready discussed above) in order to yield optimal results. The 
validity of the UIP proposition is rejected regardless of whether the foreign country is 
within or outside the continent. 
5,2,9 Summary/Findings 
Although in almost every case except for Mauritius, the weak form PPP and joint PPP and 
UIP propositions were found valid as evidenced by the support for cointegration, the 
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theory restrictions based on the symmetry and proportionality conditions were mostly 
rejected. Results for the simple UIP are less favorable as generally the hypothesis was 
rejected except for a few countries. This conclusion holds irrespective of whether the intra-
continental or the intercontinental of approach was used. The choice of numeraire country 
when testing the PPP therefore generally does not seem to matter. 
The resounding rejection of proportionality and symmetry conditions for the PPP and UIP 
in almost every country with significant cointegrating vectors, is in line with previous 
findings (see Cheung and Lai (1993b) using a different set of countries). This rejection of 
the theories' symmetry and proportionality restrictions could be attributed to the fact that 
the asymptotic critical values used are not suitable in small samples. A recommendation 
for further studies would be to use asymptotic critical values adjusted for small samples. 
Also as some authors for example Taylor (1988) have argued, although symmetry and 
proportionality may apply to the exchange rates and certain theoretical aggregate price 
series, they may not apply when measured aggregate price series are used because of 
measurement error and time series noise and, perhaps because of the effect of tariffs and 
transport costs. Taylor (2000) also concluded that the large deviations from the PPP (and 
we add the U/P), during the current floating exchange rates, are attributable to larger 
shocks to the real-exchange rate process in such episodes. 
The results of the Johansen procedure therefore only provide a weak empirical support for 
the PPP and UIP where cointegratbn exists but does not assist us to draw conclusions 
based on theory restrictions. It is long-run structW'al modeling, which then helps us to draw 
structural conclusions on the validity of these international parity hypotheses in their 
symmetry and proportionality conditions. 
Other interesting observations were made (only for the intra-continental approach) on the 
different dynamic properties of our model as well as the different speeds of convergence 
when the VECM, forecast error variance decompositions, impulse response functions and 
persistence profiles were examined. The results obtained were as different as the nwnber 
of countries tested. Overall however, the VECM and variance decompositions results 
generally showed the exchange rate as the leading variable and thus relatively the most 
exogenous in the Granger sense. A notable exception was for Zambia where the exchange 
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rate actually adjusts to restore equilibrium and hence is relatively the most endogenous 
variable. 
The generalized impulse response paths differed between the countries depending on the 
variable shocked but the general observation was that shocks to individual variables persist 
forever, a finding which confirms the unit roots tests results. Impulse response of 
cointegrating vectors to shocks to different variables however, are on1y temporary and 
eventually dissipate at different speeds for each of the cointegrating vectors representing 
the PPP and UlP, as well as for each country included in the sample. 
Results for the persistence profiles, which provide information on the speed with which the 
different relations on the model are shocked, will return to their long-run equilibria 
indicated that shocks do not persist forever. However the time it takes for the system to 
return to equilibriwn once shocked differed from country to country and was also different 
between the PPP and UIP vectors ranging from lyear for Zambia's PPP to more than 12 
years for Zimbabwe UJP. The fact that Persistence Profiles for the PPP and UIP 
rr.lationships converge to zero is in line with our conclusions based on fonnal statistical 
tests that that the PPP and UIP long-run relationships does contain cointegrating properties. 
These results are consistent with, those found in literature (see Garratt and et al (2001), 
Rogoff ( 1996) and Johansen and Juselius (1992)). 
An interesting finding though is that some PPP half-lives reported here for Botswana and 
Tanzania are shorter than the 4-5 years reported in most empirical literature. However, the 
fact that most of the literature is on industrialized countries with much lower inflation rates 
could explain this difference. Finally the fact that persistence profiles show that effects of 
shocks do not persist forever, rules out the possibility that a contradictory monetary policy 
can permanently shift the interest rate differential or a country's exchange rate for that 
matter, a phenomenon reported in Eichanbaum and Evans (1995), cited in Garratt et al 
(2001). 
Overall, our general finding is that the PPP and the joint PPP and UIP propositions are 
valid for the SADC but only in th~r weak form as evidenced by cointegration. Shocks to 
these long-run relationships do not persist forever but neither do they dissipate 
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immediately. The validity if the UIP is not is not conclusive as the theorem holds in 
exceptional cases for those countries with strong economic ties. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Arguably the dictates of data availability were the most challenging limitation. Given these 
data limitations the whole empirical modeling was fraught with difficulties, which led to 
some unnecessary delays. Also, because of this, the empirical undertaking of robustness 
checks, by making use of different price indices and data frequencies and or different 
sample periods was impinged upon, and therefore could not done. Albeit all this did not 
compromise the resultant quality of the analysis. It also did not have adverse effects on 
achieving the intended research purpose, as the findings are quite informative. 
There is however a need to carry out more research using a longer sample data series as 
well as different frequency data. It will be also interesting to use the panel approach as 
opposed to the country by country analysis and see if better econometric results can found 
especially in as far as ascertaining the validity of the symmetry and proportionality 
conditions for the two parity theorems in Southern Africa. 
Another recommendation as mentioned in the above chapter is for further studies to use 
asymptotic critical values adjusted for small samples in an attempt to find out if the 
theories' restrictions can be accepted. 
We also recommend that further studies be carried out on the same countries using data 
which include a variable which follows a stationary process to capture short run variations 
in, transport costs, infonnation disparities and the effects of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in 
the model specification for the PPP. For the UIP model specification, a variable, which 
follows the stationary process to capture risk premium associated with the effects of 
tOreign exchange uncertainties on risk-averse agents, should be added. 
Finally another recommended way to test the PPP and UIP will be to test it in a more 
complete model of macroeconomy incorporating feedbacks and interactions omitted in 
partial analyses like real money balances and foreign output. A good example is found in 
Garratt and et al (2001), where using UK data, they demonstrate that the novelty of such a 
long-run structural model has the advantage sluued by all VAR models in that it is able to 
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capture complicated dynamic relationships in the data, while at the same time it 
incorporates theory-consistent long-run properties in a transparent manner. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the validity of the PPP and UIP international parity theorems in 
Southern Africa either in their simple fonns or jointly using data from eight SADC 
countries. Another objective was also to establish whether the speed of convergence back 
to equilibrium once the system is shocked, is the same for all countries. The investigation 
was carried out using the cross national and the intercontinental approaches respectively. It 
was also the aim of the thesis to establish whether when testing the validity of these 
theorems, the results are influenced by the choice of the foreign country. 
The novelty of our research into the PPP and UIP also lies in the choice of the econometric 
model, which we used. Reported results use cointegration techniques advanced by 
Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990,1992) to establish the number of 
cointegrating vectors. Since in a multivariate framework, such as the one given by the PPP 
and UIP models, a vector error correction model may contain multiple cointegrating 
vectors, a question arises as to whether one can associate all of them with the exchange 
rate models or otherwise which vector is identified with it and what is the interpretation 
given to the others. Thus following the long-run structural modeling analysis developed by 
Pesaran and Shin (1997), a technique, which incorporates long-run structural relationships 
in an otherwise unrestricted autoreggressive model, we test the validity of the PPP and UIP 
theories in their symmetry and proportionality conditions by imposing theory restrictions 
on the coefficients of the accepted cointegrating vectors. 
Subsequently, for the intra-continental approach the long- run model was then subjected to 
Granger causality, generalized error varim1ce decompositions, generalized impulse 
response and persistence profile analysis, in the context of a vector error correction 
framework, with the view of finding more about the dynamic properties of these theories 
over the sample period in SADC counties. 
Firstly Mth the simple PPP we found evidence of statistically significant cointegrating 
vectors among the data sets for all countries tested except Mauritius. Titls finding of 
cointegration suggests that the PPP variables move together in the long run thus attesting 
to the validity of what we tenned the validity of a weak fonn PPP in the SADC; a pleasing 
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finding considering the wide usage of the theory in Southern Africa. However there are 
quite a number of perversely signed and statistically significant coefficients. Also for all 
those countries where there were fow1d cointegrating vectors, the theory restrictions of 
symmetry and proportionality conditions were mostly rejected. With the simple UIP results 
were less favorable as cointegration was only found in three out of the 8 countries. 
Secondly using the joint PPP and UIP model, the variables under investigation exhibited 
signs of cointegration except for Mauritius, indicating the existence of a long-tenn 
relations},Jp. However theory restrictions were generally rejected except for a few 
countries. Tli·erefore, this study like most studies using post-Bretton woods data sets fail to 
reject the nuli' hypothesis of non-cointegration of prices interest rates and the exchange 
rates but the estimated cointegrating vectors typically violate the symmetry and 
proportionality implied by the PPP and UIP in most cases. 
1birdly, using the intra-continental approach, the common conclusions of this research is 
that the exchange rates contain sizable mean reverting components but that this mean 
reversion vary between countries but is generally quite slow as indicated by the error 
correction tenns. Deviations from the PPP are persistent but in the end largely disappear as 
evidenced by the persistence profiles and impulse response analysis. 
Forth, regarding the issue of whether the PPP and UIP hold better for countries within the 
continent than those across continents, we conclude that except for countries with very 
strong trade and economic links the choice of foreign country does not seem to matter. 
Overall we surmise that when we compare our findings to those in empirical literature, our 
conclusions lean more towards those whose findings support the validity of the PPP. We 
however observe that empirical evidence on the PPP and the joint PPP and U1P appears to 
be sensitive to the data set used and the way in which the analysis is conducted. 
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I APPENDICES 
DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
The prices, interest rates and exchange rates data used in this paper are monthly, spanning 
from January 1979 to May 2000. All data used was obtained from Financial Data 
Company, in California, USA. For some countries, data either for interest rates series or 
for the consumer price index was not available for the whole sample period and so the 
sample periods for these countries, had to be reduced (see data table below). Sample 
periods varied for individual countries with Mauritius having the shortest sample period 
spanning from June 1996 to May 2001. 
The nominal exchange rate is defined as the price of foreign currency (US dollar or South 
African rand) in tenns of the home currency, so an increase in the nominal exchange rate 
implies depreciation. The exchange rate used is the end of month, ruling nominal exchange 
rate. Price series is Consumer Price Index (CPI). For interest rates, the 3 months Treasury 
Bill (TB) rate was used except for Botswana, Swaziland and Tanzania where the Deposit 
rate was used as a proxy for the TB rate. 
Data table 
COUNTRY Data Sample 
Botswana Jaouary 1979-May2001 
Mauritius June 1996-May2001 
Namibia Jaouary 1991-December 2000 
South Africa January 1979-May2001 
Swaziland January 1979 - December 2000 
Tanzania January 1993 - December 2000 
Zambia January 1985-December 1999 
Zimbabwe January 1979 - December 1999 
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Appendix Table I: 
UNIT ROOTS TESTS RESULTS 
TgtS!!!!!lla 
v""", ADF. ADF, PP. PP, ADP. PP, C•""'""" Dacrlpt/.on 
,-, '-= Finl mtrumct J(O)ORJ(I) 
World Oil Price 
{Unit Root Ulg- 6) 1-2.sn7> (.J.4283) (·2.8714) (.J.427?) (-2.8727) (-2.8724) 
In Oil Price -2.2297 ·2.4352 -2.7752 -3.1478 -7.3082 -13.7445 1(1) Los ofWodd Oil Price 
1. United SUlles 
(Unlt Root L•g •6) (-2.8727) (-J.4283) {·2,8724) (-3.4279) (-2.8727) (-2.8724) 
lnUSCPI -0.6948 ·2.9494 ·S.4315 -6.5139 -3.8641 -8.2923 1(1) LogolUSConswuerPrico I~ 
In USTB 
-1.3588 ·2.3669 -1.6697 -2.9004 -8.1545 -12.6569 /(1) LogofUST.-..yBill Rate 
2, Bol!IWIDI 
(UnltRootUg-6) (-2.8717) (-3.4283) (·l.8724) (-3,4279) (-2.8717) (-2.8724) 
InBCPI -1.9507 -0.4247 -2.5403 -1.0128 -6.1563 -13.7008 I (I) Log ofllcmw,lna PriCII index 
lnBDR 
-25829 -24765 ·2.4258 -2.3343 -5.9841 -20.0318 /(/) Log: ofeotsw..ia Depos~ R4le 
In BER -0.0733 ·1.9865 -0.0453 -2.2468 -5.7700 -14.1280 1(1) Los oteouwana us Exchan&o Jl$ 
lnBPSAR -1.4418 -2.0579 -1.4028 -2.6307 -8.4973 -21.7400 1(1) Los afBoUwmaSA l!xchangc Rate 
.3, M1uritius 
(Unit Root L1go•4) {·2.9101) {-3,4849) (-2.9069) (-3,4301) (-2.9109) (-2.9077) 
InMCPI -2.3835 -2.1884 -1.7908 -1.1792 -3.8984 -8.3147 1(1) Los arMauntiUlPriee index 
I,MTB ·1.8958 ·1.9690 -1.9114 -1.9215 -3.2463 -8.6503 1(1) Log of Treasury Bill Rate 
In MER -0.4755 -1.8178 -0.7409 ·1.9725 -3.2711 -7.3969 l(I) Log ofMairitilWUS l!wi,,,ae Raio 
TnMRSAR -0.4755 -1.8178 ·l.9114 -1.9215 -3.2712 -8.6503 1(1) Log ofMouritilWSA l!xchanBe )lab, 
4.N1mlbl1 
(Unit Root Lag-12) (·:Z.8884) (-3.4519) {-:Z.8859) (-3.4478) (-:Z.8887) (-2.88~) 
lnNCPI -0.5511 -2.0698 -2.3357 -3.1920 4.1338 -9.2649 1(1) LogofNamibi,.Pricc,jnclo,c 
lnNTB -1.5869 -1.5096 -1.3362 -1.6836 -3.0940 -9.9612 1(1) LosofTrcasuryBill Rate 
InNER 0.5179 ·2.5952 0.4084 2.2895 -3.8087 -8.4024 1(1) Los uf'NamibWUS ExchanBO \!alO 
lnNDSAR ·25833 -25150 -11.3225 -11.3020 -3.7720 42.5113 1(0) Los al"N,mibial SA Ellchana• Rate 
Notes: 
(I) All level form values are converted to their natural logarithms, @CPI (Consumer Price Index) 
U the log of relative prices; @TB (Trea~ury Bill Rate) or @DR (Deposit Rate) is the log or 
interest rate; @ER Is the log of the nominal exchange rate against the US dollar and,@SAR is 
the log of the nominal exchange rate against the South African Rand, Where@ represents the 
Initials for each respective country. 
(2) The ADF and PP are for Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests, respectively. 
ADFuand PPu are for the model with a constant term but no time trend, ADF1 and PP1 are for 
the model with a constant term or Intercept and a time trend. Statistics are computed using 
varying lag lengths (as indicated in bold italics for each country in the table) regressions. The 
95% critical values for the statistics 11re in(.), adjacent to the lag length. 
(3) No ADF1 and PP1 statUtics are reported for the first differences because there is no significant 
time trend in the first differences of the variables. 
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Appendix Table 1: Continued 
UNIT ROOTS TESTS RESULTS 
Tut SJ!tblls, 
ADF. ADF, PP. PP1 
l.nd F~m, 
S. Soutb Arrlc1 
{Unit Root Llg• 6) {·2.8727) {.J.4283) (·2.8724) (.J.417') 
In SACPI 
In SATB 
!nSAER 
6.Swuiland 
-3.1758 1.6413 
-2.6226 -1.4248 
-0.1880 -1.8201 
-5.6098 
-2.1362 
-0.1445 
1.9893 
·1.9571 
·2.3382 
(Unit Rool Llg:•6) (·2.8727) (..J.4283) (·l.8714) (.J.4279) 
InSWCPJ 
lnSWfB 
lnSWER 
lnSLSAR 
7, Tanzanl• 
-1.8728 .1.4049 -2.1951 
·2.7950 -2.7010 ·2.0956 
-0.2825 -1.7929 -0.1988 
·5.4474 -5.7627 ·8.9428 
-2.4379 
-1.9928 
·2.3350 
-9.0911 
(Uni! Rool Laa: •6) (-2.8727) (..J,4283) (-2.8724) (-1427') 
!nTCPI 
lnTDR 
In.ER 
lnTSSAR 
8. Zambia 
-4.1715 -2.6485 
-0.9529 2.1457 
-1.9451 -3.3670 
-1.3798 -3.0140 
-1.7100 
-0.8006 
.3.3390 
-1.7884 
-2.1718 
-2.0181 
-3.7838 
·2.8521 
(Unit Root L1g •6) (·2.lln7) (-J.418J) (·2.8724) (-3.4279) 
lnZACPI 
lnZATB 
lnZAER 
InZKSAR 
9. Zin1b1bwt 
-1.5510 
-2.0060 
l.46SS 
-1.7280 
-0.3512 
·1.9096 
1.0733 
-0.911S 
-1.6366 
-2.2939 
1.2044 
-1.3601 
0.4091 
-2.2826 
-l.3n6 
-1.2957 
{Unit Root Lag •6) (·2.8727) (.J.4283) (·2.872-1) (-3,427') 
lnZIM 
lnZIMTB 
lnZIMER 
lnZIDSAR 
Notes: 
3.3578 
0.9146 
1.7110 
1.5578 
0.2184 
-0.9500 
-1.4280 
-1.0208 
4.2285 
1.7099 
1.7269 
1.0234 
0.5946 
-0.9410 
-1.6316 
·1.3525 
(-1.8727) (·1.3'724) 
-3.6358 ·12.1127 
·5.5664 -11.1153 
-6.3911 ·15.4969 
(·2.8727) (-2.8724) 
-1.n« -21.4189 
-4.6425 -13.6045 
-6.2929 -14.9760 
-9.2836 -25.0204 
(·2.8727) (-2.8724) 
-3.4253 -6.9698 
-3.4855 -1.n55 
-4.5248 -8.8747 
-3.7194 -9.2999 
(-2.8727) (-2.8724) 
-2.9966 -7.0848 
-5.8372 -7.4568 
-5.3020 -13.9014 
-6.2607 -13.2112 
(-2.1727) (-2.1714) 
-4.6502 -12.5257 
-3.0302 -11.3639 
-6.0376 -15.1600 
·7.1449 ·14.6635 
c ....... 
l(O)ORl(I) 
I(/) 
l(I) 
1(1) 
1(1) 
l(I) 
l(I) 
I~) 
1(1) 
1(1) 
1(1) 
l(I) 
l(I) 
/(/) 
l(J) 
1(1) 
/(I) 
l(J) 
I (J) 
1(1) 
Lea ofSoulh Africa Price indoi< 
L08 olSwlh Af,ie,. Tr;iasu,y Bill ltatc 
Los olSoulh Afncw"US Exchlna<, Rate 
Lea ofSwuillnd Price index 
Lea ofSwu:iland D<po,il ltatc 
L"8 ofSwuil,nd./ US E><tbq,t Rate 
L08 oflWIZihndl SA ElCbanQo Raio 
Lqs ofTonmul. l'riec ind.eol 
Lea ot'TIIIZIIUI Deposit Ru 
LctotTonnnilUS £xctwweltatc 
L"8olT1N811ilSA~Rlto 
L"8 olZlmbil Priec incb 
Loil ofZlmbiaTrauy Bill RAle 
L"8 olloaibia t1JS l!xwni;ie ~ 
L<>ifilZlmbilfSA ~Ra!C 
L"8 oiZimbun Price inda 
L08 f!IZimi.tiw. Tniuury Bill RAle 
L"8 f!IZ=i.bws t1JS l!>.chanao R&a! 
L"8 f!IZilzlbobwt,I SA Euhmoao R.uo 
(1) All level form values are converted to their natural logarithms. @CPI (Consumer Price Index) 
Is the log or relative prices; @TB (Treasury Bill Rate) or @DR (Deposit Rate) Is the log of 
interest rate; @ER i5 the log oftbe nominal exchange race against the US dollar and,@SAR Is 
the log of the nominal exchange rate agelnst the South African Rand, Where@ represents the 
initials for each respective country. 
(2) The ADF and PP are for Augmented Dickey-Fuller Mnd Phillips-Perron tetts. resp«tlvely. 
ADFuand PP. are for the model with a constant tum but no time trend. ADF1 and PP1 are for 
the model wilh a constant term or Intercept and a time trend, Statistics are computed uslna 
verylng lag lengths (as indicated In bold Italics for each country In the table) regressions. The 
95% critlcel values for the statistics are In (.), adjacent to the lag length. 
(3) No ADF1 and PP1 statistics are reported for the first dlffeHnces because there Is no sl&nlficant 
time trend in the first differences oftbe variables. 
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Appendix Ta.hie 2: 
Johansen's Cointegration Rank Test Statistics for the Simple PPP a:i :I UIP Hypotheses 
applied to SADC Countries data over the period 1979 (ml) -2001 (mS) 
'INTRA-CONTINENTAL APPROACH 
Co11atry aomr .... Mlarttlil1 
""""' 
Soaltl Africa S'lr..aud 
·--
Zt11bl:a 7Jlllblltnn ,s" Oft 
"""" 
:tedl•1 fu Slmple l!l?1'! 
Mulmam Elf:ta' Stltbtk 
H, H, 
r = 0 
'• I 51,44• 8.27 28.3&• 40.39• 107.28• 21.12 19.0l 
r<=l '•2 20.12• 6.!iO 15.66' 13.37 .. J4,09H ..... . ... 
r<*'2 '., 1.63 1.60 1.92 6.40 3.63 •01 .. 
Tnce Stalhtic 
"• 
H, 
'. 0 '• I 73.19• 16.37 45.97' 60.]6• 125.0J• ..... ,.,. 
,<•\ ,~2 21.1s• 8.10 17.58"' 19.77' 17.72" 17.86 15.7S 
r<=2 ,_, 1.6] 1.60 1.92 6.40 ].63 
'" 
.. 
A.IC Crittrioll ,-2 ,-o ,., ,., ,., 
SBC Criterion ,., r=O ,-2 ,• I ,•I 
JIQC Criterion ,-2 ,•o ,., ,., ,., 
:rc.1•1 ro~ Sli:apll tlll! 
Ma1lmam Ell,m' Statistic 
"• 
H, 
r = 0 
'• I 7.34 
'" 
20.03' JS.14' 4.17 9.07 S,74 \US .... 
,<• \ '•2 6.S5 .. l.SS l,SS 6.6]U 0.6 7.Jg.• 1.89 &07 .. 
Tract Statlstlt 
H, H, 
'. 0 '• I ll9 m6 23.62' 21.78• 4.77 1626 .. 7.64 17.16 15.7S 
«• I ,_2 6.ssu 3.85 3.SS 6.6]U 0.6 1.1g.• 1.89 &07 .. 
,\ICCrittrkn1 ,-2 ,., ,•2 ,-2 ,-o ,• I ,•O 
SBC Criterion ,-o ,-o ,• I ,•o ,-o ,•o ,-o 
HOC Criterion ,.o ,-o r-2 ["'2 ,.o ,-o p•O 
Notes: We used the following equation to test for cointegratlon: 
M,=O+ fr,M,_,+nx,_i +s, 
,., 
where X, =(JJ,,e, ,p;} for the PPP and X, =(r,,r,·} for the UIP 
The :1ample periods for each country dlff'er depending on data avallablllty (see appendix figure 
one fordetalls) and r ls the hypothesised number of colntegrating vectors. These values are 
esllmated using the underlying optimal VAR (p) model for each country (the VAR order used 
for Individual countries are reported under each country test resultll analysil), with 
unrestricted interceptll and no trends.The 95% and 90% critical values are in bold-Italics and 
* stands for significance at 95% level while""* Indicate significance at 90% level. 
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Appendix Table 3: 
Johansen's Cointegration Rank Test Statistics for the Simple PPP and UIP Hypotheses 
applied to SADC Countries data over the period 1979 (ml)-2001 (m5) 
'INTERCONTINENTAL APPROACH 
Coantr)· Bouwu• Murillu Nl.llllbb Scl11f1 Ahia S,rulla1d T1nH!. Zlmltl1 Zllllbalnle 95" Oii 
Xesllna Slmplt rre 
Mnimam Eiata' Statbtk 
"· 
H, 
' • 0 '• I 49.0S" 9.19 2S.8' 60.45' 63.84' 24.87' 16.72 63.36' 21.12 
r<= I '•2 9.67 3.85 10.n 23.72' 7.68 lS.88' 10.9 23.99~ 14.88 
r< .. 2 '•3 1.34 02 1.09 S.08 3.87 0.00 1.85 I.II< .07 
Trace S11dstic 
I~ 
"' '. 0 '• I 60.07' IJ.06 37.66• 89.25' 15.4' 40.76• 29.47 .. 88.39' 31.5< 
r<a I ,-2 ll.01 3.87 11.86 28.79' II.SS IS.88'" 12.75 25.03' 17.116 
r<a2 ,_, 1.34 02 1,09 5.08 3.87 0.00 I.BS J.04 .07 
AIC CrHtrloi:i ,-2 ,•o r=2 ,., ,., ,-2 ,-2 ,-2 
SBC Crl!erloa ,• I ,-o ,. , ,-2 ,-1 ,-2 ,•O r=2 
HQC Crltcrlo11 ,-1 ,•O ,-2 ,., r= I T'"'l ,-2 ,-2 
Tutt11 Simple me 
M11hnam Elata' Stallallc 
Ho H, 
'. 0 '• I 9.56 9.33 11.18 10.96 10.94 4.83 3.21 7.68 1'.88 
r <"' I ,•2 7.1 2.78 2.72 8.09'" 6.43 J.26 1.84 2.71 8.07 
Trice Sllllltlc 
"· "' '. 0 '• I 16.67 .. 12.11 13.9 19.05' 17.37"' 6.09 5.06 10.39 17.86 
r<'" I ,-2 1.1 2.1 2.7 8,09' 6.43 1.26 I.SS 2.71 &07 
AIC Crlltrloa ,-2 ,•2 ,-2 ,., ,-2 ,-o ,•O ,-2 
SBC Crllcrl1111 ,-o ,•O ,-o ,-2 ,-o ,-o ,-o ,-o 
HQC CrittdOI ,-2 £" 1 ,-1 r=2 ,-2 r=Q r"O ,-o 
Notes: We used the following equation to test ror colntegration: 
f AX, =8 + r,AX,_1 + IIX,_.1- +s, 
'"1 
where X, =(p,,e,,p;} for the PPP and X, =~1 ,r,•} for the UIP. 
""""' 
19.02 
12.98 
... 
28.78 
15.75 
... 
12.98 
.. 
15.75 
•• 
The specific number or observations for each country, differ depending on data availablllty . 
(see appendix figure one for details) and r Is the hypothesised number of cointegratlng vectors. 
These values are estimated using the underlying optimal VAR (p) model for each country (the 
VAR order used for Individual countries are reported under each country test results 
analysis), with unrestricted Intercepts and no trends The 95% and 90% critical values-are in 
bold-italics and • stands for significance at 95% level while •• indicate significance 3l 90% 
levtl, 
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Appendix Table 4: 
Johansen's Cointegration Rank Test Statistics for the Joint PPP and UIP Hypothesis applied 
to SADC Countries data over the period 1979 (ml) -2001 (mS) 
*INTRA-CONTINENTAL APPROACH 
Conntry Bot1miu Mlurltlus N1mlhla SoutbAfrie:I Swnllalld TIDZllnll Zlmbla Zinl!lllbwt 95% Crit 90%Crlt 
latia11 Co-= JDh11 l!E!J!: 1ad Ille 
Mutmnm Elgen' Stti.tbtlc 
"• H, 
r = 0 r = I 53.45' 26.04 35.00' 66.22' 73.88' 3164 
r< .. I '•2 25.54u 20.3 23.41 29.2' 18.17 17.41 
r<=2 r =J 16.15 15.12 15.46 17.57 ,., 11.11 
r< .. 3 '•4 6.79 4.52 5.83 123.04 4,43 14.88 
r<'"4 '., 2.06 2.18 0.79 4.93 J.63 &07 
Trace St.1tl1tfc 
... •• 
r = 0 '• I 95,69' 68.15" 80.51' 130.95' 107.22' 70.49 
r<=l r>=2 42.24 42.12 45.5 64.74~ JJ.34 4&88 
r<'"2 '_, 24.99 21.82 22.08 35.53• 14.56 31.54 
r<=J r>=4 8.85 6.7 6.62 11.~· 8.06 17.86 
r< .. 4 '. s 2.116 2.18 0.19 4.92 3.63 &07 
AIC Crlkrio11 ,•2 ,., ,., ,., ,•2 
SBC Crflcrioa ,. , ,., ,. , ,. , ,. , 
HQC Criterio11 1•2 ,., ,., ,., ,. , 
Notes: We used the following equation to test for cointegratlon: 
M, =r1AX,_1 -IIX,_2 +C0 +1J10Apo1 +1J11.6po,_1 +s, 
where, X, = IP,, e1 ,p; ,r, ,r,· j, po1 is the logarithm of the world oil price at time I, C0 is a 
vector of intercepts and, t = l, .... ,T,. 
The specific number of observations for each country, differ depending on data availability 
(see appendix figure oRe for details) and r is the hypothesised number of cointegrating vectors. 
These values are estimated using the underlying optimal VAR (2), with unrestricted intercepts 
and no trends In the five I (1) variables. All variables are ased in their natural logarithms. The 
changt in oil price variable is treated as an 1(0) conditioning variable. The 95% and 90% 
critical values are in bol1:Mtallcs and * stands for significance at 95'Y. level while *"' indicate 
significance at 90% level, 
.. 
-
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31.0l 
"·" 19.02
11.98 
., 
... ,, 
45.70 
28.7' 
15.75 
,., 
Appendix Table 5: 
Johansen's Cointegration Rank Test Statistics for the Joint PPP and VIP Hypotheses applied 
to SADC Countries data over the period 1979 (ml)-2001 (mS) 
'INTERCONTINENTAL APPROACH 
Coun!ry Botni,1111 M1mrltl111 Namibia Sollth Arrll.. s,.e11and TIIDWIII Zambia ZlmlMbt 9J" CrlJ 90" 0/J 
:tatiaa Jalnt l!l!l! .ad 1111! 
MHlmum EigeaVIIIUt Statistic 
.. •• 
' - 0 r = I 25.04 14.44 39.26• 53.JS• 42.1s• 53.23• 31.79 50.91• JMS 
r<""l '_, IS.II 11.44 15.49 28,64• 20.85 27.10 .. 26.34 .. 9.72 11.8 
r<"'2 r =3 6.33 11.07 14.9 12.96 9.67 8.83 14.36 5.54 20.47 
True St11i11ic 
.. 
•• 
r = 0 r = I 46.49 36.95 69.65• 94.76• 12.1• 89.17• 72.49• 66.17• 6J.S4 
r<= I ,=2 21.44 22.51 30.39 41.61• 30.52 35.94 40.7• lS.26 40.J1 
r<=2 .~, 6.33 11.07 14.9 12.96 9.61 8.83 14.36 S.54 20."7 
AIC Criterlon r=2 ,-o ,., ,., ,., ,., ,., ,. , 
SBC Crlterloa r=O ,-o r=O ,. , r=O ,. , r= I 
HQC Criterlon ,-o r=O ,. , ,., ,. , r=2 r=2 
Notes: We used the following equation to test for cointegration: 
ll:z, =C0 +(-nyr}+AAx, + fr,Az,_1 +TI,z,_1 +µ, 
/•I 
where Zt = (p, e,p", r, l,po) 
,., 
,. , 
The specific numbP.r of observations for each country, differ depending on data availability 
(see appendix figure one for details) and r ls the hypothesized number of colntegratlog vectors. 
These values are estimated using the underlying optimal VAR (2) model except for Tanzania 
where we used Var (I), with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends. Testing for 
co integration is between the six I (I) variables [p, e, p •, r, l,po] in their natural logarithms for 
the joint PPP and UIP model, and foreign prices, Interest rates and oil prices are treated as 
weakly exogenous. The 95% and 90% critical values are in bold-italics and * stands for 
significance at 95% level while O Indicate significance at 90% level, 
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SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) 
THE ORGANISATION 
1: History 
Born out of the positive experiences of closer cooperation among governments and the 
peoples of Southern Africa, the first Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) was held in Arusha, Tanzania in July 1979. The organization was 
officially formed in Lusaka, Zambia on April I 1980 following the adoption of the Lusaka 
declaration- Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation. Its aim was to harmonize 
development plans and reduce the region's economic dependence on South Africa for rail 
links, air links, port facilities, imports of raw materials and manufactured goods and the 
supply of electric power. The conference, which was attended by delegations from Angola, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia also brought together representatives from 
donor governments and international agencies; the group was later joined by Lesotho, 
Malawi, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, and Namibia became a member in 1990. 
In 1985 a SADCC report noted that since 1980 the region hod become still more dependent 
on South Africa for its trade outlets and the 1986 summit meeting, although it 
recommended the adoption of economic sanctions against South Africa, it failed to 
establish a timetable for doing so. 
By the late 1980s, it hod become apparent to the SADCC policy makers that the existi,,g de 
facto international organization needed a treaty or some legally binding instruments to 
replace the Memorandum of Understanding. So in January 1992 a meeting of SADCC 
council of Ministers approved proposals to transfonn the organization into a fully 
integrated economic community and on August 17, of the same year the Declaration and 
Treaty establishing the SADC (see above) was signed in Windhoek Namibia. The Treaty 
places binding obligations on member countries with the aim of promoting economic 
integration towards a fully developed common market. South Africa subsequently became 
a member of the SADC in August 1994 and so did Mauritius and Seycheles, thus 
strengthening the objective of regional cooperation and economic integration. 
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2: Objectives of the Treaty Establishing the SADC 
The Treaty declares the following objectives: 
1. Deeper and accelerated regional economic cooperation and integration on the basis 
of balance, equality and mutual benefit, providing for cross border investment and 
trade, and free movement of factors of production, goods and services across national 
boundaries; 
ii. To achieve self-sustaining common economic development, evolve political and 
social values, systems and institutions, enhancing of enterprise competitiveness 
democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and human rights, 
popular participation and the alleviation of overall poverty; 
iii. Promote and achieve strengthened complementarity between national and regional 
strategies and programs, regional solidarity, defend peace and security, support the 
socially disadvaotaged aod, improve the standard and quality of life in order for the 
people of Southern Africa to live and work in harmony; and 
iv. Achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the 
environment as well as, strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social 
and cultural affinities and links among the p~9ple of the region. 
To achieve these objectives SADC shall aim to: 
• Harmonize political and socio-economic policies and plans for member states; 
• Mobilize the people of the region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop 
economic, social and cultural ties across the region, and to participate fully in the 
accomplishment of the SADC's projects and programs; 
• Create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilization of requisite 
resources for the implementation of programs and operations for SADC; 
• Develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to free movement 
of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples of the region generally 
among member States; 
• Advance the development of human resources to eradicate human poverty; 
• Promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology; 
• Improve economic management and perfonnance through regional cooperation; 
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• Support the co-ordination and hannonization of the international relations of member 
states; and 
• Secure international understanding, cooperation and support, and mobilize the inflow 
of public and private resources into the region; 
• Develop such other activities as member States may decide in furtherance of the 
objectives ofSADC. 
3: The Treaty 
The Treaty is a legally binding and allooencampassing framework by which countries of the 
region shall coordinate, harmonise and rationalise their policies and strategies for 
sustainable development in all areas of human endeavor. The Treaty comm.its member 
States to fundamentals of, (a) sovereign equality of member States, (b) solidarity, peace 
and security, (c) human rights, democracy and rule of law, and (d) equity balance and 
mutual benefit. Member states are expected to demonstrate their commitment to act in 
accordance with these principles as set out in article four of the treaty. 
Sanctions may be imposed on member states which, 
• Persistently fail without good reason to fulfil obligations assumed under the treaty; 
• Implement policies which, undennine the principles and objectives of SADC 
• Are in arrears for more than one year in the payment of contributions to SADC for 
reasons other than those caused by vis major or other exceptional circumstances. 
4: Organization, Institutions and Structures (as of2000) 
Over the years SADC has managed to establish institutions through which its business is 
conducted, from policy making to administration. 
Summit of Heads of States or Govenunent 
Toe Summit is held annually and is attended by the Heads of State and Government or 
their representatives. It is the supreme policy making organ of the SADC and is 
responsible for the general direction and control of the functions of SADC, including the 
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achievement of its objectives, creation of commissions institutions and committees and the 
appointment of the Executive Secretary and his/her deputy. 
Council of Ministers 
It consists of representatives of SADC member countries at Ministerial level, usually 
responsible for their country's economic planning and/or finance. The Council is 
responsible for overseeing the functioning and development of SADC and ensuring that 
policies are properly implemented. It also advises the Summit on matters of overall policy 
and approves strategies and work programs for the SADC. One of its major tasks is the 
definition of sectoral areas of cooperation and the allocation to member states of 
responsibility for coordinating sectoral activities. The Council meets at least once a year to 
review progress and operations for its subordinate institutions, 
Sectoral Committees and Commissions 
SADC has constituted Commissions and Sectoral committees to guide and coordinate 
cooperation and integration policies and programs in designated sectoral areas. The sectors 
are allocated to individual member states to coordinate and provide leadership. Sectoral 
activities are supervised by, Sectoral Committees of Ministers. 
Sectoral Commissions may be established as and when necessary through a convention or 
other instruments approved by the Summit and ratified by the member states. Commissions 
are regional institutions supported by all member states whereas Sector Coordinating Units 
are part of national governments. 
The current specialized sectoral coordinating offices are: 
i) FOOD AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: The sector's principle 
objectives are regional food security, agricultural development and natural resources 
development. The sector covers seven sub-sectors namely: 
• Agriculture and Natural Research and Training (based in Botswana) 
• Inland Fisheries, Wild Life and Forestry (based in Malawi) 
• Food Security, Agriculture and Natural Resonrces ( based in Zimbabwe) 
• Livestock production and Animal Disease Control (based in Botswana) 
• Environment and Land Management (based in Lesotho) 
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• Marine Fisheries and Resources (based in Namibia) 
• Southern African Center for Cooperation in Agricultural Research -SACCAR 
(based in Botswana) 
ii) ENERGY: (based in Angola): Areas of activity in the energy sector include joint 
petroleum explomtion, training programs for the petroleum sector and studies for 
strategic fuel storage facilities, promotion for the use of coal, development of 
hydroelectric power and the co-ordination of SADC generation and transmission 
capacities and new and renewable sources of energy including pilot projects in 
solar energy, assessment of the environmental and sicio-economic impact of wood-
fuel scarcity and relevant education programs, and energy conservation. 
iii) 
iv) 
TRADE, INDUSTRY and MINING: The sector aims to facilitate regional 
economic integration by the creation of an enabling investment and trade 
environment in SADC countries, the establishment of a single regional market by 
progressively removing barriers to the movement o, goods, services and people 
and, the promotion of cross-border investment and foreign investment in mining. 
The sub sectors are; 
• Industry and Trade (Based in Tanzania) 
• Mining (Based in Zambia) 
• Employment and Labor (based in Zambia) 
HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT: As SADC aims to 
provide the region with skilled manpower in the categories of high level managerial 
personnel, agricultural managers, high and medium level technicians, artisans and 
instructors, the sector aims to harmonize, strengthen and improve education policy 
and training systems. 
v) CULTURE AND INFORMATION (based in Mozambique): The sector is 
expected to emphasize regional and socio-cultural development as part of the process 
of greater integration. 
vi) TOURISM (based in Lesotho): Its objective is to promote tourism within the 
context of national and regional socio-economic development objectives. 
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vii) SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION 
COMMISSION (based in Mozambique): At SADC's inception transport was 
seen as the core area to be developed on the grounds that without the establishment 
of an adequate regional transport and communications system, other areas of co-
operation become impractical. The sector also seeks to identify measures to 
simplify procedures at border crossings throughout Southern A:fiica. 
Standing Committee of Officials 
A Pennanent Secretary or an official of equivalent rank, usually from the Minislty of 
Economic Planning or Finance of each member state makes the standing committee. This 
institution is a technical advisory committee to the council and meets at least once a year. 
National Contact Points 
National contact points are located in the Miltistry responsible for all SADC matters and 
act as a vital link between other agencies of government and SADC organs. Their duties 
include regular consultation with and briefing of relevant government institutions, the 
enterprise community and media on matters relating to SADC. 
Sectoral Contact Points 
All government Ministries with responsibilities for SADC sector(s) are Sectoral Contact 
Points and they work closely with the respective Sector Coordinating Units in the 
preparation of sectoral policies, strategies and formulation of product proposals and 
monitoring of projects. 
Secretariat 
The Secretariat is the Principal executive institution of the SADC and is responsible for 
strategic planning and management of programs of the SADC, the implementation of 
decisions of the Summit and the Council. Headed by the Executive Secretary, who is 
appointed by the Summit, it is also charged with the organization and management of 
SADC meetings, its financial and general administration, as well as representation and 
promotion of the SADC. 
Tribunal 
The tribunal shall be constituted to enslll'e adherence to and enslll'e proper interpretation of 
the provisions of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such 
disputes as may be referred to it. Decisions of the Tribunal are final and binding. The 
SADC tribunal has not yet been constituted. 
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